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   Abstract: 
 
This dissertation argues that, far from being incidental to al-F!r!b"’s 
political theory, the structural correspondence between the corporeal, 
cosmic and civil realms, constitutes one of its central tenets. The first chapter 
demonstrates that, according to al-F!r!b", the universe displays a clear 
hierarchical organization (tart!b). Each one of its elements, whether material 
or immaterial, receives an allotted share (qus"a) of existence (wuj#d), which 
reflects its ontological merit (isti’h$l). As a result, each being in the celestial 
and sublunary realms, is fairly endowed with a proper rank (rutba) and a 
given function: Some elements have a serving role (khidma), while others 
occupy a leading position (ri’$sa). The second chapter shows that the effects 
of this cosmic justice lead to a stratified structure in the human body. Indeed, 
according to al-F!r!b"’s strictly cardiocentric physiology, the heart rules over 
and directs all other subservient corporeal organs. These are, in order of 
importance; the brain, liver, lungs, stomach, spleen, intestines and genitalia. 
The third chapter examines how the structure and institutions of the virtuous 
city (al-mad!na al-f$%ila) exhibit a similar hierarchy. The ideal sovereign 
ranks the polity’s various inhabitants in accordance with their innate or 
providentially endowed dispositions and acquired merit (isti’h$l). As a result, 
the most gifted citizens occupy ruling positions, whereas the less talented 
members of the city are assigned a number of subordinate roles and 
functions. The closing chapter explores how al-F!r!b" frames his influential 
definition of civil science (‘ilm al-madan!) by appealing to this structural 
analogy. Thus, he describes the virtuous kingly craft (mihna malikiyya f$%ila) 
in medical terms by comparing the physician’s ability to heal bodies with the 
supreme ruler’s capacity to govern virtuous cities. Crucially, this allows       
al-F!r!b" to put forward a justification of legitimate political authority based 
exclusively on an agent’s expertise in the virtuous kingly craft, irrespective of 
any other external factor or condition.  
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         Introduction:  
     Divine Providence, Hierarchy and Medicine 
 
“La Providence divine n'est pas un trouble, une anomalie dans 
l'ordre du monde. C'est l'ordre du monde lui-même. Ou plutôt  
c'est le principe ordonnateur de cet univers. C'est la Sagesse 
éternelle, unique, étendue à travers tout l'univers en un réseau 
souverain de relations.”    
 
                                                              Simone Weil, L’Enracinement (1949) 
 
This dissertation examines one of the central aspirations of al-
F!r!b"’s political philosophy; the aspiration to show that there exists an 
important and intimate relationship between the cosmic, corporeal and 
political order (ni&$m). Indeed, al-F!r!b" emphasises in most of his treatises 
that touch on the subject of civil science (‘ilm al-madan!) the fundamental 
nature of this connection. Thus, he speaks in these terms in the Ta'(!l al-
Sa‘$da, announcing that the association of citizens in a city resembles the 
arrangement of the various parts of the universe1. In his Fu(#l Muntaza‘a 
and Kit$b al-Milla, al-F!r!b" repeats this assertion and adds that the 
organization of the city and cosmos also reflects the structure of human 
physiology2. Hence in aphorism twenty-five, different organs are said to 
cooperate and promote bodily health in the same way that citizens mutually 
assist each other to insure their political and ethical flourishing. Similarly, al-
F!r!b"’s biological writings show equal enthusiasm for this parallel. For 
instance, in his Ris$la f! A‘%$’ al-)ayaw$n he reiterates the belief that the 
ideal political order tallies with the physiological and cosmic structures3. 
Finally, this image is vividly present in al-F!r!b"’s magnum opus the Ar$’ Ahl 
                                                
1 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da, in Al-F$r$b!: al-’A‘m$l al-Falsafiyya, ed. J. al-
Y!s"n, D!r al-Man!hil, Beirut 1992, pp. 119-197. 
2 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Fu(#l muntaza’a, ed. F. Najj!r, D!r al-Mashriq, Beirut 1993, pp. 91-
92. 
3 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n in Traité Philosophiques: Al-Kind!, Al-
F$r$b!, Ibn Bajjah, Ibn ‘Addy, ed. A. Badawi, Publication de L’Université de Libye, Benghazi 
1973, pp. 65-115. 
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al-Mad!na al-F$%ila; there he explains that the heart, king and first cause 
play equivalent roles within the body, virtuous city and universe4. 
By focusing on the pervasive use of this analogy, I hope to 
significantly alter the current approach to al-F!r!b"’s political philosophy. 
This well-entrenched interpretative attitude tends to read the Farabian 
contribution to civil science in complete isolation from his biological and 
cosmological output. In fact, according to its leading exponent, al-F!r!b"’s 
entire philosophical opera can be neatly divided into a set of privileged 
sources that contain the Second Master’s authentic teachings and a group of 
more accessible works that present a rhetorically palatable and edulcorated 
version of his insight5. An unwelcome result of this methodological distinction 
is that the biological, metaphysical and cosmological parts of the Farabian 
corpus are unreservedly devalued and neglected in favour of the more 
straightforwardly political sections.  
Thus, Muhsin Mahd" claims that the early chapters of the *r$’ ahl al-
Mad!na al-F$%ila and the Siy$sa al-Madaniyya serve an essentially 
persuasive function and hold no scientific value of any sort. In his opinion, al-
F!r!b" chooses to open his inquiry in this manner because it is on the whole 
more convincing to start a work of prescriptive political analysis by framing 
its social recommendations in pseudo-metaphysical and biological terms6. 
As such, al-F!r!b"’s careful presentation of a hierarchical cosmic order as 
                                                
4 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", On the Perfect State: Mab$di’ +r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, ed. R. 
Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985, pp. 234-237. 
5 The locus classicus of this line of interpretation is found in the introduction of Muhsin 
Mahdi’s revised edition of Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, which has been 
recently re-edited. See, M. Mahd", Alfarabi: Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2001, pp. xxi-xxxv. Of course, the initial impetus given to this 
approach resides in the work of Leo Strauss and notably his famous essay on al-F!r!b"’s 
esoteric reading of Plato, see L. Strauss, Farabi’s Plato in Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, 
American Academy for Jewish Research, New York 1945, pp. 357-393. This hermeneutical 
paradigm is also painstakingly developed in the work of Miriam Galston, see M. Galston, 
Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Alfarabi, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1990.  
6 See, M. Mahd", Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, University of 
Chicago Press, London 2001, pp. 58-60. 
 10 
well as his meticulous description of human physiology are nothing more but 
subtle rhetorical ploys meant to win over the consent of his readers and 
ultimately ensure their passive acquiescence to his wider political agenda7. 
The present investigation seeks to show that precisely the opposite 
view is correct. I argue that far from being a deceptive veil deployed to 
conveniently mask al-F!r!b"’s true political doctrine, his cosmological and 
biological analyses provide the necessary theoretical underpinning upon 
which the edifice of his civil science is erected. A major benefit of this 
position is that it allows us to have, for the first time, a unified and systematic 
vision of al-F!r!b"’s political philosophy. From this perspective, al-F!r!b"’s 
overriding concern is to clarify, rather than obfuscate, the physical and 
cosmological roots of his scientia civilis by furnishing a coherent account of 
human social flourishing within a larger philosophical context.     
To carry out this project it will be helpful to begin our inquiry by 
spelling out how, according to al-F!r!b", the First Being (al-mawj#d al-
’awwal) orders the cosmos. This important question is broached in the 
opening chapter where the Farabian understanding of divine providence is 
contrasted with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ highly influential account of 
pronoia (‘in$ya). As we shall see, al-F!r!b" fully endorses Alexander’s well-
known argument that divine care obtains at the level of species rather than 
that of individuals. However, unlike the Aristotelian commentator, al-F!r!b" 
fits this line of reasoning in a broadly metaphysical and emanationist 
scheme. In particular, he explains that the survival of sublunary species 
depends on the divine attribute of ‘adl or justice8. Al-F!r!b" further signals 
his commitment to this thesis by employing typically revealing language. 
Thus, when discussing the ontological quality of various creatures he 
                                                
7 J. Parens vigorously defends Mahd"’s position in his reading of al-F!r!b"’s Talkh!( Kit$b 
Naw$m!s Afl$"#n, see J. Parens, Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s Summary of Plato’ 
Laws, State University of New York Press, Albany 1995. For an equally vigorous criticism of 
Parens’ argument see, D. Gutas, Farabi’s Knowledge of Plato’ Laws, “International Journal 
of the Classical Tradition” 4, 1998, pp. 405-411. 
8 Ibid., pp. 95-97. 
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consistently speaks of their right ('aqq) to existence and of the relative worth 
or merit (isti’h$l) of their being. Part of the reason for this is that al-F!r!b" 
believes that each entity receives an appropriate share (qus"a) of existence, 
commensurate with its ontological value or rank (rutba) in the universe. 
Naturally, this fair and impartial allocation of being (wuj#d) is related 
to divine creation. Indeed, as being emanates (fay%) from the first cause and 
proceeds via the intellects and the celestial spheres all the way to the 
sublunary world, it is parcelled into smaller and smaller quantities amidst the 
higher and lower elements until it reaches the basest constituent of 
existence: prime matter. Crucially, in the eyes of al-F!r!b", this whole 
process happens in conformity with divine justice (‘adl). In other words, each 
component of the universe receives precisely the share (qus"a) of existence 
(wuj#d) it is entitled to. Accordingly, the wuj#d distributed to the heavenly 
bodies will be more perfect and permanent than the one allotted to transient 
sublunary individuals. A case in point is that of terrestrial beings, such as the 
rational and non-rational animals, which persist and endure only in terms of 
species9.  
For al-F!r!b", the resulting cosmic order displays an unmistakable 
scalar configuration or ranking (tart!b). At the very top of the ladder stands 
the highest and unrivalled principle of the world; the First Being (al-mawj#d 
al-’awwal). Afterwards follow, in increasing levels of imperfection, the 
separate intellects, celestial bodies and sublunary beings. This kind of 
hierarchical thinking is conspicuous in the opening section of the Kit$b al-
Siy$sa al-Madaniyya, where al-F!r!b" describes the composition of the 
world in terms of six levels (mar$tib) of existence10. In the *r$’ Ahl al-Mad!na 
al-F$%ila, the universe is similarly depicted by referring to a carefully layered 
                                                
9 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 145-149, 154-159. 
10 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b al-Siy$sa al-Madaniyya, ed. F. Najj!r, D!r al-Mashreq, Beirut 
1993, pp. 21-22. 
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ranking with clearly discernible ruling and serving elements, which begin with 
the First Being and end in prime matter11. 
The second chapter delineates the process by which al-F!r!b" 
extends the theme of cosmic justice and hierarchy to the nature of human 
physiology. His dispute with Galen concerning the exact location of the 
body’s ruling organ (al-‘u%wu al- ra’!si) helps crystallize many of the 
questions surrounding this issue. The specifics of this controversy are, as 
might be expected, taken up at greater length in the core of this dissertation; 
however, al-F!r!b"’s position can be easily summarized. According to him, 
the heart is undoubtedly the leading physiological organ, as it not only 
contains the seat of the nutritional, sensitive, volitional and rational faculties 
but it also supplies the body with innate heat ('ar$ra ghar!ziyya) and directs 
the development of the foetus from the earliest moment of conception12. 
When fulfilling its commanding role the heart relies on an intricate and inter-
connected system of subordinate organs. Thus, while the body is monitored 
with the assistance of the brain and liver, these subservient members in turn, 
use a set of inferior parts like the stomach, spleen, intestines and genitalia, 
to discharge their functions. At this point and not without a hint of 
satisfaction, al-F!r!b" informs us that this finely graded corporeal structure 
mirrors the just organization of the cosmos13. 
The same kind of stratified architecture, al-F!r!b" insists, 
characterizes the institution of the ideal polity. This sentiment, which is 
closely examined in the third chapter, serves at once to explain the function 
of the perfect ruler and the nature of justice in the virtuous city. Indeed, in a 
pivotal passage al-F!r!b" discusses the work carried out by the city’s 
founding father14. There we are told that the true king is supposed to 
equitably distribute the various political, military, religious, economic and 
                                                
11 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 101-107, 112-113. 
12 Ibid., pp. 184-195. 
13 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 84. 
14 F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniyya cit., pp. 83-84. 
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administrative offices amongst the city’s inhabitants. Importantly, when he 
turns to this task, the perfect prince must insure that each position goes to 
the best-suited candidate. Since, as I hope to make clear, al-F!r!b" believes 
that certain persons are innately better equipped than others to fulfil 
particular roles, this process results in matching each office and function to 
individuals endowed with the appropriate virtues. Consequently, when this 
distribution is justly effected, the residents of the virtuous city occupy ranks 
(rutba) that reflect their merit (isti’h$l) and receive their allotted share (qus"a) 
of goods and honours. Al-F!r!b"’s use of the familiar terminology of rutba, 
isti’h$l and qus"a to describe the arrangement of the city is, of course, no 
mere coincidence. In fact, throughout his treatment of this topic, he 
invariably compares the hierarchy prevalent in the perfect city to the 
stratified order of the universe. This is most conspicuous in his 
pronouncement that the position of the ideal ruler in the virtuous polity is 
equivalent to that of the First Being (al-mawj#d al-’awwal) in the cosmos. In 
the *r$’ Ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, al-F!r!b" rounds off an identical description 
by adding that the perfect king’s function is also similar to the role played by 
the heart15. In this way, al-F!r!b" underlines the continuity between the 
cosmic, bodily and political structures.  
However, in order to translate this vision into a reality al-F!r!b" 
believes that a particular type of royal discipline is necessary; this is what he 
calls the mihna malikiyya f$%ila #l$ or first virtuous kingly craft16. Al-F!r!b"’s 
detailed account of this art reveals a deep and persistent absorption in the 
use of medical language and similes. This attitude comes out quite clearly in 
the opening aphorisms of the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a, where the work of the 
virtuous ruler is repeatedly compared to that of an expert physician17. 
Indeed, the excellent statesman is said to preserve and restore the moral 
                                                
15 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 234-235. 
16 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", I'sa’ al-‘Ul#m, ed. O. Amin, D!r al-Fikr al-‘Arab", Cairo 1948, pp. 103-
104.   
17 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 22-25.   
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and civil health of the polity in the same way that the competent doctor 
preserves and restores the physical health of the body. Al-F!r!b" uses this 
analogy to show that royal practice, just like medical practice, requires 
proficiency in the theoretical and applied elements of a particular discipline. 
One immediate effect of such a position is that political legitimacy is made to 
dependent on a certain kind of expertise. In other words, and here al-F!r!b" 
is adamant, an agent’s civil authority will always be contingent on his 
competence in the mihna malikiyya f$%ila #l$. Concomitantly, the rule of any 
sovereign that is unable or unwilling to master this virtuous craft will be 
deemed illegitimate and vicious18. This is the claim I attempt to substantiate 
in the fourth and ultimate chapter of this dissertation.  
As these observations suggest, al-F!r!b" is able to tie together the 
cosmic, corporeal and political strands of his project by depicting the mihna 
malikiyya f$%ila #l$ in medical terms. One of the upshots of this analogy is 
that the nature of the ideal and non-ideal polities can be easily described in 
strong normative language. The ignorant regimes, along with the values, 
beliefs and institutions they encourage, will be denounced as diseases and 
illnesses; whereas the just polity will be applauded as the incarnation of 










                                                
18 Ibid., pp. 49-50 
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        Chapter One: 
 
                  Divine Providence as Cosmic Justice (‘adl) 
   
In an important passage of the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, al-F!r!b" 
endorses the view that the perpetuation of natural kinds in the sublunary 
realm concerns the species as a whole and is not related to the survival of a 
specific individual19. To illustrate this point, al-F!r!b" appeals to the familiar 
example of animal reproduction. For instance, the continuous existence of 
horses does not depend on the permanent existence of a specific horse (e.g. 
Seabiscuit or Bucephalus) but on the ability of horses to generate new 
individual members of the species. As a result, according to al-F!r!b" one 
can assert that a sublunary species is permanent if “at every moment of time 
there exists a particular individual of that species at some place or other”20. 
The point is rather obvious, however the argument becomes much more 
interesting when one takes into consideration the context in which it 
emerges.  
 Al-F!r!b" resorts to this reasoning in the course of a discussion on the 
providential order of the cosmos. He uses the argument outlined to establish 
the view that the universe is structured to insure the flourishing of sublunary 
life only at the level of species and not that of particulars. Hence, it is 
acceptable to say, according to al-F!r!b", that divine providence ensures the 
continuous existence of sublunary species but it would be incorrect to infer 
from this that the First Being (al-mawj#d al-awwal) cares for specific 
individuals or is involved in the instantiation of particular events21.  
These last remarks make it quite clear that al-F!r!b"’s position on this 
issue is fairly close to the one developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
                                                
19 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 145-149, 154-159. 
20 Ibid., pp. 153-154. Translation slightly modified. 
21 F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniyya cit., pp. 47-48. 
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Indeed, both authors seem to hold the opinion that providence obtains at the 
level of species and not particulars. To clarify this statement, an example 
might be useful. Consider for instance the belief that ‘providence helped 
H!r$n al-Rash"d capture the city of Heraclea in Byzantium’. According to our 
authors this is a mistaken idea. It is incorrect simply because, when divine 
providence affects particular individuals, it does so only in so far as they are 
instantiations of a general form which is common to the species. As a result, 
providence does not affect H!r$n accidentally i.e. as being in a specific 
place, like Heraclea or engaging in a particular activity, such as warfare. It 
only affects him substantially, that is as a member of the human species, for 
example as being two-legged or rational. 
 Al-F!r!b" is clearly committed to this aspect of Alexander’s position 
and this should come as no surprise. As it is well known, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ treatise Peri Pronoias22 played a key role in the framing of the 
debate on divine providence amongst both the members of the Kind"-circle23 
and the Baghdad School 24. In fact and rather tellingly, each group relied on 
its own specific version of the text. A more accurate and complete translation 
of the treatise was used by the Baghdad Peripatetics. No doubt, al-F!r!b" 
had access to this translation as it was produced by his close associate and 
teacher Ab$ Bishr Matt! under the title F! l-‘In$ya. Further, it also seems that 
Ya!y! Ibn ‘Ad", al-F!r!b"’s student, paraphrased at least the early parts of 
the treatise25.  
                                                
22 Alexander’s Peri Pronoias survives only in two Arabic versions both edited and translated 
in German by H.-J. Ruland. See, H.-J. Ruland, Die Arabischen Fassungen von zwei 
Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Diss., Saarbrücken, 1976. There are as well two 
more recent editions and translations in French and Italian by respectively P. Thillet and M. 
Zonta. See, P. Thillet, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Traité de la Providence, Verdier, Paris, 2003. 
S. Fazzo, M. Zonta, Alessandro di Afrodisia: La Provvidenza, questioni sulla provvidenza, 
Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, Milan, 1998.  
23 S. Fazzo, H. Wiesner, Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Kind!-Circle and in Al-Kind!’s 
Cosmology, “Arabic Science and Philosophy”, 3, 1993, pp. 119-153. 
24 Thillet, Traité de la Providence cit., pp. 64-68.  
25 A passage is quoted in Paul Kraus, Jâbir Ibn Hayyân: Contribution à l’histoire des idées 
scientifiques dans l’Islam, Vol. II, Imprimerie de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale , 
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However, despite al-F!r!b"’s familiarity with and obvious sympathy for 
Alexander’s views his own position on divine providence is rather different. 
This is particularly evident within the context of the Baghdad school where a 
striking feature of al-F!r!b"’s argument comes out clearly. Indeed, unlike his 
contemporaries, al-F!r!b" does not use ‘in$ya which is Ab$ Bishr’s preferred 
term for rendering into Arabic Alexander’s pronoia, nor does he resort to 
using tadb!r which is the term favoured by the Kind"-circle. Instead, he tends 
to reserve these two expressions to designate positions held by other 
philosophers and often positions which he views with an unfavourable eye26. 
Instead, when talking about his own view of divine providence, al-F!r!b" is 
generally inclined towards the use of the term ‘adl (justice). 
I believe that this terminological modification is motivated by profound 
philosophical reasons. The conceptual shift from ‘in$ya to ‘adl allows al-
F!r!b" to construct a rigorous and systematic theory of cosmic justice that 
complements the Aristotelian arguments from motion found in Alexander’s 
Peri Pronoias. In this way, al-F!r!b" is still able to retain certain key features 
of Alexander’s position while seamlessly integrating them within his overall 
emanationist metaphysics27. More precisely, by resorting to the notion and 
terminology of ‘adl rather than that of ‘in$ya al-F!r!b" can ultimately connect 
the order of the body, city and cosmos with the justice inherent in divine 
creation. To that end, he needs to demonstrate that the First Being is not 
simply the Unmoved Mover of the universe but also its just creator and 
                                                                                                                                    
Cairo 1942-3, pp.179-180. Cited by Thillet, Traité de la Providence cit., pp. 64-65. The 
passage probably originates from the correspondence between Ibn ‘Ad" and al-Maw%il", one 
of the questions asked by al-Maw%il" concerns providence see, G. Endress, The Works of 
Ya'y$ Ibn ‘Ad!. An Analytical Inventory, Ludwig Reichert, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 97-98. See 
as well, S. Pines, A Tenth Century Philosophical Correspondence, “Proceedings of The 
American Academy for Jewish Research”, 24, 1955, pp.103-136. 
26 For more details see section 5 of this chapter. 
27 On the general Farabian tendency to supplement Aristotelian thought with arguments from 
emanation see, Th.-A. Druart, Al-F$r$b! and Emanationism, in Studies in Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. J. Wippel, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 1987, pp. 
23-43 and M. Rashed, Al-F$r$b!’s Lost Treatise On Changing Beings and the Possibility of a 
Demonstration of the Eternity of the World, “Arabic Sciences and Philosophy” 18, 2008, 
pp.19-58. 
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sustainer. In light of this, it seems best to continue our inquiry by returning to 
our opening remarks and emphasizing this time the differences rather than 
the similarities in the arguments of Alexander and al-F!r!b". 
 
1.1 -Motion and the Two Realms of Providence in Alexander:   
 
Aside from the Peri Pronoias, there are several other sources for 
Alexander’s position on providence, such as his De Fato and De Principiis 
Universi28. Important evidence can also be found in his aporetic essays and 
most notably in Quaestiones 1.25, 2.3, 2.19 and 2.2129.  For the moment I 
will focus on Quaestio 2.19, as it was translated (rather freely) by the Kind"-
circle, it seems probable that it was available as well to the members of the 
Baghdad school. The relevant arguments run this way:       
I- “[a] This [the heavens] is in no need of [some being] to exercise 
providence [over it], having in its own proper nature perfection with respect 
to being and well-being. But as much of [the world] is [b] subject to coming-
to-be and passing away, and needs assistance from something else both for 
being and for the eternity in species [that comes about] through orderly 
change, this is that over which providence is exercised, being governed by 
the orderly movement of the divine part of the world and [its being] in a 
certain relation to it.”30  
 
The first point worth considering appears in section I-[a] and it is the 
statement that providence is not exercised at the level of the celestial 
bodies. According to Alexander, the perfect nature of the heavenly bodies 
                                                
28 R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Fate, Gerald Duckworth & Co., London 
1983. Alexander’s De Principiis survives only in an Arabic version entitled Mab$di’ al-Kull 
see, C. Genequand, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Cosmos, E. J. Brill, Leiden 2001. As 
well as, A. Badaw", ed. Mab$di’ al-Kull, in Aris"# ‘inda’ l-‘Arab, Maktabat al-Nah&a al-
Mi%riyya, Cairo 1947, pp. 253-277. 
29 As Fazzo and Wiesner have shown some of these texts were available to the Kindi-Circle 
see S. Fazzo, H. Wiesner, Kindi-Circle, cit., pp. 126-9. For more details see G. Endress, 
Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer 
Übersetzung, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Beirut 1973.  
30 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 2.16-3.15, trans. R. W. Sharples, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 1994, pp. 63, 21-6. 
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renders the need for any sort of assistance superfluous31. As a 
consequence, it appears that Alexander relates the idea of providence to 
that of help and deficiency. The object of providence must exhibit a kind of 
lack or handicap to derive any benefit from the care it will receive. Differently 
put, for providence to obtain there must be a relation between a proficient 
caretaker and a deficient beneficiary. The same argument is used in the Peri 
Pronoias to distinguish two realms of providence: (1) the realm where it is 
exercised and (2) the realm from where it is exercised32.  
This leads Alexander to conclude in section I-[b] that the imperfect 
sublunary realm is evidently the privileged recipient of providence, whereas 
the celestial world is its provider. What the sublunary world lacks above all is 
the regularity of circular motion. In other words, if left to its own devices the 
sublunary world would be dominated by the natural rectilinear motion of the 
primary elements. And this rectilinear motion if left unchecked would lead to 
the dissolution of natural bodies and their ultimate extinction. Alexander’s 
argument here follows quite faithfully the position exposed by Aristotle in the 
Generation and Corruption 2.10, where heavenly circular movement corrects 
this deficiency.   
In another part of the Peri Pronoias, Alexander goes a step further 
and famously tries to link the existence of sublunary species to celestial 
motion. Alexander builds his case by showing how motion is communicated 
from the heavenly bodies to the sublunary world. 
II- “[a] That power, engendered by the motion of celestial bodies, which is 
imparted [to terrestrial bodies] in one way or another, as we’ve explained, 
[therefore] causes the [latter] to move like the former, in the sense that the 
successive generation of single particulars of the same form affords things 
down here a way to last forever. [b]The effect of that [successivity] is to 
bring out what is universal. For the generation of particulars serves to 
maintain the universal species they have in common. Socrates comes into 
                                                
31 For more details on this issue see, R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Divine 
Providence: Two Problems, “Classical Quarterly”, 32, 1982, pp. 198-211. 
32 Ruland, Alexander von Aphrodisias cit., pp 60-4. 
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being so that there be man[kind]; Achilles’ horse Xanthus comes into being 
so that there be horse[kind]”33   
 
To adequately understand the argument made in section II-[a] a missing 
element must be provided. When Alexander says “as we’ve explained” in the 
second line of the text quoted above, it is unclear what he is exactly alluding 
to. I agree with F.W. Zimmermann’s suggestion that Alexander is probably 
referring to an earlier passage of the Peri Pronoias where he states, in 
typical Aristotelian fashion, that the absence of void in the universe ensures 
that the celestial and sublunary worlds are in contact34. This fact helps 
explain the transmission of circular motion to the realm below the moon. In 
turn, the features of regularity and permanence, which define circular 
motion35, are also passed on to sublunary objects.  
According to Alexander the regularity and permanence of heavenly 
motion is expressed at the terrestrial level by the maintenance of sublunary 
species. The argument in section II-[b] simply speaks of that maintenance as 
an effect of the circular movement of the heavens. But in other parts of the 
Peri Pronoias, Alexander gives additional details. For instance, he explains 
that the motion of certain celestial bodies and specifically that of the sun 
brings about specific recurrent patterns such as seasonal cycles which in 
turn contribute to the well-being and survival of sublunary species36. And in 
different parts of the same work, Alexander talks as well of a certain power 
                                                
33 Ibid., pp. 87-91. Translation by F.W. Zimmerman, slightly modified, in R. Sorabji ed., The 
Philosophy of the Commentators (200-600 AD): A Sourcebook Vol. II, Physics, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2005, pp. 80-81. 
34 Sorabji ed., Commentators cit., p. 80. Also see, Ruland, Alexander von Aphrodisias cit., 
pp. 73-75.  Al-F!r!b" accepts of course, the view that vacuum does not exist. For his 
defense of Aristotle’s position on vacuum see, N. Lugal, A. Sayili, Fârâbî's Article on 
Vacuum, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara 1951. See, as well the useful emendations to 
this text suggested by Jon McGinnis in his entry “Arabic and Islamic Natural Philosophy and 
Natural Science”, in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008, 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-natural/>. Also H. 
Daiber, F$r$b!s Abhandlung über das Vakuum: Quellen und Stellung in der islamischen 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, “Der Islam”, 60, 1983, pp. 37–47. 
35 Cael. 1.4. 
36 Ruland, Alexander von Aphrodisias cit., pp 33-5. 
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being transmitted via circular motion to sublunary beings. It is unclear what 
this power exactly is and what sort of capabilities it is intended to transmit to 
insure the flourishing of sublunary species. At times Alexander equates that 
“divine power” to nature and as a result comes dangerously close to 
reducing providence to the general order of physics37. 
Overall, Alexander’s complex account of providence is at times rather 
tentative especially in its details38. Still, I think that certain essential features 
emerge, and these clearly showcase the importance of motion in 
Alexander’s theory: First, the fact that providence is exercised only at the 
level of the sublunary world by the heavenly bodies; second, the view that 
circular motion communicates itself to the sphere below the moon and thus 
helps the flourishing of sublunary species. 
 
1.2- Divine Providence as Ontological Justice in al-F!r!b":   
 
As noted in the opening paragraphs of this chapter al-F!r!b" 
endorses the argument concerning the survival of sublunary life in terms of 
species. Similarly, he accepts the importance of the role played by the 
celestial elements in their preservation39. This is because, like Alexander, al-
F!r!b" is committed to a broadly Aristotelian physics. However, whereas 
Alexander is happy to frame his theory of providence within the confines of 
physical order and to make it mostly an affair of motion, al-F!r!b" wishes to 
say something rather different; in his case, it is the metaphysical dimension 
of providence that is emphasized. And in section 3, I shall argue that he 
extends the reach of providence beyond the sublunary sphere and into the 
celestial world.  
                                                
37 Ibid, pp. 78-9. Where Alexander states: “Indeed, that divine power, which we also call 
nature, maintains the [terrestrial] existents in their being and structures them according to a 
certain proportion and order”. 
38 See, Sharples, Two Problems cit., pp 198-211. 
39  F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniyya cit., pp. 60-61. 
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But before, I must explain how al-F!r!b" understands divine 
providence as an ontological principle and why he calls this principle justice 
(‘adl). This will come out most clearly in the following set of arguments 
labelled [A] to [D]. In these excerpts al-F!r!b" retains certain elements of 
Alexander’s theory. For instance, providence is still concerned with the 
perpetuation of sublunary life at the level of species; however, al-F!r!b"’s 
reasoning relies on a different line of thought.  
When speaking of sublunary existents in passage [A], al-F!r!b" 
presents these entities as being caught between two rival ontological claims: 
that of their form and that of their matter. By virtue of their form sublunary 
beings have a tendency to endure. On the other hand, by virtue of their 
matter, they are inclined to alteration and change 40. The vocabulary 
employed by al-F!r!b" in the course of this argument is quite revealing.  He 
quickly incorporates within the traditional Aristotelian terminology of form 
((#ra) and matter (m$dda) a kind of talk that relies heavily on the vocabulary 
of justice. Thus, al-F!r!b" speaks of the ontological “right” ('aqq) and “merit” 
(isti’h$l) of sublunary beings. And he adds that these beings have a right to 
their form and a right to their matter and he further associates the 
propensities discussed above to these rights:   
A-“Its [i.e. the sublunary being] right ('aqq) by virtue of its form is to remain 
in the existence which it has, and its right ('aqq) by virtue of its matter is to 
assume another existence contrary to the existence which it has.”41 
 
                                                
40 An important element of al-F!r!b"’s reasoning relates to his view on the existence of 
prime matter, which according to him appears as a result of the various movements of the 
celestial bodies. However, this topic is unfortunately beyond the scope of our present study. 
Whether or not this position is genuinely Aristotelian is very much open to debate, but it is 
clearly that of al-F!r!b", see F!r!b", Perfect State cit., p. 135. For a useful analysis of the 
classical debates on Aristotle and prime matter, see W. Charlton, Aristotle’s Physics: Books 
I and II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992. M. L. Gill, Aristotle on Substance, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1989. M. Rashed, De la Géneration et la Corruption, Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris 2005.  R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their 
Sequel, Cornell University Press, Cornell 1988. M. Scharle, A Synchronic Justification for 
Aristotle’s Commitment to Prime Matter, “Phronesis” 54, 2009, pp. 326-345. 
41 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., p. 145. 
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According to al-F!r!b", a significant dilemma emerges as a result of these 
contradictory inclinations. Indeed, if these opposing claims are not 
reconciled the ontological stability of all sublunary beings is threatened. Take 
for instance an existent “x”: its ability to persist as an “x” will depend on the 
resolution of the rival claims associated with its form and matter. As such the 
problem is directly related to the hylomorphic composition of the object. The 
object will be unable to persist as an “x” if its form is incapable of controlling 
the tendency to change inherent in its matter. In this way, the problem 
seems to be associated mostly with matter. But al-F!r!b" adds a further 
difficulty in section [B]. He continues his exposition along the same lines, 
meaning that he frames the question once again by resorting to the 
vocabulary of justice when discussing ontology. For instance, he will talk of 
the “greater right” and “allotted share” of existence in the argument that 
follows: 
 
B-“For neither of them [i.e. the sublunary being] has a greater right (’awl$) to 
be in existence than the other and neither has a greater right to remain and 
last than the other, since each of them has an allotted share (qus"a) of 
existence and duration”42 
 
In excerpt [B] al-F!r!b" expands the problem, from dealing merely with a 
hylomorphic composite “x” to viewing that composite within the larger 
context of sublunary life. And this is only natural, for the existence of “x” is 
directly related to that of other sublunary beings. Indeed, if a composite “x” 
changes, it will be transformed into another sublunary composite “y”. Thus, 
by broadening his perspective, al-F!r!b" is able to touch on the larger issue 
concerning the survival of sublunary life. I now come to the most interesting 
                                                
42 Ibid., pp. 144-145. This passage should not be construed as meaning that all sublunary 
beings have the same claim to existence or that their forms should subsist in matter for the 
same length of time. As al-F!r!b" indicates in excerpt [K], the share allotted to each 
sublunary existent is related to its rank (rutba), conveniently in the-Siy$sa al-Madaniyya he 
provides a ranking of the sublunary forms: the lowest is that of the four elements, followed 
by that of bodies that are a mixture of these, after minerals, comes in ascending order the 
forms of plants, non-rational animals and rational animals. See, F!r!b", Siy$sa al-
Madaniyya cit., pp. 38. 
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excerpt, which contains al-F!r!b"’s exposition of his understanding of 
providence as ontological justice and which will explain why sublunary 
beings have an allotted share of existence:   
 
C- “Justice (‘adl) herein is, then, that matter be taken from this and given to 
that, or vice versa, and that this takes place in succession. But because 
justice must obtain for these existents, it is not possible that one and the 
same thing should last perpetually as one in number, but its eternal 
permanence is established in its being one in species.”43  
 
Although it might not be readily obvious, al-F!r!b"’s concern in section [C] is 
simply to show that the flourishing of sublunary life depends on the survival 
of the species rather than that of the individual. Even if the conclusion is 
familiar from our discussion of Alexander’s view on providence, al-F!r!b"’s 
line of thought is different. For al-F!r!b", the survival of sublunary life in 
terms of species is a result of justice (‘adl) as well as that of circular 
motion44. This is because justice resolves the rival claims of form and matter 
that al-F!r!b" introduced in excerpt [A] by giving each its allotted share of 
existence. His reasoning seems to be that divine providence qua ‘adl 
adjudicates between the form’s right to permanence and matter’s right to 
alteration by fairly distributing their ontological claims, and in so doing 
providence appears to bring about sublunary species. But how exactly is the 
idea of species a just solution that satisfies both rights?  The argument is in 
fact rather simple: The reason a given form is eternal is not that there is any 
one parcel of matter that eternally has the form, but that the form is always 
instantiated by some parcel of matter or other. In other words, the form is 
eternal as a species. As a result, the right of the form to permanence is 
satisfied and similarly, matter is allowed to change and receive different 
forms at different times. The nature of this process is outlined by al-F!r!b":  
 
                                                
43 Ibid., pp. 147-149. 
44  F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniyya cit., pp. 63-65. 
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D- “In order that a thing remain one in species, the individuals of that 
species must at one time exist and last; then they must perish and other 
individuals of that species must take their place and last for some time; then 
they perish, and the place of the individuals which perish is, again, taken by 
other individuals of that species. And that happens perpetually in this way.”45   
 
Al-F!r!b"’s argument seems to be that the regular process of generation and 
corruption, which allows for the flourishing of sublunary life, is supervenient 
on the deeper mechanism of divine providence. And providence in this case 
is to be understood as a principle of ontological justice that fairly allocates 
the proper “shares” (qus"a) of existence amongst the various beings46. In this 
way, it seems that al-F!r!b" supplements Alexander’s account by furnishing 
a metaphysical rationale to explain why the celestial spheres communicate 
their beneficial effects to lower entities. 
 
1.3-Divine Providence and Circular Motion:   
 
This is not to say that al-F!r!b" rejects the Aristotelian argument 
concerning the favourable influence of heavenly bodies on sublunary life. 
And as a matter of fact, he agrees with Alexander, in viewing permanent 
circular motion, as one of the key features of that influence.  However, unlike 
Alexander, al-F!r!b" believes that providence extends as well to the celestial 
bodies. As I hope to make clear in the next paragraphs, al-F!r!b"’s position 
is that divine providence is also in part responsible for the circular motion of 
the heavenly bodies. This line of thought is developed in the excerpts 
labelled [E] to [I] and once again al-F!r!b" appeals to the notion of 
providence as justice to make his case.  
                                                
45 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., p. 149 
46 I think that part of al-F!r!b"’s argument is that due to its hylomorphic structure sublunary 
life is unlikely to flourish in the following two cases: Case (1), form dominates the 
hylomorphic composite and brings the process of generation to a halt by holding a 
monopoly on matter. Case (2), matter dominates the hylomorphic composite and renders 
the process of corruption all pervasive through constant change. Hence, to remedy these 
possible outcomes, there is a need for a distributive ontological principle like providential 
justice. 
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When speaking of celestial bodies, al-F!r!b" stresses the point that 
their enmattered nature renders them less perfect than immaterial beings, 
and more specifically less perfect than the separate intellects. An important 
mark of that imperfection is that their activity or movement is not defined or 
given from the start. Part of the reason for this according to al-F!r!b" is that 
qua bodies the celestial beings are necessarily in a place. As such their 
movement will depend on the relation they have to their specific place in the 
universe. This place, al-F!r!b" calls a surrounding ('awl), and he defines the 
relation it has with its celestial body in the following way47:   
 
E-“Now, none of the parts of this body deserves (awl$) any part of the 
surrounding more than another-but each part of the body must necessarily 
occupy each part of the surrounding; nor does it deserve (’awl$) one part at 
one moment and not at another, but [each part of the body must occupy] at 
every moment [a part of the surrounding] perpetually.” 
 
Although al-F!r!b" does not directly use the term ‘adl in section [E], it is clear 
that he defines the relation between the celestial body and its surrounding 
place in terms of justice. Thus, he speaks of each part of the heavenly body 
as being equally deserving of each part of the surrounding place. In other 
words, according to al-F!r!b" the relation between the body and its place 
has to exhibit the attribute of justice. However, a difficulty readily emerges: 
how can a body be at two different places at the same time? For it seems 
                                                
47 Al-F!r!b"’s use of this term and his theory of place is still poorly understood, there are of 
course echoes of the Aristotelian view exposed in Physics 4.4. But if, as is generally 
assumed, we are correct in tracing a Farabian influence on this topic to Ibn B!jja’s, then the 
evidence suggests a certain modification of Aristotle’s view. The Farabian position attributed 
to Ibn B!jja is well described by J. McGinnis: “Ibn B!jja begins by slightly modifying 
Aristotle's definition of place; instead of being the first containing limit, place is now identified 
with ‘the proximate surrounding surface.’ The shift in language is slight, but it allows Ibn 
Bajja the opportunity to distinguish between two senses of ‘surrounding surface.’ Things can 
either be surrounded by a concave or convex surface, maintained Ibn B!jja. A rectilinear 
body, that is, a body that undergoes rectilinear motion, has as its place a concave surface 
that is outside of it, whereas a truly spherical body, that is, a body that undergoes circular 
motion or rotation, has as its place a convex surface, which is inside of the rotating body 
and is in fact the surface of the center around which the body rotates.” See, McGinnis, 
Natural Philosophy cit.   
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that this is what justice would require? Al-F!r!b" frames this puzzle for the 
celestial bodies in the following manner:  
 
F-“But it is impossible that two parts of the surrounding should be occupied 
simultaneously by the same part of the body at the same moment.” 
 
The issue presented in [F] is simply that each part of the heavenly body 
cannot be in contact at the same time with each part of the surrounding 
place. However, because all the parts of the surrounding place deserve all 
the parts of the celestial body equally a solution must be found. Thankfully, 
the problem can be easily resolved through movement but more importantly 
for our purposes the solution will define the exact motion of the celestial 
bodies48. Simply put, to respect the conditions introduced in section [E] the 
heavenly body will have to move by rotating in such a way as to distribute 
equally the time each part of the body spends in contact with each part of its 
surrounding place. In this manner, the celestial body will have to rotate at a 
regular interval to insure the just distribution of each one of its parts over its 
surrounding place. And as al-F!r!b" indicates this movement will have to be 
perpetual in order to insure that cosmic justice obtains at all times:    
 
G-“And because the part of the surrounding in which it was is not at one 
moment more worthy of it than at another [moment], it must unceasingly 
proceed from one part of the surrounding to the next.” 
 
                                                
48 I use the word “define” rather than “cause” in this context because it is crucial not to 
confuse al-F!r!b"’s argument here as being about the cause for the movement of the 
heavenly sphere, rather than being about the kind of movement it is. According to al-F!r!b" 
the heavens receive the power to move from the First. Similarly, the argument of circularity 
from providence which I present here should not be construed as denying the validity of 
other arguments equally accepted by al-F!r!b", such as the fact that the heavens are made 
of aether or that circular movement is eternal because it has no opposites. See for instance 
al-F!r!b"’s defence of Aristotle’s view on aether against Philoponus in M. Mahd", The Arabic 
Text of Alfarabi’s Against John the Grammarian, in Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in 
Honor of Aziz. S. Atiya, ed. S. A. Hanna, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1972, pp. 268-284. An English 
translation of this text is also available see, M. Mahd", Alfarabi against Philoponus, “Journal 
of Near Eastern Studies”, 24, 1967, pp. 233-260. See also, M. Rashed, Al-F$r$b!’s Lost 
Treatise On Changing Beings and the Possibility of a Demonstration of the Eternity of the 
World, “Arabic Science and Philosophy”, 18, 2008, pp.19-58. 
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So far al-F!r!b"’s argument is incomplete. Part of the issue is that sections 
[F] and [G] can be interpreted as simply implying a movement of rotation 
rather than that of a full-blown circular motion. In other words, the celestial 
bodies could satisfy the conditions established in [E] by merely rotating on 
their own axis instead of describing a complete revolution around the earth’s 
centre. However, this is not what al-F!r!b" has in mind and he makes it clear 
in excerpts [H] and [I], where he refers to the possibility of place being one in 
species.     
 
H-“When it is not possible that that part of the body should belong all the 
time to that part of the surrounding by being one in number, it will become 
one in species with that part of the surrounding; occupying sometimes one 
part of the surrounding, and sometimes not.” 
 
When talking about a place or a surrounding as being one in species, I 
believe that al-F!r!b" has in mind the idea of a celestial orbit. The 
surroundings are one in species because they share the same essential 
feature; i.e. they are always at an identical distance from a centre. In that 
sense, the celestial bodies do not simply rotate on their axis but describe a 
circular movement around the terrestrial centre. The perimeter of this circle, 
with its given radius, constitutes their place or surrounding in species. As 
such and in order to satisfy the conditions of justice exposed in [E] the 
heavenly bodies will have to perpetually travel within their celestial orbit. In 
this way, each part of the body will be equally in contact with each part of its 
surrounding. Al-F!r!b" presents the movement of the heavenly bodies 
exactly in this manner in the following extract:   
 
I-“Then that part of the body will go on to a part of the surrounding which is 
similar to the first part in species, then leave it too for some time and go on 
to a third part of the surrounding, which is similar to the first part of the 
surrounding. It will leave this too for some time and go on to a fourth part of 
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the surrounding which is similar to the first part. It will have this motion 
forever.”49 
 
This seems to be a good moment to recapitulate our argument; so far we 
have seen that al-F!r!b" is able to retain important elements of Alexander’s 
position without resorting to the same sort of justification. For instance, al-
F!r!b" is able to affirm that providence obtains for species rather than 
particulars at the sublunary level by supplementing the arguments from 
motion with arguments from cosmic justice (‘adl). Similarly, al-F!r!b" is able 
to warrant the circular orbit of celestial bodies on the same basis, in addition 
to the more standard appeals to the perfection of their physical movement or 
to their desire for emulating the First Being50. In the next section, the 
reasons behind al-F!r!b"’s strategy of complementing appeals to physical 
motion as a cause for divine providence with a metaphysical justification will 
become clearer. Appropriately enough, these reasons are made apparent in 
another context where al-F!r!b" deals with a problem inherited from 
Alexander. 
 
1.4- Divine Providence and Emanation:  
 
In the Peri Pronoias, Alexander famously says that while the heavens 
do not exercise providence over the sublunary world in an accidental 
fashion, they do so in a secondary rather than a primary way51. The 
distinction between primary and secondary care is of course an attempt to 
solve a major difficulty concerning the manner in which providence is 
exercised. For if the heavens exercised providence in a primary fashion over 
the sublunary world, it would imply that the terrestrial realm is of greater 
importance than the celestial world, which of course would be absurd. 
                                                
49 For all excerpts E to I see F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp.125-127. All translations are 
slightly modified.  
50 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 118-120. 
51 Ruland, Alexander von Aphrodisias cit., pp 64-70. This point is also discussed in Quaestio 
2.21. See, Sharples, Two Problems cit., pp 204-210. 
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However, if providence were exercised in an accidental manner, it would not 
be providence at all. The importance of this argument has not gone 
unnoticed amongst Arabic philosophers. In fact, Alexander’s reasoning is 
described with great precision in the corpus of works attributed to J!bir ibn 
"ayy!n52.  
 Al-F!r!b" faces the same problem, but in a slightly different form. In 
his case, the question should be phrased in broader terms. Because al-
F!r!b" does not restrict providence to the sublunary realm, the First should 
be understood as exercising justice towards both celestial and sublunary 
beings. The difficulty of course remains the same, in the sense that al-F!r!b" 
cannot have the First Being provide and care for these entities in a direct 
and primary fashion. For, if this were the case, the First Being would have an 
activity and a function that is not self-directed. And as we know, al-F!r!b" 
repeatedly affirms that the First Being has no final end (gh$ya) or purpose 
(ghara%) outside its own substance53. However, we also know that in his 
eyes, the First Being is also the creator of all the other existents54; as such 
these two major features need to be harmonized. Conveniently, al-F!r!b" 
frames his solution to this dilemma in his discussion of the emanative 
process:  
 
J-“Inasmuch as the substance of the First is a substance from which all the 
existents emanate, without neglecting (yukhilla)55 any existence beneath its 
existence, It is generous, and Its generosity is in Its substance” 
                                                
52 Paul Kraus, Jâbir Ibn Hayyân: Contribution à l’histoire des idées scientifiques dans 
l’Islam, Vol. II, Imprimerie de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale , Cairo 1942-3. 
Quoted in Thillet, Traité de la Providence cit., pp. 66-7.  
53 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 57-9 
54 This is the first line of the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila: “The First Existent is the First 
Cause of the existence of all other existents.” See, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., p. 57. 
55 Given the nature of the argument in this context Walzer’s reading “yukhilla” is far superior 
to that of N!dir’s “yukha((a”. For N!dir’s reading see, Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", *r$’ ahl al-
Mad!na al-F$%ila, ed. A. N!dir, D!r al-Mashreq, Beirut 1991, pp. 57-8. Based on N!dir’s text 
the passage would read this way: “Inasmuch as the substance of the First is a substance 
from which all the existents emanate, without being particularized (yukha((a) by any 
existence beneath its existence, It is generous, and Its generosity is in Its substance”. In this 
context, it is hard to make any sense of the way in which the attribute of generosity is 
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 Al-F!r!b"’s use of the expression “without neglecting” (min ghayri an 
yukhilla) is extremely important in this context. Indeed, he has spent the 
better part of the opening chapters of the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila 
arguing against any direct involvement of the First Being in the affairs of the 
sublunary, celestial or even immaterial realms. As a result, this suggestion 
should be taken seriously. All the more so, since it is explicitly framed in 
terms of the First Being’s substance: The lack of neglect towards inferior 
beings is said to be a result of the generosity inherent in its substance. In 
that sense, the exercise of providence derives explicitly from the First 
Being’s relation to itself rather than its relation or solicitude for other 
existents. Al-F!r!b" makes this point particularly clear when he warns the 
reader against a possible anthropomorphic understanding of the attribute of 
generosity as applied to the First. Unlike a human being, al-F!r!b" says, the 
First does not receive or seek any kind of benefit from its generosity. His 
relationship to its creation is not like that of parents to their offspring or that 
of rich man to his wealth56.  But while generosity can account for the First 
Being’s creation of other existents, al-F!r!b" associates another crucial 
element with its substance: justice (‘adl). In point of fact, it is justice that 
explains the care and ordering that other elements derive from the First 
Being:   
   
 K- “And inasmuch as all the existent receive their order of rank from It, and 
each existence receives from the First its allotted share (qus"a) of existence 
in accordance with its rank (rutba), the First is just (adil) and Its justice (‘adl) 
is in its substance [#] The First’s substance is also such that the existents, 
when they have issued from It in their ranks (rutba), are necessarily united, 
connected and ordered (ni&$m) with one another in a way that they become 
one whole and are established like one thing.”57 
 
                                                                                                                                    
related to that of particularity. How could the First be generous in its substance because it is 
not “particularized”? Moreover, I find it equally difficult to understand what being 
“particularized” in its substance means for the First Being.  
56 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., p. 91. 
57 For excerpts J and K see, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 95-7. 
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 In passage [K] al-F!r!b" describes how justice (‘adl) emanates from the 
substance of the First Being. The implications of that process for the 
celestial and sublunary existents are also clearly detailed. Each one of them 
is to receive its allotted share (qus"a) of being (wuj#d) along with its rank 
(rutba) in the order (ni&$m) of existence. This terminology is of course 
familiar from the arguments developed in section 2 and 3 of this chapter. It is 
now easier to appreciate how divine providence is related to the emanation 
of justice from the First Being. Clearly, it is through this process that, for 
instance, each sublunary being is granted its share of existence (qus"a) and, 
as a result, the survival and flourishing of sublunary life in terms of species is 
ensured.     
 Thus, by relating divine providence to emanation al-F!r!b" is able to 
show that the care directed towards celestial and sublunary life does not 
interfere with the First’s self-actualization of its substance. In other words, al-
F!r!b" completely sidesteps the problem confronted by Alexander. And as a 
result, he has no use for a distinction between primary and secondary care. 
This is because divine providence is inherent in the creative process that 
brings about the cosmos. In light of this, it is easier to understand why al-
F!r!b" has avoided framing his theory of providence solely in physical terms 
but has added justice as a reason to explain the favourable effects of 
motion. His objective all along has been to construct a theory of providence 
related to the divine creation of the world. And by making justice, that is the 
providential order of the universe, emanate from the substance of the First 
Being he has successfully and ingeniously reached that goal.   
 
1.5- Divine Providence and the problem of Evil: 
 
  Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to the consistent 
manner in which al-F!r!b" prefers the use of ‘adl to ‘in$ya in his work. An 
excellent example comes up in the Fu(#l muntaza‘a where al-F!r!b" 
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touches on the standard problem of divine providence and the existence of 
evil. The relevant passages are found in aphorisms seventy-four and eighty-
seven, labelled respectively excerpt [L] and [M] in the next paragraphs. This 
is a very interesting philosophical issue, but I will be mostly concerned with 
the terminological side of the question. In [L] al-F!r!b" attempts to refute a 
view of providence commonly associated with Stoicism and most probably 
taken up, as Dunlop suggests, by a number of theologians58. When speaking 
of this position, which he calls the “root of wicked opinions”, al-F!r!b" talks 
about providence in terms of ‘in$ya and tadb!r. However, when al-F!r!b" 
introduces his own views concerning the existence of evil, he speaks of 
providence in term of justice (‘adl). I shall now turn to a brief examination of 
aphorism eighty-seven:  
 
L- “Many persons hold different beliefs about God’s providence (‘in$ya) for 
His creatures, may He be exalted. Some claim that He provides for His 
creatures just as the king provides for his flock and their welfare-without 
becoming directly involved in each one of their affairs, nor without mediation 
between each one [of those] and his associate or his wife. [#] Others are of 
the opinion that that is not enough unless He takes over for them and takes 
upon Himself, on their behalf, the governing (tadb!r) of each one of His 
creatures’ actions and welfare and does not allow anyone of His creatures 
to be in charge of another. Otherwise, these would be His partners and 
aides. From that, it follows that He is responsible for many of the actions 
that are defects, blameworthy things, base things, the error of those who err, 
and obscene speech and deed. And when any one of His creatures is intent 
upon tricking one of His helpers of refuting by means of objection the 
statement of someone who is telling the truth, He would be his aide and the 
One responsible for directing and guiding him. He would drive this person to 
                                                
58 See, D. M. Dunlop, Al-F$r$b!: Fu(#l al-Madan! (“Aphorisms of the Statesman”), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1961, pp. 69. There are clear allusions in this 
excerpt to the doctrine of the Mujbirah such as Jahm Ibn 'afw!n, (ir!r Ibn ‘Amr and 
)usayn Ibn Mu*ammad al-Najj!r. These theologians were known for defending a strong 
determinist position based on a complete denial of human free will. Thus according to Jahm 
and his associates, human beings make no deliberate choices and are said to act only 
metaphorically since their actions are entirely determined by Divine providence. See, J. Van 
Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Ein geschichte des 
religiösen denkens im frühen Islam, vol. 2, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin 1991, pp.496-497, 568-
569. See also, J. Van Ess, ,ir$r b. ‘Amr und die Cahm!ya: Biographie einer vergessenen 
Schule, “Der Islam”, 43, 1967, pp. 241-279. See as well, C. Bouamrane, Le Problème de la 
Liberté Humaine dans la Pensée Musulmane, J. Vrin, Paris 1978, pp. 33-38.   
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fornication, murder, theft, and what is baser than that such as the actions of 
children, drunkards, and mad persons. Now if they deny some of His 
governing (tadb!r) or aiding (‘in$ya) they must deny all of it.”59       
 
The position which al-F!r!b" rejects is the view that divine providence 
extends to all things including particulars. Al-F!r!b"’s refutation focuses 
primarily on the ethical nature of the problem and specifically on the question 
of evil and moral responsibility. Al-F!r!b"’s reasoning is straightforward: if 
divine providence operates and guides all particular events at the sublunary 
level, then it brings about all states of affairs both good and evil. The latter 
ones could be the result of blameworthy acts such as “fornication, murder 
and theft” or of thoughtless deeds, such as the ones carried out by 
“drunkards, madmen and children”. In light of this, divine providence would 
be the direct cause of wrong-doing and evil in the sublunary world. Al-F!r!b" 
concludes, by saying that the partisans of this view have to either accept that 
their position will make God responsible for irrational and wicked actions or 
deny the existence of providence altogether. What is interesting, in this 
passage is al-F!r!b"’s consistent use of the terms ‘in$ya and tadb!r when 
speaking of this interpretation of providence. However, when al-F!r!b" turns 
to his own solution of the problem of evil in aphorism seventy-four, he 
frames his answer by referring to providence as justice (‘adl). As is made 
abundantly clear in section [M], he argues that evil is not caused by 
providence; rather it is human agency which brings about morally 
reprehensible acts. And in presenting his position, al-F!r!b" relies on the 
familiar vocabulary of ‘adl, tart!b, ni&$m, and isti’h$l: 
 
M-“Evil has no absolute existence, nor is it in anything in these worlds, nor 
in general in anything of which existence is not due to human volition [#] As 
for the good in the worlds, it is the First Cause, and everything which is 
consequent on it, and whose being is consequent on what is consequent on 
it, to the end of the chain of consequents. And as a result of this ranking 
                                                
59 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Fu(#l muntaza‘a, ed. F. Najj!r, D!r al-Mashreq, Beirut 1993, pp. 91-
92. There are echoes here of Alexander’s refutation of the Stoic position in the early part of 
the Peri Pronoias. See, Ruland, Alexander von Aphrodisias cit., pp 5-30.  
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(tart!b) how could there be any evil? For all these are according to order 
(ni&$m) and justice (‘adl) with merit (isti’h$l), and what comes to pass from 




1.6- Divine Providence from Motion to Emanation: 
 
To sum up, divine providence, according to al-F!r!b", consists in the 
just cosmic order (ni&$m) which emanates from the First Being. This order 
exhibits a clear scalar structure or ranking (tart!b) where each being’s 
allotted share (qus"a) of existence is distributed fairly according to its 
ontological merit (isti’h$l). In light of this, it seems rather judicious that al-
F!r!b" prefers the use of ‘adl rather than ‘in$ya when speaking of divine 
providence. The change in terminology not only reflects the connection 
between providence qua ‘adl and the process of emanation, but it also nicely 
eliminates the overtones of involved care and deliberation that are 
associated with words such as ‘in$ya and tadb!r.   
At this point, I would like to return to the Peri Pronoias. I believe that 
al-F!r!b" was impressed by the originality of Alexander’s argument, which 
manages to create a via media between the Stoic view that providence 
extends to all things and the Epicurean position which denies providence 
altogether. However, as a good Aristotelian, Alexander develops his 
argument in accordance with the thesis that God is the Unmoved Mover of 
the universe, not its creator. Al-F!r!b"’s greatest achievement is to retain all 
                                                
60 F!r!b", Fu(#l, cit., pp 80-1. Translation Dunlop modified to match Najj!r’s superior edition, 
see D. M. Dunlop, Aphorisms, cit., pp. 59-60. Here it is important to contrast al-F!r!b"’s use 
of the term justice (‘adl) with that of the Mutakallim#n and notably the Mu‘tazilites. Indeed, 
the principle of divine justice was a cornerstone of Mu’tazilite theological doctrine and for 
this reason they were also known as the “people of justice” (Ahl al-‘Adl or ‘Adliyya). 
However, their concern with this issue was entirely related to the problem of human agency 
and divine retribution rather than cosmogony. To speak of God’s justice (‘adl), meant, in 
Mu‘tazilite terms, that human beings would be punished only if they were responsible for 
their actions. See, W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh 1973, pp. 231-242. 
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the benefits associated with Alexander’s via media while developing his 
position on providence around the notion of God as creator. In that sense, 
al-F!r!b"’s argument represents a significant step in the Ancient 
Commentators’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s God61 from simple mover of the 
universe to its maker and sustainer.62 To carry out this project more fully, 
and to show that the structure of the cosmos tallies with that of the body and 
ultimately with that of the city as well, al-F!r!b" will have to ascertain his 
understanding of divine providence at the corporeal level against Galen’s 
remarkably influential account of human physiology. In the second chapter, 
we will examine how al-F!r!b" successfully responds to this challenge by 
defending a specific form of stratified cardiocentrism. 
                                           
 




                                                
61 See, R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, cit., pp. 249-285 and R.W. Sharples, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and the End of Aristotelian Theology, in Metaphysik und Religion: 
Zur Signatur des Spätantiken Denkens, ed. M. Erler, T. Kobusch, K.G Saur Verlag, Munich 
2002, pp. 1-21.  
62 There is another lesson that can be drawn from our analysis of al-F!r!b"’s position on 
providence and it concerns the authorship of the Harmonization of the Two Sages. In a 
recent article Marwan Rashed has called into question the inclusion of this important treatise 
in the Farabian corpus. Rashed follows the lead of Joep Lameer on this topic and touches 
on a series of arguments. One of these arguments deals specifically with al-F!r!b"’s view on 
providence. The author of the Harmonization defends a universal providence which extends 
to particulars. In view of our findings here, the position exposed in the Harmonization seems 
incompatible with al-F!r!b"’s understanding of providence as justice.  See, J. Lameer, Al-
F$r$b! and Aristotelian Syllogistic: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice, E.J. Brill, Leiden 
1994.  M. Rashed, On the Authorship of the Treatise of the Harmonization of the Opinion of 
the Two Sages Attributed to Al-F$r$b!, “Arabic Sciences and Philosophy” , 19, 2009, pp. 43-
82. However, C. M. Bonadeo and more recently D. Janos have both argued against M. 
Rashed’s position see, C. M. Bonadeo, Al-Fârâbî: L’Armonia delle opinion dei due sapienti, 
il divino Platone e Aristotele, Edizioni Plus, Pisa 2008, pp.  28-30 and D. Janos, Al-F$r$b!, 
Creation ex nihilo and the Cosmological Doctrine of the K. al-Jam‘ and Jaw$b$t, “Journal of 




        Chapter Two: 
                     Cardiocentrism and Hierarchy in the Human Body 
  
 
In his Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n63, al-F!r!b" presents a series of 
arguments in defence of Aristotelian physiology and embryology against the 
criticism introduced by Galen in the De Usu Partium VIII, 2-5 (hereafter De 
Usu). Galen’s major complaint in these passages64 concerns Aristotle’s 
alleged misunderstanding of the brain’s proper function. Instead of seeing 
the brain as the seat of the nervous system, Aristotle attributes to the 
encephalon a thermo-regulating role; its function is to cool the excessive 
heat that is generated by the heart65. This dispute is of course related to the 
classical debate in Ancient and Medieval philosophy over the appropriate 
bodily site of the soul’s ruling principle or hegemonikon (‘u%wu al- ra’!si). Is 
the hegemonikon located in the brain or is it rather found in the heart? 
Aristotelians and Stoics tended to espouse a cardiocentric view, whereas 
certain Platonist and a number of physicians, such as Erasistratus and 
Galen defended an encephalocentric position66.  
                                                
63 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n, in Traité Philosophiques: Al-Kind!, Al-
F$r$b!, Ibn Bajjah, Ibn ‘Adyy, ed.  A. Badawi, Publication de L’Université de Libye, Benghazi 
1973, pp. 65-115.  
64 Galen, De Usu Partium Libri XVII, vol. I, ed. G. Helmreich, Teubner, Leipzig 1907, pp. 
445-61. English translation by M. T. May, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, vol. I, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1968, pp. 387-98. The Arabic translation of the De Usu was 
produced by the joint efforts of )ubaysh Ibn al-)asan and his more famous uncle )unayn 
Ibn Is'$q under the title Ris$la f! man$fi‘ al- a‘%$’. For more details on how the translation 
was carried out see )unayn Ibn Is*!q’s letter to Ibn Ya*ya in G. Bergsträsser, )unayn ibn 
Ish$q über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen, zum ersten mal 
herausgegeben und übersetzt, F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1925, pp. 27-29. At the moment 
only the sixteenth book of the Arabic version of the De Usu is available in a critical edition. 
See, E. Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves, Veins and Arteries: A critical edition and 
translation from the Arabic, with notes, glossary and an introductory essay, Diss., University 
of Wisconsin-Madison 1969. 
65 Arist., PA., II, 653 a 10- b 5  
66 For a helpful overview of the debate see, J. Rocca Galen on the Brain: Anatomical 
Knowledge and Physiological Speculation in the Second Century A.D., E. J. Brill, Leiden 
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Naturally, the debate became particularly acute when discussing the 
respective roles of the brain and the heart. As a result, Aristotle’s view that 
the brain served to refrigerate the warmth exuded by the heart was 
staunchly opposed by Galen and just as strongly defended by al-F!r!b". 
After all, the argument is central to cardiocentric claims: if the brain has a 
thermo-regulating role then it is obviously subservient and secondary to the 
heart’s heating function. Al-F!r!b"’s version of cardiocentrism, which is 
introduced in the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila relies heavily on this argument 
to develop a hierarchical vision of human physiology67. Thus, according to 
al-F!r!b", the bodily organs are structured in terms of a strict functional 
ranking (tart!b) where the regent position of the heart is followed by the 
subordinate roles of the brain, liver, spleen and finally the reproductive 
organs68. But why does al-F!r!b" insist on such a stratified version of 
cardiocentrism? 
A brief overview of Galen’s counter-argument will give us a hint. 
According to Galen, Nature or the Demiurge69 would not have placed the 
encephalon in the head if it had a thermo-regulating role. Rather, the brain 
                                                                                                                                    
2003, pp. 17-46. Another succinct and magisterial presentation of the problem can be found 
in V. Nutton, Essay Review: Embodiment of Wills, “Perspectives in Biology and Medicine”, 
53, 2010, pp. 271-288. On the debate in the Islamic context see, G. Strohmaier, Reception 
and Tradition: Medicine in the Byzantine and Arabic world in Western Medical Thought from 
Antiquity to the Middle Ages ed. M. D. Grmek, trans. A. Shuggar, Harvard University Press, 
Boston 1998, pp. 139-70. On the political ramification of this problem in the Medieval Latin 
milieu see, J. Le Goff, Head or Heart? The Political Use of the Body Metaphor in the Middle 
Ages, in Fragments for a History of the Human Body, vol. 3, ed. M. Feher, Zone Books, New 
York 1989, pp. 13-26. See also, T. Shogimen, Head or Heart? Revisited: Physiology and 
Political Thought in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century, “History of Political Thought”, 28, 
2007, pp. 208-229. 
67 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 175-87 
68 Ibid., pp. 182-83.  
69 Galen uses both terms interchangeably in the De Usu. Nature (phusis) is often personified 
and has skill, forethought and intent. In the Arabic translation, when “phusis” is used in a 
personified way, it will generally be translated as the “Creator” (al-f$‘il) and sometimes as 
the “Created order” (al-khal!qa). To underline this point, I shall capitalize all Galenic 
reference to a personified “phusis” as Nature. See, Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves cit., pp 
202. For a discussion of Galen’s provident and skillful creative figure see, R. Flemming, 
Demiurge and Emperor in Galen’s World of Knowledge, in Galen and the World of 
Knowledge, eds. C. Gill, T. Whitmarsh, J. Wilkins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2009, pp. 59-84. 
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would have been positioned closer to the heart to easily cool it down70. The 
structure of Galen’s argument is revealing, he presupposes that the 
usefulness (chreia) of each organ fits within a much larger design. The 
organ’s function and location are ideally matched by the foresight and craft 
of a benevolent Demiurge71. In this light, the inadequacy of the cardiocentric 
view, for Galen, becomes evident. The role of the encephalon is obviously 
misconstrued, since its supposed “cooling” function does not correspond to 
its actual location.     
It is noteworthy that by appealing to the role of the Demiurge in the 
construction of the human body, Galen chooses to argue from the nature of 
providence to solve an issue related to the location of the hegemonikon72. It 
is my suggestion that Galen’s shift of perspective from physiology to 
providence prompts al-F!r!b" to follow his lead when constructing his 
answer. It is unlikely, however, that Galen’s argument from design will 
appear convincing to al-F!r!b". The latter, as we have seen, believes that 
the activity of God is always self-oriented and the idea that this activity might 
include the direct design of sublunary bodies seems incongruous.  
                                                
70 Galen suggests that the ideal location for the encephalon to fulfill a thermo-regulating is 
the thorax or the immediate vicinity of the heart, just by the lungs. May, On the Usefulness 
of the Parts cit., vol. I, pp. 387-88.   
71 This position is defended extensively in the De Usu and the De Placitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis (PHP). See, May, On the Usefulness of the Parts cit., vol. II, pp. 724-37 and Galen, 
De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, vol. I, ed. P. De Lacy, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1978, pp. 
589-99. On the Arabic version of the PHP see De Lacy’s introduction pp. 42-46. 
72 It is important to note that the dispute over the location of the hegemonikon had several 
strands, the most significant related to the soul-body problem. The majority of Galen’s 
polemics against the Stoics (notably Chrysippus) and the Aristotelians deal with this topic. 
On Chrysippus see, T. Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul, E. J. Brill, Leiden 
1996, and R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian 
Temptation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, pp. 29-55, 93-121. In a similar vein, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ arguments in favour of cardiocentrism in his De Anima are related 
to a more general defence of the Aristotelian position on the soul-body problem against 
Stoic and Galenic opposition. See, A. P. Fotinis. The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias: 
A translation and Commentary, University Press of America, Washington 1979. R. W. 
Sharples, On body, Soul and generation in Alexander of Aphrodisias, “Apeiron”, 27, 1994, 
pp. 163-70. There is considerably less work done on the topic of providence and the 
location of the hegemonikon. 
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However, al-F!r!b" is not opposed to the thesis that providence plays 
a significant role at the biological level; rather, he offers an alternative 
answer which starts from his position on the topic and leads seamlessly to 
his hierarchical cardiocentrism. Thus, we know that for al-F!r!b", Divine 
providence obtains at the celestial and sublunary levels. We have also seen 
that a main feature of providence as justice is rank ordering or tart!b. For al-
F!r!b", the cosmos is structured or ordered (ni&$m) by emanating from the 
First in a scalar fashion. It seems natural in this context that the feature of 
hierarchy would lead al-F!r!b" to adopt and develop a rigorously stratified 
form of cardiocentrism. The human body, by being related to the process of 
emanation, displays a just and providential constitution, one that is 
exemplified by the rule (ri‘$sat) of the heart over each one of the subsidiary 
organs73. From this perspective, a defense of the subservient thermo-
regulating role of the brain seems appropriate. It is simply a way for al-
F!r!b" to show that his view of providence as justice is compatible with the 
structure of human physiology. 
 
2.1- From Hippocratic to Galenic Justice: 
 
It is important to note, however that al-F!r!b"’s reception of Galen’s 
work is not entirely negative. He accepts, with certain restrictions, Galen’s 
broad recasting of Hippocrates’ famous reference to justice in the De 
Fracturis74. In this treatise, the allusion to justice, as E. Savage-Smith rightly 
points out75, is intended in a very specific sense. The Hippocratic author 
                                                
73 For al-F!r!b"’s description of the structural analogy between the order of the cosmos, the 
order of the body see, F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp 82-85. F!r!b", Perfect State 
cit., pp. 231-37. In both cases, the city constitutes the third term of the analogy.  
74 Hippocrates, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. III, ed. E. Littré, J.B Baillére, Paris 1839-61, pp. 
412-15. Bibliographical evidence indicates that an Arabic translation was produced see, F. 
Rosenthal, An Eleventh-Century List of the Works of Hippocrates, “Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences”, 28, 2, 1973, pp. 156-165. 
75 Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves cit., pp. 196-97. 
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employs this term to indicate the most appropriate or suitable setting to 
mend a fractured bone: 
“In dislocation and fractures, the practitioner should make extensions in as   
straight a line as possible, for this is most just with nature; but if it inclines at  
all to either side,it should turn towards pronation rather than supination for  
the error is less.”76 
  
However, throughout the De Usu, Galen makes use of this reference to 
substantiate the much wider claim that divine providence obtains at the 
physiological level. For instance, in the following excerpts, the “just” 
distribution of nerves, veins and arteries throughout the human body is taken 
to be a hallmark of demiurgic design.  
 
I-“(a) I shall develop my discussion around the principle which I 
have stated in other treatises: that the nerves originate and spring 
from the brain, the arteries from the heart and the veins from the 
liver. It is necessary that all three of these instruments be distributed 
and dispersed throughout the entire body. So give me your attention 
and consider my description of their nature and the justness and 
equity of their distribution [#]. (b) Accordingly, large portions have 
been made to reach some parts and small portions others, and this 
is the case throughout the whole body. Therefore, since this is so, 
Hippocrates spoke the truth and deserves praise for the justice 
(‘adl) and equity (in($f) by which he characterized Nature. (c) 
Furthermore, since these instruments are apportioned according to 
justice (‘adl) and equity (in($f), in addition to which, as I have 
mentioned, they reach every part of the body safely, in good 
condition and having suffered no harm, we are compelled to 
characterize Nature not only by justice (‘adl) and equity (in($f), but 
also by evident skill, wisdom ('ikma) and subtlety.”77    
 
Interestingly, at I-(a), Galen links the just distribution of nerves, arteries and 
veins with the tri-partition of the soul. A key feature of the physiological 
dissemination of these channels is that each one of them originates from a 
                                                
76 Translations slightly modified, see E. T. Withington, Hippocrates Vol. III: On Wounds in 
the Head. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1957. pp. 95-96. For the various 
interpretative strategies adopted by Galen when commenting on Hippocrates see, G. E. R. 
Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1991, pp. 398-416. 
77 Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves cit., pp. 56-57, pp. 107-08. (The first set of numbers 
refers to the Arabic version, the second to Savage-Smith’s translation).  
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specific organ. The nerves stem from the encephalon, the veins issue from 
the liver and the arteries from the heart. Of course, each organ fulfills a 
specific function and uses the nerves, veins and arteries as instruments to 
carry out its purpose. Hence, the spinal medulla grows out of the brain and 
supplies nerves to the bodily parts below the head, but it supplies only those 
parts which can be useful to motion or sensation78. As a result, nerves are 
not found in organic components that do not play this role such as bones or 
cartilage. In this respect, it is the perfect fit between function or usefulness 
(chreia) and distribution that allows Galen to associate the idea of justice to 
that of demiurgic design or wisdom (!ikma) at I-(c) 79. The argument is 
developed in a painstakingly detailed fashion in the rest of De Usu XVI, 2-8 
where Galen demonstrates how each nerve is perfectly allocated and serves 
a specific purpose (e.g. the optic, olfactory and auricular nerves).    
 In the same chapter, Galen uses a telling political or civil simile, which 
summarizes his point and brings it into sharp relief. The just distribution of 
nerves, arteries and veins throughout the body is compared to the 
sophisticated networks of aqueducts, reservoirs and conduits that insure the 
appropriate delivery of water to an urban population80. In this context, Galen 
suggests, at II-(a) that the idea of a just distribution goes hand in hand with 
that of skill and forethought. In other words, the optimal dispensation of a 
city’s water supply depends on the expertise of those administrating its 
hydraulic networks in the same way that the just distribution of nerves, veins 
and arteries in the body depends on the skill and foresight of the Demiurge. 
This kind of reasoning is typical of Galen and his reliance on the analogy 
                                                
78 Ibid., pp. 58-59, pp. 111-12. 
79 As used by Galen, “chreia” can mean purpose, utility, function or advantage. For a 
functionalist interpretation of “chreia” see, M. Shiefsky, Galen’s Teleology and Functional 
Explanation, “Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy”, 33, 2007, pp. 369-400. In )unayn’s 
version “chreia” is consistently translated by “manfi’a”, see Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves 
cit., pp.43-45. 
80 On Roman hydraulics see, H. B. Evans, Water Distribution in Ancient Rome, University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI 1994. 
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between human craft and demiurgic design is well-documented81. 
Interestingly in this case, he associates expertise in the craft of civil 
administration to the application or practice of a specific kind of justice. 
 
II-“In a similar way those people knowledgeable in the administration (tadb!r) 
and public service of towns operate their apportionment and allotment of the 
town’s water supply in accordance with the best interest of the townspeople. 
For they make the stream as it comes from the spring in a large river and 
channel it, occasionally diverting some water to other places before it 
reaches the town. Then when the water reaches the town, they distribute it 
throughout the entire city (mad!na) so that no district may lack a channel 
with a sufficient quantity of water flowing in it. (a) Now, the most 
praiseworthy of those performing this service for us is he who not only 
provides running water throughout the whole city, but also distributes and 
allots the supply with justice (‘adl) and fairness. In the same way, we realize 
that these three instruments [viz. nerves, veins and arteries] are justly and 
fairly distributed and dispersed in the body as part of the work of Nature, 
then we must praise Nature and praise its Creator. 
     Now justice (‘adl) and fairness are in a category of having two 
subdivisions, one of which the common public (‘aw$mm) knows, and the 
other known only to the wise and thoughtful; and we found that Nature 
preferred and elected the wisest of these two aspects. In view of this we 
must praise Nature even more.(b) If you wish to know the meaning of this 
aspect of justice (‘adl), then you must refer to Plato and understand his 
statement in which he says that he who is ruling justly and is expert in 
administration (mudabbiran) ought to settle things according to merit 
(isti'q$q). (c) In the same way, when water is distributed in a city, it is not 
apportioned to all its districts in equal volume or weight, but rather the share 
sent to the public baths ('amm$m$t) and to places of worship (‘ib$dat) and 
prayer ((alaw$t) is greater than the one sent to other places, or the portion 
allotted to homes in the streets, and markets and to private baths.”82  
 
                                                
81 The occurrences of the analogy in the De Usu are far too numerous to be exhaustively 
catalogued. However, the analogy plays a significant role in De Usu, XVII, where Galen 
presents his teleological proof of God’s existence. See, May, On the Usefulness of the Parts 
cit., vol. II, pp. 731-35. In the PHP, Galen puts the analogy to a similar use and introduces it 
almost in an axiomatic fashion: “Therefore, just as we form judgments about human 
molders, so we must also about the divine, and we must wonder about the craftsman who 
fashioned our body, whichever god he is. If because we do not see him we say that he does 
not exist, we shall no longer be preserving the similarity with judgments in the arts; there we 
did not make our judgment of the art depend on our seeing the person who has fitted 
together the ship or the couch, neglecting to look at the use of each part, but we made the 
latter inspection the crucial one”. See Galen, PHP, vol. II, cit., pp. 597.  
82 Savage-Smith, Galen on Nerves cit., pp. pp. 57-58, pp. 109-10. Translation slightly 
modified.  
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Clearly, part of the analogy’s attraction for Galen resides as well in its ability 
to highlight the agreement between Platonic and Hippocratic forms of justice. 
Hence at II-(b), Galen explains that Nature’s optimal dissemination of neural 
and cardiovascular pathways in the body exemplifies Plato’s comments in 
the Laws VI, 757 b-c. In this passage the Athenian stranger, the dialogue’s 
leading protagonist, initially distinguishes between numerical and 
proportional justice before concluding that the latter is preferable. His 
reasoning is fairly simple, unlike a straightforward numerical distribution, 
which gives equal shares to every individual; a proportional allotment takes 
into consideration the relative merit of each person. To paraphrase the 
Platonic recommendation: It is best to distribute more to what is greater and 
give smaller amounts to what is lesser and in this way preserve due 
proportion (isonomia) 83. 
 In physiological terms, it means that the quantity of nerves, arteries 
and veins reaching the members of the body is not identical for all parts. 
Rather the exact number of nerves, veins and arteries allocated to each 
organ will depend on its specific needs and function. For instance, the 
amount of veins located in the bones of the ribcage, such as the scapula or 
the sternum, will seem trivial when compared to the quantity going to the 
lungs. The reasons for this are evident. According to Galen, the bones, 
because they are hard and without motion, require less nourishment than 
the lungs, which are moist and in constant activity84. Of course, the same 
reasoning is mirrored in the city’s water system. Hence, proportional justice 
requires, at II- (c), that the quantity of water distributed to public and sacred 
places should be superior to the amount going to domestic or private 
quarters.  
                                                
83 Plato, Laws, 757 b-c. For the translation see, Plato, Complete Works, ed. J. Cooper, 
Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis 1997, pp. 1433. Al-F!r!b" discusses this passage very 
briefly in his paraphrase of the Laws see, Th.-A. Druart, Le Sommaire du Livre des “Lois” de 
Platon, in “Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales” 50. 1998, pp. 144-145. 
84 Ibid., 103-04, pp. 190-91. May, On the Usefulness of the Parts cit., vol. II, pp. 722-23. 
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As Armelle Debru aptly remarks, the connection made between the 
idea of just distribution or isonomia and the physiological organization of the 
body had become, by the Hellenistic period, a communis opinio shared by 
many philosophers and physicians85. However, what is interesting is that 
Galen has managed to draw on this received sentiment to advance specific 
elements of his Hippocratic and Platonic agenda. In fact, he has succeeded 
in adroitly tying together the notions of Demiurgic design, Natural justice and 
tri-partition. Partly, this helps explain why the influence of Galen’s account 
was not limited to human anatomy or medicine. The De Usu specifically had 
a major impact on medieval philosophical and theological debates over the 
nature of creation and divine providence86. And although al-F!r!b" is clearly 
sympathetic towards Galen’s attempts to argue that justice obtains at the 
level of the human body, he is less impressed by the encephalocentric and 
tri-partite tenor of the entire project.  
 
2.2- Ri’$sa and Khidma in the Farabian Body: 
 
Al-F!r!b"’s resistance to Galen’s vision is of course related to his 
commitment to Aristotelian physiology, embryology and psychology as 
presented in the De Partibus Animalium III, 4 the De Generatione Animalium 
II, 4 and the De Anima II and III. However, al-F!r!b" does not rely 
exclusively on standard Peripatetic positions to develop his argument. This is 
all the more interesting, as many commentators defending cardiocentrism 
generally adopted a more conventional approach. This attitude is famously 
                                                
85 A. Debru, Le Corps Respirant: La Pensée Physiologique chez Galien, E.J. Brill, Leiden 
1996, pp. 164-65. 
86 A famous example where both concerns are merged appears in Galen’s discussion of the 
length of eyelashes, which leads him to an analysis of Biblical creation and Divine 
providence. Galen’s analysis of Mosaic cosmogony gave rise to a larger debate. See, May, 
On the Usefulness of the Parts, cit., vol. II, pp. 532-33. R. Walzer, Galen on Jews and 
Christians, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1949. Maimonides, Medical Aphorisms Treatise 
6-9, ed. G. Bos, Brigham Young University Press, Provo 2007. Galen’s position on 
creationism is ambiguous; as David Sedley indicates, he exploits the tradition of pagan 
Creationism but he is at the same time non-committal. See, D. Sedley, Creationism cit., pp. 
238-44.  
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epitomized by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the closing section of his treatise 
on the De Anima87. In this chapter, Alexander makes a series of claims to 
defend the importance of the heart in human physiology88. Many of them are 
directly inspired by Aristotle’s biological writings. For instance, Alexander 
repeats the view that because nature places the most honorable part in the 
most honorable position, the heart’s location in the center of the body 
explains its pre-eminence89. Similarly, Aristotle’s embryological proof that the 
heart is the principle of movement because it is the source of heat plays a 
key role in Alexander’s reasoning90. While al-F!r!b" accepts and deploys 
many of these arguments, he builds his case against Galen by providing an 
interpretation of Aristotle’s cardiocentrism that specifically focuses on the 
significance of hierarchical stratification (tart!b) amongst the ruling (ra’!siyya) 
and serving (kh$dima) organs of the human body.  
To make this line of reasoning more explicit, it might be helpful to turn 
to a concrete example of its use in the Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n. In the 
following excerpt, al-F!r!b" correctly traces Galen’s position on the soul to 
Plato’s Timaeus 69 b-71 e. However, more relevant to our immediate 
concerns, is the way al-F!r!b" contrasts the Platonic tri-partition of the soul 
with Aristotle’s stratified cardiocentrism:  
 
 [A]-“(1) And both Timaeus and Plato believe that there are three kinds of 
rule (ri’$s$t) located in three organs and these are: the encephalon, the 
heart and the liver. And according to them, the spirited part is located in the 
heart, and the rational part is found in the encephalon. The sensitive faculty 
(al-juz’ al-'ass$s al-‘awwal) is also found in the brain along with that part of 
the soul which causes volitional movement (al-'araka al-ir$diyya) in 
animals. (2) These different forms of governing are not stratified (tartaq!) 
under the command of a single originating organ, but each governs what 
                                                
87 I. Bruns, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Praeter commentaria scripta minora, G. Reimer, Berlin 
1887, pp. 94-100. See as well, A. P. Fotinis, De Anima of Alexander, cit., pp. 125-136. 
88 See, P.-M. Morel, Cardiocentrisme et antiplatonisme chez Aristote et Alexandre 
d’Aphrodise, in Plato, Aristotle or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and Aristotelianism in 
Antiquity, eds. T. Bénatouïl, E. Maffi and F. Trabattoni, George Olms, Hildesheim 2011, pp. 
63-84. 
89 Ibid., pp. 95-96. Arist., PA., IV, 665 b 20.  
90 Arist. GA., II, VI, 742 b 20- 743 b 30.  
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comes under its rule in a separate way (munfarid#n) determining the actions 
of its members independently. (3) But Aristotle believes that the ruling parts 
(al-’ajz$’ al-ra’!sa) of the soul and its faculties are all located in the heart 
(qalb). And he believes that the nutritive and appetitive parts, as well as the 
rational part, the common sense (al-juz’ al-'ass$s al-‘awwal) and that part of 
the soul which causes volitional movement in animals are in the heart. (4) 
He also believes that the encephalon serves (yakhdamu) the heart and rules 
(yar’usu) other organs, and the liver also serves the heart and rules many 
other organs.”91 
 
First, it is important to note that al-F!r!b" gives an encephalocentric 
interpretation of Plato’s position by inaccurately stating that in the Timaeus 
the brain is said to contain the rational, volitional and sensitive faculties. In 
fact, Plato does not locate sense-perception in the head but rather places 
this faculty in the section of the body which is below the neck92. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation allows al-F!r!b" to weave into his case 
against the soul’s tri-partition a rejection of encephalocentrism. This 
argument is introduced in a compressed manner at A-(2).  
At first blush, it seems that al-F!r!b" is simply describing the 
physiological configuration of tri-partition by stating that the soul’s capacities 
are located in three different organs: the liver, heart and brain. However, 
upon closer scrutiny we come to see that al-F!r!b" ushers in a critique of 
this position against the familiar background of hierarchy or tart!b. In fact, al-
F!r!b" seems to deplore the absence of stratification (irtiq$’) inherent in a tri-
partite system. If the liver, heart and encephalon perform equally important 
tasks then there is no single controlling organ overseeing the management 
of the entire body. In this case, it is hard to tell which one of these three 
organs fulfils a ruling (ri’$sa) function and which one has a serving (khidma) 
role. As a result, according to al-F!r!b" tri-partition seems to lead to an 
uncoordinated physiological system, where the liver, heart and brain govern 
separately (munfarid#n) over their relative spheres of influence.    
                                                
91 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 84-85. 
92 Plato, Timaeus, 68 d-e. This position is depicted accurately in Galen’s paraphrase of the 
Timaeus see, P.Kraus, R. Walzer, eds. Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis, Kraus Reprint, 
Nendeln 1973, pp. 22-24. 
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Compare this unruly state of affairs with the kind of order that prevails 
in Aristotelian cardiocentrism as interpreted by al-F!r!b" in section A-(3). In 
this case, a stratified form of ri’$sa is readily apparent in the physiological 
structure of the human body. The heart, where the rational, nutritive, 
volitional and sensitive faculties are all located, is obviously the governing 
organ. It rules all and is ruled by none. As a result, the liver and brain occupy 
an intermediate position in this ranking; they serve the heart and rule over 
other inferior organs. These organs, al-F!r!b" will later tell us are the spleen, 
lungs, intestines and genitalia. It is interesting to note that in section A-(4) al-
F!r!b" specifically uses the terminology of khidma and ri’$sa to depict the 
relationship between the heart and its subservient elements.  
This hierarchical vision of cardiocentrism is also noticeable in al-
F!r!b"’s account of embryology93. In the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila he 
underlines on numerous occasions the leading role played by the heart in 
foetal development94.  Al-F!r!b"’s description of the human reproductive 
process closely follows that of Aristotle95. Drawing directly on the “First 
Teacher”, he illustrates the relationship between semen and menses by 
appealing to the notorious ‘curdled milk’ metaphor employed in the De 
Generatione Animalium 739 b 20-25. Sperm, being the efficient cause, acts 
on the blood prepared within the uterus in the same way that rennet 
(minfa'a) curdles fresh milk96. As a result of the interaction between material 
and efficient cause the embryo is formed and the first organ to appear is the 
heart. Al-F!r!b" then suggests that this regent part directs the subsequent 
growth of the embryo.  
                                                
93 For an overview of Islamic embryology see, C. Baffioni, L’Embryologie Islamique Entre 
Héritage Grec et Coran : Les philosophes, les savants, les théologiens, in L’Embryon : 
Formation et Animation, eds. L. Brisson, M. Congourdeau, J. Solère, J. Vrin, Paris 2008, pp. 
213-231.  
94 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 186-187, pp. 192-193, pp. 234-235.  
95 Arist., GA., II, VI, 731 b 20- 739 b 30. 
96 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 188-189. 
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More specifically, the formation (takw!n) of all the other bodily 
components is delayed until the requisite faculties (quwwa/ dunamis) are 
found in the hegemonikon97. Undoubtedly, al-F!r!b" is hinting here at the 
appearance of the nutritive, sensitive and volitional powers in the heart. He 
is clearly implying that the network of serving (kh$dima) secondary and 
tertiary organs follows the presence of the ruling primary faculties in the 
‘u%wu al- ra’!si. It would seem then that the emergence of the ruling nutritive 
faculty (al-quwwa al-gh$dhiya al-ra’!sa) in the heart, leads to the formation of 
subservient nutritive members (al-a‘%$’ al-kh$dima) like the liver, stomach 
and kidneys98. Presumably, the same process takes place in the case of the 
other faculties. For instance, the chief sensitive power (al-quwwa al-'$ssa 
al-ra’!sa) located in the heart would, in all likelihood, usher in the 
development of the five senses and their serving organs such as the eyes, 
ears and nose99. Based on this reasoning, al-F!r!b" confidently asserts that 
the heart is not only the cause (sabab) of the existence of all the bodily parts 
but also the architect of their specific arrangement (tart!b)100.  
 
 2.3- Ri’$sa and Khidma in the Perfect City: 
 
Al-F!r!b"’s second argument for cardiocentrism in the Ris$la f! a‘%$’ 
al-'ayaw$n focuses as well on the idea of hierarchical stratification (tart!b). 
To show that a single controlling organ should govern the body al-F!r!b" 
appeals to an analogy between political and natural khidma and ri’$sa. Thus, 
                                                
97 Ibid., pp. 192-193.  
98 Ibid., pp.166-167. 
99 Ibid., pp. 168-169. 
100 Ibid., pp. 234-235. Of course, Galen is notoriously opposed to this cardiocentric view of 
embryology: “Why then did Chrisippus and many other Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers 
see fit to make these pronouncements about the heart, that it comes into being first of the 
animal parts, and that the other parts are formed by it? And that since it is first to be 
constructed it must necessarily be the source of veins and arteries as well? The clear 
evidence is that it is not the first to be formed.” See, Galen, The Construction of the Embryo 
in P. N. Singer, trans. & ed. Galen: Selected Works, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, 
pp. 187-188. On Galen’s embryology see, D. Nickel, Untersuchungen zur Embryologie 
Galens, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1989.  
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he affirms, in the following excerpt, that according to Aristotle the body’s 
physiological organization is essentially similar to the political structure of a 
city. This is of course a familiar image and we have seen how Galen has 
used a comparable metaphor to defend his understanding of justice in the 
body.  
 
[B]-“(1) Aristotle believes that the natural kinds of ruling and serving 
(khidma) are similar to the voluntary kinds of ruling and serving. (2) They 
differ only in so far as the capacities and forms through which the voluntary 
kinds are enacted in the various parts of the city (al-mad!na) do not come 
about naturally or through nature but rather through volition (ir$da), 
habituation, study and constant practice.”101   
 
Al-F!r!b" follows up this analogy by a brief description of the kind of political 
order that should exist in a perfect Aristotelian city. Surprisingly, Aristotle’s 
political doctrine, as presented by al-F!r!b", favours the institution of a 
stratified ideal monarchy. In this context, it is easy to see how a justification 
of cardiocentrism can be derived from such a simile. Indeed, according to al-
F!r!b" a single ruling organ, the heart, should govern the body in the same 
way that a single sovereign, the perfect king, rules the ideal city102. In each 
case the ruling element acts via a series of subservient parts or subordinate 
helpers to carry out its task. The heart governs the body through the help of 
the liver, brain and spleen and the king rules the city with the assistance of 
ministers, secretaries and soldiers. It is, of course, well known that Aristotle’s 
Politics was unavailable in Arabic103. As a result sources for al-F!r!b"’s view 
on Aristotle’s political doctrine should be sought in other components of the 
Aristotelian canon, notably in his biological work. An important section found 
                                                
101 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 83-84 
102 This parallel is briefly discussed in Lutz Richter-Bernburg, Ab# Bakr al-R$z! and al-F$r$b! 
on Medicine and Authority in In the Age of al-F$r$b!: Arabic Philosophy in Fourth/Tenth 
Century, ed. P. Adamson, Warburg Institue, London 2008, pp. 119-30. 
103 See, R. Brague, Notes sur la traduction Arabe de la Politique d’Aristote. Derechef, qu’elle 
n’existe pas, in Aristote Politique, ed. P. Aubenque, Presse Universitaire de France, Paris 
1993, pp. 423-33.   
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in the De Motu Animalium, X, 703 a 30-35 probably served as a basis for al-
F!r!b"’s argument:  
 
III-“We should consider the organization of an animal to resemble that of a 
city well-governed by laws (eunomoumenen). (1) For once order (taxis) is 
established in a city, there is no need of a separate monarch to preside over 
every activity; each man does his own work as assigned, and one thing 
follows another (2) because of habit. In animals this same thing happens 
because of nature: specifically because each part of them, since they are so 
ordered, is naturally disposed to do its own task. There is then no need of 
soul in each part: it is in some governing origin of the body and other parts 
live because they are naturally attached.”104 
 
In excerpt [III], Aristotle describes the physiological organization of an 
animal’s body in terms of the regime of a well-governed city. The context of 
this description is important, since Aristotle uses the analogy between the 
city and the body to argue for the necessity of a single physiological center 
to manage the animals’ unified organism. Although in the De Motu Aristotle 
does not positively affirm that the heart plays this role, he still makes a 
number of strong suggestions in that direction105. In that sense, al-F!r!b"’s 
interpretation is not as far-fetched as it seemed prima facie. Furthermore, al-
F!r!b"’s suggestion in B-(2) that volition and habit fulfill at the political level 
the role played by nature at the physiological level reflects Aristotle’s similar 
                                                
104 Arist., De Motu. X, 703 a 30-35, for the translation see, M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De 
Motu Animalium, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978, pp. 52. There are no known 
Arabic versions of the De Motu. However, Arabic philosophers were aware of the existence 
of the De Motu, and might have had access, if not to the whole treatise, at least to a 
summary (ascribed simply to Nicolaus) from which Averroes quotes in his Long 
Commentary on the De Anima, see Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De 
anima, ed. F. S. Crawford, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass 1953, 
pp. 524. For the English translation of this passage see, Averroes, Long Commentary on the 
De Anima, ed. trans. R. C. Taylor, sub-ed. Th.-A. Druart, Yale University Press, New Haven 
2009, pp. 422-423. Furthermore, as R. C. Taylor and Th.-A. Druart point out a similar 
reference occurs in Averroes’ Middle Commentary of the De Anima. See, Averroes, Middle 
Commentary on the De Anima, ed. trans. A. L. Ivry, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, 
Utah 2002, pp. 128-129. According to H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Averroes is probably referring 
in this section to the zoological part of the compendium of Aristotle’s philosophy produced 
by Nicolaus of Damascus. See, Nicolaus of Damascus, Nicolaus of Damascus on the 
Philosophy of Aristotle:  Fragments of the First Five Books Translated from the Syriac, ed. 
H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1965, pp. 11-12, 24, 32-34. 
105 See, Arist. De Motu, VIII, 702 a 20- b 25, 703 a 10- 20. 
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remark at III-(2). Finally, Aristotle’s speculation at III-(1) that the absence of 
order in a city would require the presence of several monarchs overseeing 
different activities is strongly reminiscent of al-F!r!b"’s criticism of tri-partition 
as being a disunited form of physiological organization involving a series of 
separate rulers.   
 However, despite these similarities al-F!r!b"’s position emphasizes 
more substantially the importance of a hierarchical order in the city and the 
body. For instance, whereas Aristotle’s text mentions only a city well 
governed by laws, al-F!r!b"’s interpretation speaks of a city ruled by a single 
monarch. And while Aristotle argues that the body should be viewed as a 
unified system, al-F!r!b" insists that it is also a highly stratified structure. A 
good example of this attitude is al-F!r!b"’s description of the liver as a 
subordinate organ, which serves the heart in the same way that the 
commander of an army obediently serves his king106. Part of the reason for 
this is that Aristotle uses the comparison between the body and the city in 
the De Motu simply as a metaphor to illustrate an important physiological 
argument. Al-F!r!b"’s stance, on the other hand, assumes a much deeper 
correlation between the hierarchical structures of the body and the city and 
this, I believe, colors his interpretation of Aristotle’s cardiocentrism. 
According to al-F!r!b", the ideal fit between the political and natural 
arrangements of khidma and ri’$sa is not simply fortuitous or convenient, but 
it is rather the result of the providential justice inherent in the emanative 
process of divine creation. 
 
2.4- Ri$’sa, Khidma and Divine Providence: 
 
 
In the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, al-F!r!b" goes to great lengths to 
establish this thesis. In his detailed description of the correspondence 
between the city and the body al-F!r!b" especially emphasizes the similarity 
                                                
106 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 85. 
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between their stratified compositions. Thus, in excerpts [C], [D] and [E] al-
F!r!b" explains how the different organs in the body and the various ranks in 
the city are ordered according to a precise correlation between their ruling 
and serving functions. It is important to note that in the following excerpts al-
F!r!b" compares two ideal models. He always talks of a virtuous city and a 
healthy body:  
[C]-“ (1) The virtuous city resembles the perfect and healthy body, all of 
whose members co-operate to make the life of the animal perfect and to 
preserve it in this state. Now the members and organs of the body are 
different and their natural endowment and faculties are unequal in 
excellence, there being among them one ruling organ (‘u%wun ra’!si), 
namely the heart, and organs which are close in rank (martaba) to that 
ruling organ. [#] Other organs, in turn, perform their functions according to 
the aim of those which are in the second rank (rutba), and so on until 
eventually organs are reached which only serve (takhdum) and do not rule 
at all.   (2) The same holds true in the case of the city. Its parts are different 
by nature, and their natural dispositions are unequal in excellence: there is a 
man who is the ruler (ra’!s), and there are others whose ranks 
(mar$tibuhum) are close to the ruler, each of them with a disposition and a 
habit through which he performs an action in conformity with the intention of 
that ruler; these are the holders of the first rank (rutba). Below them are 
people who perform their actions in accordance with the aims of those 
people; they are in the second rank. Below them in turn are people who 
perform their actions according to the aims of the people mentioned in the 
second instance, and the parts of the city continue to be hierarchically 
arranged (tart!b), until eventually parts are reached which perform their 
actions according to the aims of others, while there do not exist any people 
who perform their actions according to their aims; these, then are the people 
who serve (yakhdum#n) without being served in turn, and who are hence in 
the lowest rank (martaba) and at the bottom of the scale.”  
 
 
[D]- “(1) The part of the body close to the ruling organ (‘u%wun ra’!si) 
performs the most honorable natural functions in agreement with the aims of 
the ruler [#], the organs beneath them perform those functions which are 
less noble, and eventually one reaches the organs that perform the lowest 
functions. In the same way the parts of the city which are close in authority 
to the ruler of the city perform the most noble voluntary actions, and those 
below them less noble actions, until eventually the parts are reached which 
perform the most base actions.[#] (2)This applies equally to the city and 
equally to every composite whole (jumla) whose parts are naturally united 
(mu’talifa), ordered (munta%ima) and connected (murtabi"a): they have a 
ruler whose relation to the other parts is like the one just described ” 
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[E]- “(1) For just as the first ruler (al-ra’!s al-’awwal) in a genus cannot be 
ruled by anything in that genus-for instance the ruler of the [bodily] members 
cannot be ruled by any other member- and this holds good for any ruler of 
any composite whole (jumla),  (2) so the art of the ruler in the excellent city 
of necessity cannot be an art that serves (yukhdima) any other art and 
cannot be ruled by any other art”107  
 
 
At E-(1) and D-(2) al-F!r!b" introduces a significant mereological argument 
which helps buttress the ladder-like architecture (tart!b) apparent in the city 
and the body. He affirms, rather matter-of-factly, that the first ruler (al-ra’!s al-
’awwal) in a genus cannot serve lesser elements contained in that same 
genus. More precisely, it would appear that this principle applies only to 
composite wholes (jumla). Now, given the examples used one might think 
that al-F!r!b" believes that this is true of the entire class of composite 
wholes, including continuous, contiguous and discrete wholes. In other 
words, any entity made up of parts will be ruled by a single leading element. 
Presumably, however this can only be true of composite wholes that 
possess a coherent structure or hierarchy. Indeed, a body of water, such as 
a lake or a pond for instance, cannot be ruled by a single “commanding” 
particle of liquid. But it is nonetheless a contiguous whole. For this reason, I 
think that it is important to realize that when al-F!r!b" talks of a jumla, which 
is united (mu’talifa), ordered (munta&ima) and connected (murtabi"a), he 
means to speak only of composite wholes that have a configuration with 
clear ruling and serving elements.  
When this mereological principle is applied to the organization of the 
body and the city, the outcome is predictable. The heart, being the chief 
organ within the body, will not serve any other corporeal member but will rule 
them all. The virtuous king, who is the most excellent citizen in the ideal city, 
will similarly govern all of its inhabitants. As a consequence, the functional 
structure of the body and the city will have an obvious pyramidal 
                                                
107 For excerpts [C]-[E] see, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 230-31, pp. 236-37, pp. 240-41. 
All translations slightly modified. 
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configuration (tart!b) distinguished by several ranks (martaba). At the top, the 
highest level of ri’$sa will belong to a single element, which directs all the 
others and is directed by none. This first rank (rutba ’#l$) is followed by a 
series of intermediary echelons that contain many components, which can 
be both ruling and serving. These components act in accordance with the 
commands of the first ruler and transmit orders to more subservient parts. 
Hence from the highest level of ri’$sa we slowly move in a descending 
succession to layers that are more and more subordinate until we reach the 
lowest level. This is the level of pure khidma and it can contain multiple 
elements, which in al-F!r!b"’s formulation, always serve and never rule.  
 This hierarchical pattern is of course reminiscent of the just 
providential order that exists in the universe. In chapter one, section four we 
have already established that the scalar structure (tart!b) of the world was a 
feature of the attribute of justice (‘adl) emanating from the First’s substance. 
For this reason, each being receives its allotted share (qus"a) of existence 
and its rank (rutba) in the general order of the world (ni&$m). This order 
ensures that ‘being’ (wuj#d) is justly distributed among all the existents. It 
flows (fay%) from the First and proceeds via the intellects and through the 
celestial spheres all the way to the sublunary world where it is parcelled in 
smaller and smaller quantities amongst rational and irrational animals, 
vegetables and the elements until it finally reaches the lowest constituent of 
existence: prime matter. In section [F] al-F!r!b" completes his description of 
this process by adding an important detail. It appears from F-(1) that the 
justice (‘adl) which emanates from the First contributes not only to the 
ranking of each existent, but provides as well the structure of their 
mereological composition.  
 
[F]-“(1) The First’s substance is also such that the existents, when they have 
issued from it in their ranks (rutba), are necessarily united (ya’talif), 
connected (yartabi") and ordered (yanta&im) with one another and arranged 
in a way that they become a composite whole (jumla) and are established 
like one thing.  (2) Some of them are connected and united by something 
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within their substance, so that their substances (jaw$hirih$) to which they 
owe their existence produce their connection and their union; others by 
modes (a'w$l) which accompany their substances [#]. These modes 
(‘a'w$l) of theirs are also derived from the First, because its substance is 
such that many existents receive from it together with their substance the 
modes by which they are connected (yartabi"u), united (ya’talifu) and 
ordered (yanta&imu) with each other”108 
 
When using expressions such as ya’talif, yartabi" and yanta&im, al-F!r!b" is 
obviously suggesting that all the different types of hierarchized or ordered 
composite wholes (whether they are continuous, contiguous or discrete) 
derive their organization from the substance of the First Being109. It is also 
evident that a significant feature of this structure relates to the hierarchical 
arrangement of the various parts. Consequently, it would appear that al-
F!r!b" believes that the mereological principle adduced earlier at E-(1) and 
D-(2) is associated as well to the feature of justice (‘adl) inherent in the First 
Being’s substance. This would go a long way toward explaining why al-
F!r!b" simply assumes the validity of this principle in the earlier discussion 
on the ruling and serving parts of the city and the body.  
 
 
2.5- From Galenic to Farabian Justice:  
 
Similarly, if we return to the Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n, we can see 
that the complex arguments deployed in the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila 
inform to a large extent al-F!r!b"’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
cardiocentrism. In fact, al-F!r!b" attributes to the “First Teacher” a line of 
thought based entirely on the analogy between the ruling configuration of 
the city, body and cosmos: 
 
[G]-“And he [Aristotle] also believes that the rule (ri’$satu) that sustains the 
order of the world and its parts, and the rule (ri’$satu) that ought and needs 
to sustain the order of the city and its segments and the rule (ri$’satu) that 
                                                
108 For excerpts [F] see, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 96-97. Translations slightly modified. 
109 The Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics + contains 
the same sort of vocabulary when referring to various composite wholes, see note 108. 
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sustains the order of the body and its members are analogous (mutan$siba) 
and similar (mutash$biha). And just as the rule that sustains the world and 
its parts is stratified (tartaq!) according to a ranking (tart!b) topped by the 
rule of a single ruler (ra’!s), alone in its being, whose rule is shared by no 
one [#] in the same way, he believes that the rulerships among the cities 
and nations should be stratified (tartaq!) towards the rule of a single ruler, 
alone in his rank (rutba) [#]. And in the same way, he believes that the 
various rules found in multiple members of the body, are necessarily 
stratified (tartaq! ) according to a ranking (tart!b) culminating in the rule 
(ri’$satu) of a single organ, unique in its rank (rutba).”110  
 
The resemblance of Aristotle’s opinion as presented in [G] and al-F!r!b"’s 
argument in the *r$’ is evident. In both instances, the structure of the city 
and the body takes the shape of a highly stratified pyramidal arrangement. In 
both texts this order is ruled by a single organ or element, which has a 
complete monopoly over its subservient parts. The terminology is also 
remarkably familiar, in each case the structures of the body and the city are 
understood in terms of tart!b, and ri$’sa. Finally, these notions help ground 
the argument for cardiocentrism in the two inquiries. Hence, according to al-
F!r!b", Aristotle believes that the pyramidal stratification (tart!b) 
characteristic of the cosmic structure ought to obtain at the political and 
biological levels. As a result, the various physiological functions distributed 
throughout the body must all be stratified under the rule (ri’$sa) of a single 
organ: the heart.  
The remote background for al-F!r!b"’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
view on ri’$sa is most likely furnished by Metaphysics +, 10. In particular, al-
F!r!b"’s insistence on the importance of having a single ruler would seem to 
take as its point of departure Aristotle’s well-known quotation from the Iliad, 
II, 204 concerning the appropriate number of principles in the universe: 
“There is no good (l$ khayra) in a multiplicity of rulers, the ruler (ra’!s) is 
one”111. A further source of inspiration for al-F!r!b"’s reading could be 
                                                
110 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 84. 
111 See, Arist., Metaph. XII, 1076 a 5. For the Arabic version, see Averroes, Tafs!r M$ Ba‘d 
A"-"ab!‘at: Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, vol. III, ed. M. Bouyges, Imprimerie 
Catholique, Beirut, 1948, pp. 1736. On the different translations of the Metaphysics 
 58 
Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics Lambda. The paraphrase is believed 
to have accompanied Ab$ Bishr Matt!’s translation of Lambda and al-F!r!b" 
affirms in his F! Aghr$% that it is the only complete commentary on this book 
that is known to him112. While discussing the role of substance in 
Metaphysics Lambda 1069 a 17-25 1035 b 25, Themistius draws a similar 
analogy between the unity of the universe (al-kull), the structure of the bodily 
parts and the order of a city113. In addition, in the closing section of his 
                                                                                                                                    
available in Arabic see, A. Bertolacci, On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
“ Arabic Science and Philosophy”, 15, 2005, pp. 241-75. Interestingly, Metaphysics +, 10 
and specifically section 1075 a10-25 were viewed by the exegetical tradition as a privileged 
source for the construction of an Aristotelian theory of providence. For instance, in the Tafs!r 
m$ ba‘da al-tab!‘a, Averroes says that Aristotle’s famous comparisons of cosmic order to the 
structures of an army and of a household contains his opinion on ‘in$ya”. See, Averroes, 
Tafs!r cit., pp. 1714-15. For Averroes’s view on providence and sublunary generation see, 
G. Freundenthal, The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle’s Biology: Averroes on the role of 
the celestial bodies in the generation of animate beings, “Arabic Sciences and Philosophy” 
12, 2002, pp. 111-137. This tradition certainly goes back to the work of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Averroes and al-F!r!b" had access to Alexander’s 
lost commentary on the Metaphysics in Ab$ Bishr Matt!’s translation and probably to his De 
Principiis as well. For the relationship between the De Principiis and Alexander’s lost 
commentary on the Metaphysics see, S. Fazzo, L’Exégèse du Livre Lambda de la 
Métaphysique D’Aristote dans le De Principiis et la Quaestio I.1 d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise, 
“Laval Théologique et Philosophique”, 64, 2008, pp. 607-26. For an analysis of the different 
Arabic translations of the De Principiis, see, C. Genequand, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On 
the Cosmos, E. J. Brill, Leiden 2001, pp. 31-35. 
112 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", F! Aghr$% al-)ak!m f! kulli maq$la min al-kit$b al-maws#m bi-l-'ur#f, 
in Alfarabi’s philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. F. Dieterici, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1892, pp. 34-
38. See as well, Th.-A. Druart, Le traité d’al-F$r$b! sur les buts de la Métaphysique 
d’Aristote, “Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 24, 1982, pp. 38-43. A partial English 
translation of this text along with comments is also available in D. Gutas’ classical study of 
Avicenna. See, D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading 
Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1988, pp. 240-242. 
113 The specific passage from Themistius’ paraphrase is worth quoting in full: “The unity of 
the universe (al-kull), whether it is like the unity (’iti'$d) of the members of the human body 
and the parts of plants, or the composition (tark!b) of contiguous parts like those of a house 
or a boat, or the concord (ta’l!f) of separated elements like the concord of soldiers or a city 
(al-mad!na), the first part of this unity is substance (jawhar), which stands towards the whole 
like the heart (qalb) towards the rest of the animal’s body.” This fragment of Themistius’s 
lost original commentary survives in Arabic and is cited by Averroes in his Great 
Commentary on Arisotle’s Metaphysics, see, Averroes, Tafs!r M$ Ba‘d A"-"ab!‘at cit., pp. 
1410. For a reconstruction of Themistius’ commentary on the basis of Arabic and Hebrew 
sources see, R. Brague, Thémistius: Paraphrase de la Métaphysique d’Aristote (livre 
lambda), J. Vrin, Paris 1999.        
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commentary Themistius echoes this sentiment by claiming that all things 
aspire to be ruled by a single principle114.  
The importance of this cosmic argument is also apparent in the 
physiological vocabulary al-F!r!b" chooses to employ. As Richard Walzer 
perceptively suggests, the terms used to describe thermal adjustment and 
regulation (’i‘tid$l, ‘addala) are reminiscent of the justice (‘adl) that prevails in 
the order of the universe115. In light of this, it is interesting to see how al-
F!r!b" fits certain biological justifications of thermo-regulation within his 
overall case for stratified cardiocentrism and divine providence: 
 
 [J]-“The heart is the ruling organ which is not ruled by any other organ of 
the body. It is followed in rank by the brain, which is also a ruling organ, but 
its rule is secondary rather than primary: it is ruled by the heart and rules 
over all the other organs and limbs. For it serves the heart, whereas all the 
other organs and members are its servants, in accordance with the natural 
aims of the heart. It [the brain] may be compared to the steward in a 
household; for the steward himself is subordinate to the master, whereas 
the other members of the house serve him in accordance with the aims of 
the master.” 
 
[K]-“For since the heart is the source of the innate heat, its heat must 
necessarily be made strong and excessive so that it can produce a surplus 
which overflows (yuf!%u) to the other parts of the body, and does not fail or 
weaken. The organs by themselves do not suffice to regulate (tu‘adil) their 
heat, which the heart sends forth into them [#.]. Thus, to this end the brain 
was made cool and moist, even to the touch, in comparison with the other 
part of the body and a faculty was placed in it by which a definite and 
complete adjustment (’i‘tid$l) of the heart’s heat is brought about.”116  
 
In passage [K], al-F!r!b" deploys the classical Aristotelian view that the 
heart is the source of innate heat ('ar$ra ghar!ziyya) to warrant the brain’s 
subservient function. This heat spreads to all the other organs and as a 
result it nourishes and controls their activities. However, the heart is served 
in this task by the encephalon which being colder and more humid than all 
                                                
114 R. Brague, Thémistius cit., pp. 118-119. 
115 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 394-395. 
116 For excerpts [J] and [K] see, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 174-75, pp. 179-81. 
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the other organs regulates the temperature going into each member. In the 
Ris$la f! a‘%$’ al-'ayaw$n, al-F!r!b" offers a more ample discussion of this 
issue. He carefully explains how the thermal adjustment (ta‘d!l) provided by 
the brain should not be confused with the ventilation or aeration (tarw!') 
dispensed by the lungs. Aeration is meant to help the process of concoction 
(pepsis) by insuring the regular supply of fresh air to the heart as well as the 
evacuation of putrid pneuma (ru'an ‘afnan)117. This is an important function 
but one evidently different from the careful monitoring of temperature 
exercised by the brain.  
Al-F!r!b" indicates that the moderation of cardiac heat takes place 
principally by counter-balancing the drying and caloric nature of the 'ar$ra 
ghar!ziyya with the assistance of the brain’s cooling and moisturizing 
qualities. This has beneficial effects notably on various fragile viscous bodily 
parts like muscle, cartilage as well as on a number of earthy components 
like the sensory and motor nerves. Importantly, in the case of the nerves, al-
F!r!b" adds that the brain helps preserve their pliability and moisture by also 
altering the composition of the heart’s vital pneuma (r#' 'ayaw$n! ghar!z!).  
After its passage or transit (s$lik) through the encephalon the vital pneuma, 
al-F!r!b" suggests, is refrigerated and as a result it is deprived of its 
smouldering and smoky nature (dukh$niyya) 118. 
Interestingly, these explanations allow al-F!r!b" to construct a 
successful response to Galen’s initial objections to the brain’s subordinate 
role. As we have already seen in this chapter’s opening section, Galen tries 
to saddle his cardiocentric opponents with an embarrassing paradox. He 
argues that if the brain’s location were suitably fitted to its alleged thermo-
regulating function (chreia/ manfa‘a) then the encephalon would have to be 
                                                
117 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 96-99. On concoction see the section entitled 
‘The Master Cook’ in G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1996, pp. 83-103. 
118 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 180-82. 
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placed much nearer to the heart rather than in the cranial cavity119. Galen 
then adds, with characteristic sarcasm, that the thermo-regulating teachings 
are so absurd and opposed to Nature that, by following their twisted logic, 
one could easily conclude that even the heels were formed for the sake of 
cooling the cardiac heat. Visibly, Galen considers the sizeable distance that 
separates the cranial cavity from the heart to be a major chink in the 
cardiocentrists’ armour.  
Al-F!r!b", instead of recoiling from this challenge, responds by 
exploiting the apparent weakness to his advantage. He explains that the 
interval that exists between the encephalon and the heart, far from being 
superfluous, serves a specific purpose. It acts as a buffer zone and allows 
the excessive temperature ('ar$ra shad!da) emanating from the bosom of 
sanguineous animals to dissipate gradually. If this were not the case, the 
physiological result would be disastrous. Indeed, had the encephalon been 
located within the ribcage as Galen suggested, it would entirely dry up and 
lose all of its natural moisture by being too closely exposed to the full 
intensity of cardiac heat. In other words, the brain’s actual location within the 
cranial cavity allows it to retain its inherent cooling attributes and to perform 
its subordinate thermo-regulating function appropriately120.     
In that sense, Aristotelian physiology as interpreted by al-F!r!b" 
corroborates the wide-ranging arguments from tart!b, such as the one 
presented in [J]. Indeed, the brain’s thermo-regulating function as well as its 
cranial location reflect the hierarchical ruling and serving patterns that are 
supposed to obtain in the body, city and cosmos. Thus, the encephalon 
occupies a clear position in the corporeal structure; its rank (rutba) follows 
that of the heart. It is therefore subservient (kh$dim) to the hegemonikon and 
helps it direct other organs by carrying out its bidding like an obedient and 
loyal steward in al-F!r!b"’s memorable image. In many ways, this 
                                                
119 May, On the Usefulness of the Parts cit., vol. I, pp. 387-88.   
120 F!r!b", Ris$la f! a’%$‘ al-'ayaw$n cit., pp. 96-97. 
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agreement between biological and cosmic structures puts to rest Galen’s 
claim that cardiocentrism betrays the order of nature and the providential 
design and skill of the Divine craftsman. In all likelihood, al-F!r!b" wants us 
to see that, on the contrary, when providence is rightly understood as justice 
(‘adl), it is Galen’s tri-partite encephalocentrism that seems unsuitable. This 
is true, at least in al-F!r!b"’s tendentious presentation of this doctrine as a 
disunited and chaotic physiological system. To be sure, the view that there 
are three separate and seemingly independent governing organs in the 
human body does not square well with the Farabian idea of providence 
which calls for a perfect compatibility between the cosmic, corporeal and 
political orders, each ruled by a single dominant principle: The First Being, 
the heart and the virtuous king. 
 
2.6 Theology, Medicine and Philosophy: 
 
Interestingly, al-F!r!b"’s defence of cardiocentrism helps undermine 
certain theological positions based on Galen's physiology. Part of the reason 
for this is that the overlapping discussion of human physiology and 
providence constituted a central feature of Ancient and Medieval 
controversies over the nature of creation121. In that context Galen’s 
argument from design, particularly as presented in the De Usu122, was a 
major source of authority for the creationist agenda of the early Mutakallim#n 
and their successors123. For instance, when al-Ghaz!l" marvels at the 
intricate design of a gnat or a bed bug and offers its perfect composition as a 
                                                
121 See, D. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 2009 and R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 1983, pp. 193-321.  
122 See, J. Schacht, New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology, “Studia 
Islamica” 1, 1953, pp. 23-42. 
123 See, A. Shihadeh, The Existence of God, in The Cambridge Companion to Classical 
Islamic Theology, ed. T. Winter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 197-
218.  
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sign of Divine creation124, he is simply appealing to a standard Galenic trope, 
one that had already been perfected by al-J!!i# in his Kitab al-)ayaw$n125.  
Furthermore, as F.W. Zimmermann has noted, the intellectual prestige of 
Galen, in the cultural milieu of 10th century Baghdad, rivalled and even 
exceeded that of Aristotle126. For that reason, al-F!r!b"’s opposition to 
Galen’s encephalocentrism should be appreciated within the context of the 
on-going debates between philosophy and medicine in the Abbasid capital.  
The practitioners of each discipline were vying for intellectual 
dominance and both sides were trying to establish their field as being more 
authoritative. Interestingly, some of the arguments on the medical side nicely 
blended scientific and providential themes by appealing to the idea of 
premonitory dreams. Thus, Is!!q Ibn Al" al-Ruh!w" calls on the famous 
episode where Galen learned how to cure his chronic abdominal pain 
through an oneiric vision to establish the superiority of the medical 
profession127. Indeed, al-Ruh!w" suggests that when Galen dreams that he 
should excise a vein between his thumb and index finger, this therapeutic 
suggestion is of Divine origin and indicates God’s solicitude and care for the 
physician’s noble mission128.  
On the philosophical side, Silvia Fazzo has shown that a number of 
classical anti-Galenic arguments can be traced back to the Baghdad School. 
The polemical character of certain remarks was heightened and read back 
into the Greek sources, notably in the adaptation of works attributed to 
                                                
124 al-Ghaz!l", I*y!’ ‘ul$m al-d"n, vol. 4, al-Ma,ba-ah al--Uthm!n"yah al-Mi%r"yah, Cairo 1933, 
pp. 273-275. 
125 al-J!*i., Kitab al-)ayaw$n, vol. 7, ed. M. H!r$n, Mu%,af! al-B!b" al-)alab", Cairo 1938-
1945, pp. 169. 
126 F.W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi und die philosophische Kritik an Galen von Alexander zu 
Averroes, in Akten des VII Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft, Göttingen, 
1976, pp. 401-14. 
127 Is*!q Ibn Ali al-Ruh!w", Medical Ethics of Medieval Islam with Special Reference to Adab 
al-"ab!b, trans. M. Levey, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia 1967, pp. 70-71.  
128 On the Divine nature of premonitory dreams see, R. Hansberger, How Aristotle Came to 
Believe in God-given Dreams: The Arabic Version of ‘De divinatione per somnum’, in 
Dreaming Across Boundaries: The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands, ed. L. Marlow, 
Center for Hellenic Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 2008, pp. 50–77 
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Alexander of Aphrodisias129. Many of these arguments centred on Galen’s 
critical opinion of a number of elements in Aristotle’s physics and biology. 
Often the critiques found in the sources identified by Fazzo resulted in a 
belittling of Galen’s philosophical abilities and were characterized by ad 
hominem attacks on his competence outside the field of medicine. These 
kinds of remarks and the perspective they defend are well exemplified by a 
jibe reported in al-‘/mir"’s Kit$b al-Amad ‘al$ l’Ab$d. In this text, Galen is 
admonished to go back to his ointments, laxatives, and to treating sores and 
fevers rather than dabbling in important philosophical questions concerning 
the eternity of the world or the nature of the soul130.       
In this perspective, al-F!r!b"’s defence of Aristotelian cardiocentrism 
in the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila enables him to advance several elements 
in his philosophical agenda. It allows al-F!r!b" to subtly develop his view of 
providence as justice and the concomitant rejection of Galenic 
encephalocentrism helps nudge the balance of power in Baghdad’s 
intellectual circles in favour of Aristotle and philosophy and away from Galen 
and medical practitioners131. And as we shall see, al-F!r!b" will ultimately 
co-opt the prestige associated with the medical sciences when, in a bold 
move, he models the virtuous civil craft on the art of the expert physician. 
But before reaching this stage of my argument, I shall first need to examine 
the nature of justice in the ideal polity.  
                                                
129 See. S. Fazzo, Alexandre d’Aphrodise contre Galien: La Naissance d’une Légende. 
“Philosophie Antique”, 2, 2002, pp. 109-144.  
130 See, S. Stroumsa, Al-F$r$b! and Maimonides on Medicine as a Science, “Arabic 
Sciences and Philosophy” 3, 1993, pp. 235-249. For al-‘/miri’s text quoted by Stroumsa 
see, E. K. Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate: Al-‘+mir!’s Kit$b al-
Amad ‘al$ l’Abad, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1988, pp. 74-75. 
131The stake lurking behind all of these polemics is the scientific status of medicine and its 
dependence on the higher philosophical disciplines of physics to establish its principles. For 
an illuminating analysis of the classification of medicine in Arabic philosophy see, D. Gutas, 
Medical Theory and Scientific Method in the Age of Avicenna, in Before and After Avicenna, 
ed. D. Reisman, E.J. Brill, Leiden 2003, pp. 145-162. E. Gannagé, in a recent article 
highlights the attempt by later physicians to free themselves from this methodological 
subordination see, E. Gannagé, Médecine et Philosophie à Damas à l’aube du XIIème 
siècle: Un tournant post-avicennien?, “Oriens”, 39, 2011, pp. 227-256. 
  
 65 
                                   
                                     Chapter Three: 
 




 In aphorisms sixty to sixty-five of the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a132, al-F!r!b" 
introduces his conception of justice in the virtuous city by adapting a series 
of arguments from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics133. One of these 
arguments relates to Aristotle’s famous description of friendship in terms of 
virtue, pleasure and use134. This discussion informs al-F!r!b"’s account of 
the political fellowship that unites and connects the residents of the ideal 
city. Thus, al-F!r!b" argues that the city’s primary political bond is born out 
of a friendship (ma'abba) which is for the sake of virtue (fa%!la). This 
founding sentiment is then strengthened by two subsidiary kinds of friendly 
attitudes. The first kind emerges from the utility (manfi‘a) the citizens derive 
                                                
132 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp 70-71. 
133 For a survey of al-F!r!b"’s reception of the Nicomachean Ethics see, M. Fakhry, Ethical 
Theories in Islam, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1991, pp. 78-85. See as well, the introduction in D. 
Mallet, Le Rappel de la Voie à Suivre pour Parvenir au Bonheur de Ab# Nasr al-F$r$b! , 
“Bulletin d’ Études Orientales”, 39-40, 1987-88, pp. 113-140. See also the introduction in 
D.M. Dunlop, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. A. Akasoy, A. Fidora, E.J. 
Brill, Leiden 2005, pp. 5-19, 35-55, 85-94. Dunlop concludes that al-F!r!b" is likely to have 
relied on Is*!q Ibn )unayn’s Arabic version as the basis for his lost commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Al-F!r!b"’s lost commentary is famously quoted by Ibn 0ufayl in the 
introduction of his )ayy Ibn Yaq&$n where the Second Master is accused of limiting human 
happiness to political flourishing. Ibn B!jjah defends al-F!r!b" against this charge. For a 
useful overview of the polemic between Ibn 0ufayl and Ibn B!jjah see, P. Vallat, Farabi et 
L’École d’ Alexandrie, J. Vrin, Paris 2004, pp. 102-126.    
134Arist. N.E. VIII, 2-3. For the Arabic versions see, Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., 
pp. 428-437. John Cooper famously argued that the two lower forms of friendships (utility-
friendship and pleasure-friendship) could be as disinterested as the highest form (virtue-
friendship). See, J. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, “Review of Metaphysics”, 
30, 4, 1977, pp. 619-648. For a revision of Cooper’s argument see, K. Alpern, Aristotle on 
the Friendship of Utility and Pleasure, “Journal of the History of Philosophy”, 21, 1983, pp. 
303-315. Al-F!r!b"’s argument seems more subtle, in the sense that, for him the relative 
quality of each form of friendship cannot be judged irrespective of the political situation in 
which it takes place. Within the context of the virtuous city, al-F!r!b" would most likely agree 
with Cooper’s position.   
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from their mutual dealings and the second arises from the pleasure 
(ladhdha) they experience during their reciprocal interactions135.  
Despite, the obvious influence of Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, al-
F!r!b"’s fuller account of ma'abba contains some distinctly un-Aristotelian 
elements. Notably, in the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, al-F!r!b" describes 
the origin of human friendship by appealing to the idea of providence136. We 
briefly touched on this topic in the preceding chapter (2.4-[F]), during our 
examination of al-F!r!b"’s views on the formation and ordering of composite 
wholes and their parts. In the same section, al-F!r!b" argues that ma'abba 
is a feature of divine justice and that its specific function is to unite (ta’talif) 
and connect (tartabi") mankind into a composite whole i.e. a city.  
By deriving the existence of friendship in this manner, al-F!r!b" 
gestures towards the possibility that divine providence might promote or 
justify the existence of a certain type of political associations, notably that of 
the virtuous polity. But how can the existence of an ideal human association 
be related to divine care? In answering this question al-F!r!b" must avoid 
                                                
135 “In the [virtuous] city, friendship occurs for the sake of sharing in virtue and that is 
connected with sharing in opinion (’ittif$q al-ra’y) and action (af‘$l). [#] When the opinions of 
the inhabitants of the [virtuous] city are agreed on these things and are completed by the 
actions by which they mutually gain happiness, they necessarily become mutual friends. [#] 
Then because they are neighbours of one another in one dwelling place, some of them 
needing others and some being useful to others, there follows friendship which exists on 
account of utility. Then on account of their sharing in virtue and because some of them are 
useful to others and some of them take pleasure in others, there follows as well friendship 
which exists on account of pleasure. And in this way, they are united and connected”. 
Translation slightly modified, see D. M. Dunlop, Al-F$r$b!: Fu(#l al-Madan! (“Aphorisms of 
the Statesman”), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1961, pp. 52-53. It might not be 
immediately clear how friendship (ma'abba) is connected to the notion of “sharing in 
opinion” (’ittif$q al-ra’y). To understand how these two ideas are related one should simply 
turn to the Arabic version of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: “It appears that agreement of 
opinion (’ittif$q al-ra’y) is friendly also. Hence it is not agreement in intention, for this exists 
among those who do not even know each other. [#][But] agreement in action (’af‘$l), and 
that concerning great matters, and able to be realized by both or all parties: as in cities 
when all agree that the rulerships (r!’as$t) shall be virtuous (fa%$’il)”. See, Arist., NE., IX, 6, 
1167 a-b. For the Arabic version see, Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., pp. 502-03. 
Translation modified. As is evident from excerpts above, Is*!q Ibn )unayn systematically 
uses the Arabic expression ’itif$q al-ra’y to render the Aristotelian term for concord or 
political friendship: “homonoia”.  
136 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 96-97. 
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two important difficulties. The first hurdle that presents itself is that of 
theological determinism137. This view was defended by many of al-F!r!b"’s 
contemporaries, specifically a number of Mutakallim#n who denied free will 
and extended divine agency and concern to particulars138. The second 
obstacle derives from the opposite thesis, broadly associated with Epicurean 
indeterminism139. As presented by al-F!r!b", this position rejects altogether 
the existence of providence and argues against the reality of an ordered 
universe with stable entities or substances; instead all things are said to be 
the result of sheer randomness and chance140.  
From a political as well as an ethical perspective, both views lead to 
undesirable conclusions. By insisting that all events are providentially 
                                                
137 See, P. Adamson, The Arabic Sea Battle: al-F$r$b! on the Problem of Future 
Contingents, “Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie” 88, 2006, pp. 163-188. And by the 
same author, Freedom and Determinism, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, 
ed. R. Pasnau, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, pp.  399-413. In his 
interpretation of De Int. 9, al-F!r!b" vehemently rejects causal determinism and posits free 
will as self-evident principle, see F.W. Zimmermann, ed. Al-F$r$b!’s Commentary and Short 
Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1981, pp. 83-84. 
138 See, K. Blankinship, The Early Creed, in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic 
Theology, ed. T. Winter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 33-54. F.W. 
Zimmermann believes that the target of al-F!r!b"’s criticism could be Jahm Ibn 'afw!n, see 
Zimmermann, Al-F$r$b! on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione cit., pp. cxiii-cxviii. On the political 
and ideological implications of these views see also, P. Crone, God’s Caliph: Religious 
Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986.  
139 For a helpful overview of the debate between Stoic and Epicurean views on determinism 
see, R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Fate, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 
London 1983, pp. 3-29. For an analysis of Epicurus’ position see, T. O’Keefe, Epicurus on 
Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005. For Aristotle’s position on the 
same topic see R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1980, pp. 227-272.    
140 In the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila , al-F!r!b" classifies Epicurean views on Atomism 
among the opinions of the misguided cities; these views are mixed with references to 
Heraclitian flux theory and standard Skeptical arguments. See, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., 
287-329, 481-503. As Walzer suggests, al-F!r!b" seems to also have another target in 
mind: Theological Occasionalism. On the sources of Atomism in Kal$m, see S. Pines, 
Studies in Islamic Atomism, ed. T. Langermann, trans. M. Schwarz, Magnes Press Hebrew 
University, Jerusalem 1997, pp. 1-40, 108-117. On the differences between Epicurian and 
Kal$m Atomism see, A. Dahnani, The Physical Theory of Kal$m: Atoms, Space and Void in 
Basrian Mu‘tazil! Cosmology, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1994, pp. 90-123, 182-195. See also, R. 
Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1983, pp. 384-402. On the importance of the political 
dimension of the Islamic debate on determinism and free will see, R. Chiaradonna, M. 
Rashed, Before and After the Commentators: An Exercise in Periodization, Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy, 38, 2010, pp. 251-297.    
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ordained theological determinism, aside from threatening human free will, 
automatically justifies the de facto power of serving dynasties and rulers. To 
put it simply, all existing political institutions are legitimate because their 
occurrence is necessarily the direct result of God’s command and decree. 
Epicurean atomists, on the other hand, uphold a diametrically opposed view. 
Since in their eyes providence does not obtain, it is impossible to justify the 
existence of any particular political system on the assumption that there is a 
carefully arranged and beneficial cosmic structure. 
Al-F!r!b" proposes a middle way between these two extreme 
stances. His general solution affirms the important role played by human 
volition and rational deliberation (ir$da wa-ikhtiy$r) within the context of a 
coherent and providentially ordered universe. Hence, contrary to the 
Epicurean atomists, al-F!r!b" believes that cosmic justice provides mankind 
with a distribution of all the necessary moral, deliberative and intellectual 
dispositions required to achieve human flourishing (sa‘$da) and to establish 
a virtuous polity. However, unlike the theological determinists, he does not 
think that divine agency is concerned with the actualization of particular 
events or with the moulding of political groups and societies in a specific 
fashion. Instead, the attainment of happiness (sa‘$da) and the construction 
of a virtuous city is a task that can only be carried out by the proper use of 
our innate free will and rational deliberation (ir$da wa-ikhtiy$r)141.  
 
3.1-Divine Providence, Friendship and other Human Dispositions: 
 
This impression is confirmed in al-F!r!b"’s Falsafat Aris"#"$l!s, when 
he claims that human beings are not given their final end or perfection 
(kam$l) from the start. In fact, members of the species must use their 
                                                
141 Human will and rational deliberation are guided, in the best cases, by what al-F!r!b" 
calls ‘ilm al-madan!. On the ethical and metaphysical dimension of the ‘ilm al-madan! see,  
D. Gutas, The Meaning of Madan! in al-F$r$b!’s “Political” Philosophy, “Mélanges de 
l’Université Saint-Joseph”, 57, 2004, pp. 259-282.  
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prohairetic faculties (ir$da wa ikhtiy$r) to strive towards this ultimate goal142. 
Of course, in his description of Aristotle’s philosophy, al-F!r!b" suggests, 
quite correctly, that nature (phusis, al-"ab!‘$) contributes partially to this 
process by insuring that human beings possess a number of innate 
dispositions that promote their survival. Interestingly, however in his 
programmatic as well as his chief political works al-F!r!b" tends to distance 
himself from strict Aristotelian orthodoxy and complements the reference to 
nature with an appeal to the idea of providence and divine agency. This 
approach is conspicuous in the Kit$b al-Milla, where al-F!r!b" knowingly 
mixes both naturalistic and providential phraseology when he talks of a God-
given or divinely ordained set of natural dispositions (hay’$t "ab! ‘!ya). Thus, 
after affirming that the universe is created as a coherent and structured 
whole, al-F!r!b" remarks that this order emerges partly thanks to the natural 
capacities or dispositions (hay’$t "ab! ‘!ya) that are found in each one of its 
components. Crucially, however the presence of these ‘natural’ dispositions 
depends on the beneficial work of divine influence:    
[A]-“The Governor of the world places natural dispositions (hay’$t "ab!‘!ya) in 
each part of the universe by which they are united (’i’talafat), ordered 
(’inta%amat), connected (’irtaba"at), and mutually supportive in actions in such a 
way that, despite their multiplicity and the multiplicity of their actions, they 
become like a single thing performing a single action for a single purpose.”143  
 
The same idea is introduced in the *r$’ ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila but the 
argument there is slightly more detailed. Al-F!r!b" explicitly adds that the 
presence of these dispositions (hay’$t, a'w$l) is related to the First Being’s 
substance. He reasserts that all the components of the universe are 
connected and ranked through their essences and their dispositions (hay’$t, 
’a'w$l). However, this time al-F!r!b" is a bit more explicit in his description 
                                                
142 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Falsafat Aris"#"$l!s, ed. M. Mahdi, D!r Majallat Shi‘r, Beirut 1961, pp. 
24-26. 
143 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, D!r al Mashreq, Beirut 2001, pp.64-65. 
Translation modified, see, C. E. Butterworth, Alfarabi: The Political Writings, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2001, pp. 112-113.  
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of these hay’$t or ’a'w$l and gives as an example the inherent capacity for 
friendship (ma'abba) displayed by human beings. To explain how this 
feature comes to characterize mankind al-F!r!b" resorts to the same 
strategy we have explored in our opening chapter (1.4-[K]). In other words, 
he links this sociable attribute to cosmic justice. As we have already seen a 
number of features favourable to the persistence of sublunary life are 
connected to the divine substance (and more specifically to the property of 
‘adl). In the following passage, al-F!r!b" further extends this idea by 
applying it to another beneficial sublunary quality; ma'abba:  
 
[B]-“Other [beings are connected and united] by dispositions (’a'w$l) which 
accompany their essences, such as friendship (ma'abba) by which human 
beings are connected, for friendship is one of their disposition ('$l) not the 
essence to which they owe their being. (2) These dispositions of theirs are also 
derived from the First Being, because its substance is such that many existents 
receive from it together with their substances the dispositions (’a'w$l) by which 
they are connected (yartabi"u) with each other and united (ya’talifu) and ordered 
(yunta%imu).”144 
 
What is striking about excerpt [B] is that al-F!r!b" continues to weave 
together naturalistic and providential explanations. This is a particularly 
interesting move, since it allows him to interpret the Aristotelian dictum that 
man is naturally a political or civil animal (zoon politikon, 'ayaw$n madan! 
bi-"ab‘) in a different perspective. Instead of understanding the social 
dimension of human existence solely in terms of a natural gregarious 
impulse, al-F!r!b" suggests that this beneficial attribute (ma'abba) can 
further be explained metaphysically as the result of divine agency. Thus, 
when he describes the occurrence of this particular feature a few chapters 
later he carefully says that mankind is providentially endowed (maf"#run) 
with a social inclination145.  
                                                
144 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 96-97. 
145 Ibid., pp. 228-229. 
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I shall briefly return to al-F!r!b"’s deliberate use of the Quranic notion of 
fi"ra in a moment, but for now I would like to see how he is helped in his 
reasoning by preserving the Aristotelian view that the city is a composite 
whole or a compound (suntheton, jumla). It is well known that in the Politics, 
Aristotle argues for the priority of the city over the family and the 
individual146. To make his case, Aristotle appeals to the standard kind of 
part-whole rationale that he employs in his biological work147. Hence, he 
claims that in the same way that the human body is naturally prior to the 
hands or the feet, so the city is naturally prior to the individual or the family. 
This is because the parts are naturally posterior to the whole, since the parts 
are for the sake of the whole and dependent on it. For instance, a severed 
hand cannot fulfil its function and in this case is called a “hand” only by 
homonymy. Similarly an isolated individual will not be able to fulfil his 
function by leading a good life, since such a life is only attainable in a city. 
The solitary person then becomes either less or more than human: a beast 
or a god. 
   As I have already intimated, al-F!r!b" believes as well that the city is 
a composite whole (jumla). However, unlike Aristotle, al-F!r!b" does not 
explain the part-whole relation by resorting exclusively to the teleological 
order of nature (phusis) but once again he supplements this point of view 
with the idea of providence. This is already evident in passages [A] and [B], 
where al-F!r!b" explains that the part-whole structure is informed by the 
substance of the First Being. In section [A] al-F!r!b" affirms that the First 
Being orders the various parts that compose the universe into a coherent 
whole by ascribing to them specific dispositions. And in [B] he confirms that 
                                                
146 Arist., Pol. I, 2. This theme is picked up by al-F!r!b" in his discussion of the various kinds 
of human political associations; see F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniya cit., pp. 69-70. 
147 For an analysis of Aristotelian part-whole reasoning as applied to social and political 
reality see, M.R. Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 
237-246 
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statement by asserting that in the case of human beings that particular 
disposition is friendship (ma'abba).  
Al-F!r!b" complements his reworking of Aristotle’s political naturalism 
when discussing the noetic role of the active intellect (‘aql al-fa‘‘$l). The tenth 
and last intellect to emanate from the First, the ‘aql al-fa‘‘$l famously endows 
the human species with common first intelligibles (ma‘q#l$t ’#wla) and in the 
Siy$sa al-Madaniyya this role is particularly described as a form of 
benevolent care (‘in$ya)148. Just as importantly for our purposes, certain of 
these first intelligibles supply human beings with moral and ethical principles. 
These principles are used as the starting point of our goal oriented 
deliberations and their actualization transforms our desiderative states. 
Rather, than being informed by mere animalistic impulses carried through 
sense-perception, our pro-attitudes become, as an effect of the active 
intellect, more rational and reflective.  At this point according to al-F!r!b", 
one can no longer speak of a simple desiring will (ir$da) when describing the 
human volitional faculty, but rather of a deliberative or prohairetic capacity 
(ir$da wa ikhtiy$r)149.   
As we can see, al-F!r!b" is able to capture and recast part of 
Aristotle’s project in providential terms. For instance, he can easily explain 
the presence of ethical and political capacities in the human species by 
appealing to divine justice; which seems to guide and support the hand of 
nature (phusis, al-"ab!‘$). In this way, al-F!r!b" is able to integrate his idea of 
a just cosmic order with his account of human free will and deliberation. 
                                                
148 This is by far one of the most studied elements of al-F!r!b"’s thought. For a general 
analysis of the topic see, H. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their 
Cosmologies, Theory of the Active Intellect and Theories of Human Intellect, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford – New York 1992, pp. 44-73. For the influence of Alexander on al-
F!r!b" see, M. Geoffroy, La Tradition Arabe du Peri Nou d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et les 
Origines de la Théorie Farabienne des Quatres Degrés de l’Intellect, in Aristotele e 
Alessandro di Afrodisia nella Tradizione Araba, ed. C. D’Ancona, G. Serra, Il Poligrafo, 
Padova 2002, pp. 191-231. For the reference to ‘in$ya’ see, F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniya cit., 
pp. 32-33. 
149 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 202-205. F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniya cit., pp. 71-72. 
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Indeed, the existence of a prohairetic faculty (ir$da wa ikhtiy$r) and the 
occurrence of a sociable or friendly impulse (ma'abba) in human beings 
depends on, and confirms the beneficial structure of the universe. 
 
 
3.2- A Hierarchy of Moral, Deliberative and Intellectual Dispositions: 
 
In the little studied Tanb!h ‘al$ Sab!l al-Sa‘$da, and in the more 
famous Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da al-F!r!b" continues to adapt Aristotle’s ethical 
arguments to serve his philosophical agenda. In these texts, he suggests 
that human beings are endowed with the required aretaic dispositions to 
flourish ethically and to be able to construct and live in a virtuous city.  First 
of all, it is important to note that al-F!r!b" adopts the Aristotelian 
classification of virtue into ethical, practical and intellectual categories. 
Moreover, he also largely accepts the peripatetic account of arete (fa%!la) as 
an acquired state developed through gradual habituation. Finally, al-F!r!b" 
insists as well on the fact that the process of habituation results from the 
exercise of one’s free will.      
This comes out clearly in the opening of the Tanbih ‘al$ Sab!l al-
Sa‘$da, where al-F!r!b" differentiates between two kinds of capacities in the 
human soul: the voluntary capacities which lead to the possession of states 
of character that are liable to praise or blame and the natural dispositions 
which do not150. Al-F!r!b"’s reasoning here is evidently dependent on 
Aristotle’s remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics on the nutritive part of the 
soul151. According to Aristotle a study of human virtue will incorporate a 
consideration of the human soul. However, not all parts of the soul contribute 
equally to human agency. For instance, the soul’s nutritive part fulfils 
                                                
150 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b Tanb!h ‘al$ Sab!l al-Sa‘$da, ed. J. Yassir, D!r al-Man!hil, 
Beirut 1992, pp. 229-230. Translated in , J. McGinnis, D. Reisman, Classical Arabic 
Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 2007, pp. 
104-105. 
151 Arist., NE, I, 13. For the Arabic version see, Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., pp. 
146-150. 
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vegetative functions which play a small role in our ethical lives. More 
particularly, the performance of these nutritive functions should not be taken 
into consideration when we wish to evaluate an agent’s moral responsibility 
or worth. Indeed, no one is praised or blamed for breathing appropriately, 
digesting well or sleeping soundly.  Instead, praise or blame, merit and 
demerit are associated with the parts of soul which deals with acting, 
desiring and thinking. Al-F!r!b" takes this distinction for granted when he 
lists these different dispositions in passage [C] as belonging to the voluntary 
part of the soul. 
 
[C]-“Every person, from the moment he exists, is innately endowed (maf"#run) 
with a capacity (quwwa) through which his actions, the accidents of his soul, 
and his discernment are the way they should be, and it is through the very same 
potentiality that these three are not the way they should be.”152 
 
When speaking in excerpt [C] of the soul’s voluntary capacity which deals 
with actions, the accidents of the soul and discernment, al-F!r!b" is of 
course referring, in a rather belaboured fashion, to our moral, deliberative 
and intellectual powers. In other words, he is simply suggesting that human 
beings are providentially endowed (maf"#r#n) with these dispositions and 
can use them voluntarily to pursue virtuous or vicious ends. In the first case, 
these capacities are “the way they should be” and in the second “they are 
not the way they should be” to use al-F!r!b"’s desperately contorted words. 
By once again alluding to the notion of fi"ra or God-given primordial nature 
al-F!r!b" knowingly exploits religious terminology to advance his position 
that human capacities are dependent on divine providence153. 
Aside from the use of Quranic and theological vocabulary, much of 
what al-F!r!b" says is familiar. For instance, like Aristotle he believes that 
human beings are not uniformly equipped with the same virtuous 
                                                
152 F!r!b", Tanbih cit., pp. 232-233. Translation slightly modified see, Reisman, Classical 
Arabic Philosophy Anthology, cit., pp.106-107. 
153 See, “fi"ra” EI2, II, 932, (D. B. MacDonald).  L. Gardet, G. Anawati, Introduction à la 
Théologie Musulmane, J. Vrin, Paris 1944, pp. 349-350.  
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dispositions. In fact, certain persons are more inclined to acquire and 
develop particular moral traits rather than others154. This is more easily 
noticed, al-F!r!b" argues, in irrational animals. A number of species are 
inherently prone to display specific traits of character: such as courage in 
lions or cunning in foxes. Of course, in irrational animals these behaviours 
are not related to the moral virtues at all, since their performance does not 
involve a deliberate and voluntary process of acquisition. Nevertheless, al-
F!r!b" uses a series of zoological examples to bring out the point that 
certain persons appear to be innately better equipped to acquire certain 
virtues. For instance, someone who is inherently prone to stand his ground 
against an enemy will more easily acquire the virtue of courage, according to 
al-F!r!b", than someone whose first reaction is to flee in the face of 
danger155.  
Al-F!r!b" quickly generalizes this observation on moral traits to 
intellectual and deliberative virtues. His argument is rather simple and 
proceeds essentially by analogy. He claims that if moral dispositions vary in 
excellence then this must also be the case for deliberative and intellectual 
dispositions, since they all belong to the same voluntary part of the soul. 
Hence some people will more easily become discerning, generous or clever, 
while others, will have more facility in being courageous, quick-witted, or just. 
In other words, al-F!r!b" assumes that a diverse assortment of virtuous 
dispositions is unevenly distributed across the human species. This 
conclusion seems rather innocuous and uncontroversial. At this point 
however, al-F!r!b"’s line of thought takes an interesting turn. On the basis of 
the arguments elicited above, al-F!r!b" suggests that there is in fact a 
                                                
154 Here al-F!r!b" is obviously inspired by Aristotle’s treatment of the problem of the 
voluntary in the Nicomachean Ethics. See, Arist., NE., III, 5. For the Arabic version see, 
Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., pp. 204-212. For an overview of this problem see, 
S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, pp. 124-178.   
155 F!r!b", Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da cit., pp. 164-165. For a different interpretation of this passage 
see, C. Colmo, Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as founder. Lexington Books, Lanham 2005, 
pp. 17-24.  
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natural dispositional ranking of intellectual, moral and practical virtues in the 
human species. In other words, starting from the Aristotelian idea of a 
diversity of virtuous dispositions, al-F!r!b" tries to ascertain the thesis that 
there exists a latent or potential hierarchical ordering (tart!b) of these 
qualities in the species at large. This claim comes up in the following 
passage from the Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da : 
 
[D]-“(a) If this is the case, not every chance person (ins$n itafaqa) shall possess 
[practical] arts, ethical virtues and intellectual virtues of great potentiality. (b) As 
a result, the king is not a king simply by will (ir$da) but also by nature ("ab!‘$). 
Similarly, the subservient [citizen] occupies a serving (kh$dimun) position 
primarily by nature and secondarily by will. In this way, the [servant’s] natural 
dispositions are perfected. (c) If this is the case, then theoretical virtue, as well 
as the highest deliberative, and moral virtues, along with the practical art are 
found in [persons] that have been readied for it by nature (’u‘idda lah$ bi-"ab‘i ). 
(d) These are the [persons] who are said to possess superior natures with the 
most exceptional potential (quwwa).”156    
 
Al-F!r!b"’s argument in excerpt [D] covers a lot of theoretical ground and as 
a result it rewards close scrutiny. Starting from the assumption at D-(a) that 
there is a hierarchical distribution of innate virtuous dispositions, al-F!r!b" 
infers that the highest political office in the city will have to be occupied by 
the most gifted person. At D-(c) he supplements this claim by affirming that 
this individual’s ethical, intellectual and deliberative dispositions are naturally 
ordained or prepared (’u‘idda lah$ bi-"ab‘i ). By combining these two 
propositions, al-F!r!b" is in fact giving an answer to the all-important 
question: who should govern?  
According to al-F!r!b", the legitimacy of the ruler ought to be based 
on the excellence of his innate virtues. In giving this answer, he explicitly 
rejects two alternative solutions: the belief that the power of the ruler derives 
from simple chance (ittif$q) or that it is rooted only in convention or will 
(ir$da). The critical remark against the importance of chance or randomness 
                                                
156 F!r!b", Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da cit., pp. 165. Translation significantly modified see, Mahdi, 
Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle cit., pp. 33-34. 
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is most probably a jibe directed towards Epicurean atomism. Importantly, al-
F!r!b" extends his analysis from the subject of political legitimacy to that of 
political obligations by resorting to the same kind of reasoning. Once again, 
a person’s inborn virtuous dispositions are believed to prepare her or him for 
a specific political function. Thus, at D-(b), al-F!r!b" explains that a set of 
individuals will have inherently limited talents and abilities; these people 
should as a result fulfil subservient roles in the city157.  
  Interestingly, al-F!r!b" carefully avoids the use of language that might 
lead to a muddling of his position with deterministic arguments. Thus, he 
does not claim that the less gifted citizens will always and necessarily 
occupy a serving position by deferring to the more virtuous inhabitants of the 
city. Similarly, he insists, when discussing the qualities of the possible rulers 
or kings that he is speaking of potential dispositions (quwwa) and not of 
actual virtues. In other words, al-F!r!b" is not asserting that these 
remarkably gifted individuals will in all cases actualize and develop their 
virtuous potential. A fortiori, neither is he claiming that divine providence will 
necessarily ensure that these persons will obtain positions of power and 
prestige if they actualize their dispositions. In fact, on numerous occasions, 
al-F!r!b" underlines the hostile or at best unreceptive socio-political context 
encountered by exceptionally virtuous persons158.  
It is obvious then, that in devising his arguments al-F!r!b" wishes to 
avoid getting caught on either horn of the dilemma surrounding providence. 
Hence, to escape from the Epicurean denial of cosmic order, he claims that 
the human species is endowed (maf"#r/fi"ra) with the necessary disposition 
                                                
157 This line of thought, with its endorsement of the subordination of innately inferior 
individuals to intrinsically superior ones, is in many ways reminiscent of Aristotle’s view on 
natural slavery. See, Arist., Pol. I, 2-5. See, M. Levin, Aristotle on Natural Subordination, 
“Philosophy”, 72, 1997, pp. 241-257.   
158 F!r!b", Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da cit., pp. 195-196, F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 94-95, F!r!b", Afl$t#n 
cit., pp. 22-23. This sensitivity to the difficult predicament of would-be philosopher-kings 
expands on a familiar Platonic theme; see Rep. VI-VII. In fact, in his Falsafat Afl$t#n, al-
F!r!b" goes as far as saying that the perfect human being (al-ins$n al-k$mmil) is in grave 
danger when he finds himself stranded amidst a crowd of inferior citizens. 
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to flourish and construct a virtuous city. On the other hand, to evade the view 
of theological determinists, al-F!r!b" allows for the existence of ideal, non-
ideal and even vicious states of affairs by making the actualization or non-
actualization of virtuous dispositions dependent on the exercise of one’s 
prohairetic faculties (ir$da wa ikhtiy$r).  
 
3.3- Dispositions, Hierarchy and Justice in the Virtuous City: 
 
 The idea that there is an uneven distribution of virtues across the 
human species has also a significant impact on al-F!r!b"’s understanding of 
justice (‘adl) in the ideal city. It notably leads him to assume that the 
institutional composition of the mad!na f$%ila will take the form of a 
meticulously organized hierarchy. We’ve touched on this topic in the 
preceding chapter and seen how al-F!r!b" uses an analogy with the body to 
signal the type of stratification that exists in the perfect polity. Although al-
F!r!b" makes numerous direct references to the nature of this ranking 
(tart!b), he is rarely as explicit and detailed as in the following passage from 
the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a:   
 
E-“The virtuous city is composed of five parts: the virtuous, the belles-lettrists, 
the assessors, the warriors, the merchants. The virtuous are the wise and 
prudent and those who have opinions on the foremost questions. Following 
them are the transmitters of the creed and the belles-lettrists, they are: the 
rhetoricians, the eloquent, the poets, the musicians, the scribes and those who 
accomplish similar tasks. The assessors are the accountants, the engineers, the 
doctors, the astronomers, and those who accomplish similar tasks. The 
merchants are those who earn money in the city, like the farmers, herders, 
sellers and those who accomplish similar tasks.”159 
 
Admittedly, there are echoes here of the constitution of Plato’s Kallipolis, 
obvious in the distinction al-F!r!b" makes between the classes of citizens 
constituted by the wise, the soldiers and the merchants. However, more 
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importantly for our purposes, there are also very clear hints of Aristotle’s 
famous discussion of teleology in the opening book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  
There Aristotle, starting from the view that all activities and inquiries 
are for the sake of something, is led to differentiate between the various 
types of ends that are pursued160. Some appear to be subordinate and 
others seem to be super-ordinate or ultimate ends. Aristotle then offers an 
analysis of the various crafts and sciences based on this distinction161. He 
illustrates his argument with the example of bridle making, an example that 
al-F!r!b" also employs. Thus, Aristotle says that the craft of the bridle maker 
is subordinate to that of the horseman. This is because the horseman is the 
end-user of the bridle. Presumably, the function of the bridle is to allow for 
good horse riding and only the horseman can reckon whether this function is 
properly accomplished or not. Aristotle continues in the same vein by saying 
that the craft of horse riding, in times of war, is subordinate to the art of the 
general, which assigns it its end; namely, victory in battle. At this point, a 
pattern emerges: Aristotle appears to be arguing for the subordination of 
activities that provide means (a bridle or a cavalryman) to those that control 
the ultimate ends (horse riding or military strategy).  
In a striking move al-F!r!b" uses this Aristotelian distinction to help 
him describe the hierarchical order of the ideal city. This is made explicit in 
the following passage: 
 
                                                
160 Arist., NE, I, 1. Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., pp. 112-113. 
161 This topic has been the subject of a central controversy among Aristotelian scholars and 
constitutes one of the focal points in the dispute that opposes “inclusivist” readings of 
Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia to “intellectualist” interpretations. See, J.L Ackrill, Aristotle 
on Eudaimonia, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics ed. A. O. Rorty, University of California 
Press, Berkeley 1980, pp. 15-34. J. M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1975, pp. 144-180.  R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human 
Good, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1989, pp. 197-266. G. Richardson-Lear, Happy 
lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2004, pp. 8-46. 
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F-“The ranks (mar$tib) of the virtuous city are stratified in the [following] 
manner: In certain cases, when a person performs a given action to achieve a 
specific end and in pursuing this end this [person] uses an object-which had 
been the goal of another person’s action- then the first [person] is the ruler and 
has priority in rank over the second. And this is the case of horsemanship; the 
purpose of this [craft] is the perfect use of weaponry. The horseman who uses 
the reins and the instruments that are the aim of the art of making bridles is the 
ruler and he has priority over the bridle maker, and over the horse trainer, and 
this is the case in all activities and crafts”162   
 
Al-F!r!b"’s argument in excerpt [F] is evidently quite similar to that of 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, but it is not identical. In fact, al-F!r!b" 
deploys his reasoning in a slightly different direction. He uses Aristotle’s 
teleological analysis to forge a link between the subordination of activities 
and the subordination of persons. As such, the purpose of al-F!r!b"’s 
argument is to connect the ability of certain citizens to achieve specific ends 
or functions to their political status or rank (rutba). In other words, a citizen 
who performs a higher activity which aims at an ultimate end (gh$ya qu(w$) 
will have more authority in the virtuous city than the one who fulfils a mid- or 
low-level function. By higher end, al-F!r!b" understands, in a very 
Aristotelian fashion, an end that is choice-worthy for itself (a favourite 
example of a gh$ya qu(w$ is happiness). Of course, mid and low level 
activities are not ends in themselves but are carried out for the sake of 
superior goals. 
Importantly, for al-F!r!b" the capacity to carry out higher or lower 
activities will be contingent on the agent’s inborn virtuous abilities. In other 
words, the more gifted agents are more adept and likely to pursue higher 
ends than the less able ones. For instance, someone who is endowed with 
outstanding intellectual and practical abilities is more likely to acquire 
wisdom and prudence. As a result this person is able to better discern and 
grasp the ultimate purpose of human life, i.e. happiness (sa‘$da). Al-F!r!b"’s 
                                                
162 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 68-69. 
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five-fold stratification of the ideal city’s inhabitants presupposes such a 
teleological arrangement.  
Thus, when describing the leaders who occupy the city’s preeminent 
echelons al-F!r!b" says that they are wise and prudent and acquainted with 
the loftiest or foremost matters (’um#r ‘a&!ma). They are followed by the 
transmitters of the creed; these are the rhetoricians, the poets and the 
eloquent. As its name indicates this group of citizens carries out a 
subordinate task, its function is to persuasively communicate and propagate 
the opinions that are endorsed by their enlightened or wise superiors. The 
next group is that of technical administrators; composed of accountants, 
engineers and physicians, this class is inferior to the ideologues since it 
presumably deals with more mundane and practical matters such as 
taxation, water distribution, public health, fortification and road building. For 
the same reason, the warrior, merchant and artisan class occupy the last 
three echelons in the polity. It appears then that the citizens are organized 
by suitably matching the teleological excellence of their social function, their 
political position and their virtuous capabilities.  
As it turns out, this perfect correlation between merit (isti’h$l), civil 
function and institutional rank (rutba) corresponds to al-F!r!b"’s view of 
justice (‘adl) in the ideal city. This implication is conveyed in a turn of phrase 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s analysis of distributive justice in book five of the 
Nicomachean Ethics163:  
                                                
163 See, Arist., NE., V, 1131 a-b. “Regarding the class of partial justice [#] it is concerned 
with the distribution of honour or wealth, or any other [good] which is divided amongst the 
members of the city. For in these things there are equal and unequal [shares] for different 
persons. There is also another kind [of justice] which corrects human transactions. And 
these can be of two types: some incorrect [transactions] are voluntary and others are 
involuntary. For instance, the voluntary are like selling, lending, pledging, loaning, depositing 
and letting, and these are said to be voluntary because the starting point of the transaction 
is voluntary. As to the involuntary ones, some of them are secretive, like theft, adultery, 
witchcraft, procuring, enticing of slaves, assassination and false witness and some involve 
force, like assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery, oppression, insult and slander.” By 
involuntary, Aristotle is referring to transactions done against one’s will or under duress, he 
is obviously describing the action from the perspective of the unwilling victm rather than that 
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G-“Justice (‘adl) concerns first of all the distribution of the common goods 
amongst all the inhabitants of the city. Then, [justice] preserves this distribution. 
The common goods are safety, wealth, honour, ranks (mar$tib) and all the other 
goods that can be shared amongst the inhabitants. To each one of the 
inhabitants of the city correspond a share (qus"a) of these goods equivalent to 
their merit (isti’h$l). It is unjust that one receives less or more [than one’s share]. 
If one receives less, it is an injustice to oneself. If one receives more it is an 
injustice done to the other inhabitants of the city. When each member [of the 
city] has received its proper share (qus"a) of [the common goods], this share 
must be preserved for all of them.” 164  
 
Just like Aristotle, al-F!r!b" recognizes that justice consists in the fair 
allocation of common goods and benefits amongst the citizenry. Moreover, 
they both agree that the share (qus"a) allotted to each person will have to be 
commensurate with their merit (isti’h$l). Where al-F!r!b" and Aristotle differ 
is in the specific institutional context surrounding this procedure. The 
‘Second Teacher’ insists -and here his Platonism comes to the fore- that the 
just distribution of goods and offices is the sole prerogative of an all-powerful 
and virtuous philosopher-king or ideal prince. Aristotle on the other hand 
does not associate distributive justice with one particular form of 
government; indeed, in The Politics he considers how various kinds of 
regimes (democratic, aristocratic, monarchical and mixed) can carry out a 
fair distribution of goods and benefits165. Al-F!r!b"’s more exclusive 
viewpoint, which is consonant with arguments we have explored in the 
                                                                                                                                    
of the active perpetrator. Translation modified see, Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., 
pp. 300-03. On this topic see, D. Keyt, Distributive Justice in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, 
“Topoï: An International Review of Philosophy”, 4, 1985, pp. 23-45. A revised version of this 
article appears under the title "Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice" in A Companion to 
Aristotle’s Politics, eds. D. Keyt, F. Miller, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1991, pp. 238-78. 
See also, T. H. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988, pp. 
424-438. 
164 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 71-72.  
165 Arist., Pol. III-6-7, III-10, 1281 a 10-35, III-12, 1282 b 15–25, III-18, 1287 b 30-35, IV-11. 
Some of these remarks (notably Pol., III, 1282 b 15-25) are reminiscent of Aristotle’s claim 
in the Nicomachean Ethics that all regimes believe in distributive justice: “This is also clear 
from [what accords with] merit (isti’h$l), for all agree that justice is in the [distribution] of 
worthy things, but they do not say that merit (isti’h$l) is the same. The supporters of 
democracy say that it is freedom, while the supporters of oligarchy say that it is wealth, 
others say that it is noble lineage.” See, Arist., NE., V, 1131 a-b. Translation modified see, 
Dunlop, Arabic Nicomachean Ethics cit., pp. 300-03.  
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preceding chapter (2.4-[E]), comes up with particular force in a revealing 
section of the Siy$sa al-Madaniyya where he describes the preeminent role 
played by the first ruler (al-ra’!s al-’awwal) in the ranking (tart!b) of his 
subjects: 
 
H-“(a) The ranking (mar$tib) of the members of the city, when it comes to ruling 
(ri’$sa) and serving (khidma), are stratified in excellence according to their 
inherent dispositions (fi"ra) and according to the habits of character they have 
formed. The first ruler (ra’!s al-’awwal) is the one who ranks each section and 
every individual in each section, in the place they merit (isti’h$l), by ascribing to 
each one a ruling or serving position. Therefore there will be certain ranks that 
are close to the [first ruler], others slightly further away, and still others that are 
far away from him. These are the ruling ranks of [the city] (mar$tib al-ri’$s$t), 
starting from the highest ruling position, one descends gradually until one 
reaches the serving ranks (mar$tib al-khidma), devoid of any element of ruling 
and below which there is no other rank. (b) Therefore, after having ordered 
these ranks (mar$tib), if the first ruler wishes to issue a command concerning a 
certain matter that he desires the members of the city or one of their sections to 
perform, [#], he will communicate his wish to the ranks closest to him, these 
will hand it on to their subordinates, and so forth until it reaches down to the 
rank (rutba) assigned to execute (khidma) that specific matter. As a result, the 
parts of the city will be connected (murtabi"a) to each other and united 
(mu’talifa) together and hierarchized (murataba) by giving precedence to some 
[parts] over others [parts]. (c) Thus the [structure] of the city becomes 
analogous to the [order] of natural beings, its ranking is similar to the ranking of 
the existents (al-mawjud$t) which originate from the First [being] and terminate 
in prime matter and the elements; and the way the [parts of the city] are 
connected (murtabi"a) and united (mu’talifa) to each other will be similar to the 
way the existents are connected (murtabi"a) and united (mu’talifa) together. The 
founder (mudabir) of such a city will be like the First cause which is the cause of 
the existence of all the other beings. The ranks of existents decline gradually, 
each [rank] fulfilling a ruling and serving [role], until one reaches the lowest 
possible existents which have no ruling qualities but can only serve (kh$dima) 
and exist for the sake of others that is, prime matter and the elements.”166 
 
In this pivotal passage, al-F!r!b" nicely brings together a number of central 
features of his conception of cosmic and political justice. In the first place, he 
begins by explaining how the virtuous sovereign arranges the various ranks 
(rutba) of the ideal city by judiciously calibrating each position and office to 
the virtuous disposition (fi"ra) and merit (isti’h$l) of its occupant. As in Plato’s 
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Republic, the perfect ruler is supposed to meticulously evaluate the abilities 
of all the individuals before assigning them a function consonant with their 
skill. And since, as we just saw, human beings are endowed with unequal 
dispositions the best citizens will be entrusted with leading roles and the less 
gifted will be assigned more subservient tasks. A direct outcome of this 
process is the establishment of a strictly hierarchical and centralized chain of 
command throughout the entire polity. The orders issued by the perfect king 
will be conveyed to his closest and most worthy deputies who will 
communicate his wishes to suitable auxiliaries. If need be these persons 
might pass on the necessary commands to lower ranked attendants and so 
on until the appropriate actions are taken and the required results obtained. 
In this way, a beneficial and effective ranking will permeate the multiple 
layers of the city’s institutions. The subordinate and superordinate arts, 
crafts and sciences and the persons that pursue them will be so perfectly 
coordinated and ordered that even at a distance from the first ruler, the 
exercise of his diffused authority will still be called the work of wisdom and 
justice. 
In the second place, al-F!r!b" indicates that this hierarchical structure 
(tart!b) mirrors exactly the graded emanative organization of the universe 
(ni&$m). To underline this resemblance, al-F!r!b" characteristically employs 
similar language when describing these two arrangements. Thus, each 
inhabitant in the city is said to have a certain virtuous merit (isti’h$l) to which 
corresponds a proper share (qus"a) of goods and a clear rank (rutba). In the 
same way, each being emanating from the First has an allotted share (qus"a) 
of existence (wuj#d) which reflects its ontological worth (isti’h$l) and its rank 
(rutba) in the world. Finally, al-F!r!b" rounds off his depiction by comparing 
the role played by the city’s founding father (mudabir) to the function of the 
First Being.  
 In his sober and almost peremptory presentation of this analogy, al-
F!r!b" coarsens the subtleties of his vision, but this deliberate economy of 
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detail is meant to serve a greater purpose. I think that al-F!r!b" wants us to 
realize that the agreement between the cosmic and political structures is in 
part rendered possible by the providential allocation of dispositional virtues 
(fi"ra/’a'w$l) in the human species at large. In other words, it is only because 
there are persons potentially equipped with higher, lower and mid-level 
abilities that there are clearly differentiated serving and ruling parts (mar$tib 
al-khidma/ mar$tib al-ri’$sa) in the city. In this sense, the dispositional 
gradation of intellectual, practical and moral virtues enables the 
differentiations between the various specialized groups that compose the 
virtuous polity such as the belle-lettrists, the assessors, the warriors and the 
merchants; and this renders the collective pursuit of human excellence 
possible. It is important to notice, however, that the existence of these 
diverse virtues and dispositions is not to be confused with their proper 
actualization or correct ranking.  
As we have just seen, the attainment of communal flourishing 
depends on the deliberate and voluntary actions of a set of free agents led 
by an exceptionally gifted ruler. If these agents are rightly guided and ranked 
then they will correctly exercise their inborn capacities and in the process 
acquire the corresponding virtues and achieve their ultimate ends. The 
opposite is, of course, true. In other words, human beings can easily use the 
same innate prohairetic faculties and dispositions in a completely different 
direction and pursue vice rather than virtue, domination and pleasure instead 
of justice and wisdom.  
 
 
3.4- The Denial of Providence and the Diseased Opinions of Ignorant   
  Cities:  
 
In fact, according to al-F!r!b" all the unjust or ignorant cities strive 
towards false conceptions of happiness and operate with a misconstrued 
understanding of justice. As a result, their political institutions tend to 
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promote erroneous values and breed vicious habits in the citizenry. This is 
evident in the way the majority of their inhabitants conceive of merit (isti’h$l). 
For instance, many of them will estimate an individual’s worth in accordance 
with the quantity of pleasure, wealth, and power this person will have been 
able to accumulate without any regard for his or her virtuous disposition and 
development.    
 
J-“In the eyes of the members of the ignorant cities, merits (istih$l) are not 
based on virtue but on wealth, or on possessing the means of pleasure and play 
and on obtaining more [than one’s share] of both or on obtaining more [than is] 
necessary for life, so that one is served and well provided for with all the 
necessities he needs. [#] There is another thing which is strongly desired by 
most of the members of the ignorant cities: domination. For whoever gains it 
becomes an object of envy. Therefore, [domination] as well must be regarded 
as one of the merits (istih$l) in the ignorant communities.”167 
 
Interestingly, al-F!r!b" suggests that these erroneous conceptions of 
happiness and justice might often be rooted in a denial of divine providence. 
In passage [M] al-F!r!b" describes a series of atomistic and flux doctrines 
and connects them to the opinions held by the inhabitants of ignorant and 
perverted cities in excerpts [K] and [L].  
 
K-  “Some people maintained that friendship and attachment do not exist, 
neither by nature nor by a conscious act of will, that every human being ought to 
hate every other human being and that everybody ought to show dislike of 
everybody; that two people join forces only in case of necessity and do not unite 
except in case of need [#] If some outside event compels them to associate 
and unite, their cooperation will go on. But when that emergency has passed, 
they ought again to dislike each other and separate.”  
 
L- “Justice is to defeat by force every possible group of men which happens to 
be in one’s way; and the defeated either loses his physical integrity in his defeat 
and then dies and perishes, and the victor remains alone in existence, or he 
loses his position of honor in his defeat, and then will survive in an inferior 
status or be enslaved by the victorious group and will do what is most useful for 
the victor.” 
 
                                                
167 F!r!b", Siy$sa al-Madaniya cit., pp. 90-91. Translation significantly modified see, F. 
Najjar, The Political Regime, in Medieval Political Philosophy, ed. M. Mahdi, R. Lerner, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1972, pp. 44-45. 
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M-“We see things occurring without order; we see that the established ranks of 
the existents are not kept, we see many single things connected closely with 
some being or non-being without deserving it. They said: This and the like of it 
is evident in the existents which we observe and come to know. [#] Therefore 
they held that cities ought to overpower and to fight each other, there being 
neither any ranks nor any established order, nor any place of honour or 
something else reserved for one and nobody else in particular according to 
merit (istih$l).”168   
    
In other words, al-F!r!b" argues that if our conception of the cosmos 
concentrates on its apparent chaotic nature and on the perceptible rule of 
chance in human events then we will reach a deviant conception of political 
justice. Starting from the apparent cosmic disorder, one will posit by analogy 
a view of human affairs that privileges the importance of power, survival and 
domination. By extension, this same belief will lead us to reject the existence 
of a providential gradation of human dispositions and virtues. As a result, a 
person’s political rank and function will not be made to correspond to his or 
her inborn nature and talents. Consequently, the entire edifice that sustains 
the foundation and justice of the ideal city will crumble. Indeed, if there are 
no inborn dispositions and virtues then there is no proper function or correct 
ranking within a polity.  
Here, al-F!r!b" clearly underlines the fact that our metaphysical 
presuppositions influence to a large extent our normative beliefs. He gives a 
further example of this when he says that someone who denies the 
existence of a providential cosmic order will also deny the existence of an 
inherent amicable impulse in the human species. In point of fact, al-F!r!b" 
argues in excerpt [K], that from this false perspective the motivations behind 
our mutual interactions are likely to be glossed over as either expressions of 
self-interest or reactions to strong external constraints. Similarly, he 
continues in [L], political justice will in all likelihood be equated with the 
manifestation of brute force and domination.  
                                                
168 For excerpts [K] [L] [M] see, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 291, 293, 299.  
 88 
Al-F!r!b" sketches a picture of human existence under these presumed 
chaotic cosmic conditions which resembles the nasty version of life 
encountered in a Hobbesian state of nature. This dark tableau serves the 
dual purpose of warning us against the consequences of faulty ideas about 
providence and of complementing al-F!r!b"’s analysis of Ignorant regimes. 
Indeed, al-F!r!b"’s description of this disorderly moral and cosmic universe 
is carried out to finalize his account of the various symptoms that ail 
unhealthy political communities. As we shall see in the next chapter, this 
investigation helps tie together the cosmic, bodily and political strands of his 
project. After establishing that certain views or beliefs are diseased169, al-
F!r!b" describes how a healthy or virtuous state of affairs can be brought 
about through the assiduous and expert care of a beneficial and therapeutic 
political craft. 
 




















                                                
169 Here it is important to keep in mind that the understanding of providence associated with 
Stoicism and theological determinism is also seen by al-F!r!b" as a wicked and unhealthy 
doctrine. This point has already been discussed in our opening chapter; see section 1.5-[L].  
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           Chapter Four 
 
      Medicine and the Practice of Virtuous Politics 
 
The opening of al-F!r!b"’s Fu(#l Muntaza‘a announces his 
commitment to an analogy between the medical and political or civil craft 
(mihna, (in$‘a) in dramatic terms. The drama begins with the title: the word 
“Fu(#l” is surely intended to recall the Fu(#l Buqr$", the name )unayn Ibn 
Is'$q had given to his Arabic translation of Hippocrates’ famous Aphorisms. 
Al-F!r!b"’s first move, in other words, is to associate his treatise in the minds 
of his readers with one of the most celebrated works in the history of medical 
thought and practice170. The importance of this decision is confirmed in the 
first series of aphorisms. After stating that the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a offers 
political and ethical recommendations gleaned from the ancients (al-
qudam$’) to assist the founding of a virtuous city171, al-F!r!b" explicitly 
compares the craft of the statesman to that of the physician. He suggests 
that the role of the statesman or king is to restore and preserve the moral 
health of the city in the same way that the physician restores and preserves 
the physical health of the body172.  
In aphorisms thirty to thirty two of the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a, al-F!r!b" hints 
at a fundamental clarification: While discussing the different types of political 
                                                
170 For the use of “Fu(#l” in the Arabic medical literature see, D.M. Dunlop, Aphorisms of the 
Statesman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1961, pp. 9-10, 27-28. For the nature 
of the medical curriculum in the Islamic context see, P.E. Pormann, E. Savage-Smith, 
Medieval Islamic Medicine, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2007, pp. 80-85. 
Maimonides in his commentary on Hippocrates’ Aphorisms famously mentions al-F!r!b"’s 
work as a model in his discussion of the literary genre of the “Fu(#l”. See, Maimonides, 
Medical Aphorisms Treatise 1-5, ed. trans. G. Bos, Brigham Young University Press, Provo 
2007. To my knowledge there exists no critical edition of )unayn Ibn Is'$q’s Arabic version 
of Hippocrates’s Aphorisms. Although the Syriac version has been edited, see H. Pognon, 
Une Version Syriaque des Aphorismes d’Hippocrate, J.C. Hinrich, Leipzig 1903.   
171 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 22-23. “These are selected aphorisms (fu(#l muntaza‘a) which 
include many basic considerations from the sayings of the ancients on how cities must be 
ruled and rendered prosperous and the lives of their people reformed, and how they must 
be directed towards happiness”.  Translation slightly modified, see Dunlop, Aphorisms cit., 
pp. 26-27. 
172 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 24-25.   
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leadership, he suggests that the analogy between medicine and politics is 
valid primarily when used to describe the work performed by the ideal ruler 
or true king (al-malik f! l-'aq!qa). Part of the reason for this is that, according 
to al-F!r!b" non-ideal sovereigns will usually exercise their power to pursue 
their personal benefits, such as wealth, pleasure or honour, rather than to 
foster their subjects’ moral flourishing173. As such, the comparison with the 
medical craft would obviously be inappropriate: Simply because, in al-
F!r!b"’s view a physician’s actions are always directed towards the 
promotion of his patients’ health and not towards the promotion of his self-
interest174.  
In this sense, the analogy between medicine and politics allows al-
F!r!b" to touch on the problem of political authority. He notes that the 
shortcomings of non-ideal rulers are such that the ancients (al-qudam$’) 
refused to call them kings at all. This remark points us towards an interesting 
argument on political legitimacy, which al-F!r!b" uses on several occasions, 
notably in the concluding section of the Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da175. In this segment, 
al-F!r!b" argues that the legitimate exercise of political authority depends 
solely on the ruler’s possession of a certain form of virtuous expertise and 
not on the presence of other extrinsic elements such as wealth, public 
support or even power. Predictably, al-F!r!b" reinforces this claim by 
appealing to a medical analogy. Thus, he says that the ideal ruler is a 
                                                
173 “A group of other [non-virtuous] rulers is of the opinion that it is all three of these [ends] 
brought together-namely, honours, wealth, and pleasures. They rule despotically and use 
the inhabitants of the city as things similar to tools for them to attain pleasures and wealth. 
Not one of these is called king by the ancients.” F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 24-25. Translation 
modified, see C. E. Butterworth, Alfarabi: The Political Writings, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2001, pp. 28-29.    
174 For al-F!r!b"’s definition of the medical craft see, Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Ris$la f! al-Radd 
‘al$ J$l!n#s in Traité Philosophiques: Al-Kind!, Al-F$r$b!, Ibn Bajjah, Ibn ‘Addy, ed.  A. 
Badawi, Publication de L’Université de Libye, Benghazi 1973, pp. 38-42. For an illuminating 
analysis of the classification of medicine in Arabic philosophy see, D. Gutas, Medical Theory 
and Scientific Method in the Age of Avicenna, in Before and After Avicenna, ed. D. 
Reisman, E.J. Brill, Leiden 2003, pp. 145-162.  
175 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da, ed. J. Yassir, D!r al-Man!hil, Beirut 1992, 
pp. 195-196. Translation slightly modified see, M. Mahdi, Alfarabi: Philosophy of Plato and 
Aristotle, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1969, pp. 48-49.   
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sovereign because of his mastery of the kingly craft in the same way that the 
authentic physician is a physician by his mastery of the medical craft176.  
 This idea, of course, has significant Platonic undertones and D. M. 
Dunlop correctly notes that the analogy between the craft (techne) of the 
ideal king and that of the excellent physician can be traced back to several 
sections of the Statesman177. It is unlikely that this dialogue was available to 
al-F!r!b" in its entirety. Nevertheless, he seems to have been familiar with 
the main lines of its argument, which he correctly reports in his Falsafat 
Afl$"un178. To explain this familiarity Dunlop speculates that al-F!r!b" could 
have had access to the dialogue through an Arabic version of its Galenic 
synopsis179. Whatever the case may be, what is clear is that al-F!r!b" is 
attracted to the Platonic view that there is an expert political knowledge and 
that the possession of this knowledge renders the exercise of power 
legitimate. 
On the other hand, when it comes to his discussion of how this 
legitimate power is employed, al-F!r!b" turns to Aristotle’s treatment of 
prudence (phronesis, ta‘aqqul) for inspiration. For instance, when he defines 
the various components of the ideal kingly craft in the Kit$b al-Milla and the 
I's$’ al-‘Ul#m, al-F!r!b" insists that the perfect ruler should apply his craft by 
relying on a specific faculty, a faculty which is acquired only via a prolonged 
period of wide ranging experience (tajriba) in political affairs. The 
philosophers of antiquity, al-F!r!b" adds, call this faculty, prudence 
                                                
176 See, excerpts [A] and [B]. 
177 Dunlop, Aphorisms cit., pp. 17-20. For additional parallels with Platonic texts, notably in 
the Statesman, Laws and Republic see, J. Lameer, The Philosopher and the Prophet: 
Greek Parallels to Al-F$r$b!’s Theories of Religion and Philosophy in the State, in 
Perspectives Arabes et Médiévales sur la Tradition Scientifique et Philosophique Grecque, 
ed. A. Hasnawi, M. Aouad, Peeters, Leuven 1997, pp. 609-621. 
178 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Alfarabius: De Platonis Philosophia, ed. F. Rosenthal, R. Walzer, 
Warburg Institute Press, London 1943, pp. 12-13. 
179 See, G. Bergsträsser, )unayn ibn Ish$q über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-
Übersetzungen, zum ersten mal herausgegeben und übersetzt, F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 
1925, pp. 49-50. See as well, P. Kraus, R. Walzer, Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis, 
Warburg Institute, London 1951, pp. 1-17, 97-98. 
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(ta‘aqqul). Here it is obvious that when he refers to the Ancient or Classical 
view of prudence, al-F!r!b" has specifically in mind the Aristotelian account 
of phronesis as presented in book six of the Nicomachean Ethics. Al-F!r!b" 
is of course entirely conversant with this portion of the work as can be 
gathered from his description of phronesis (ta‘aqqul) and other Aristotelian 
intellectual virtues such as deliberation (rawiyya) and wisdom ('ikma) in 
aphorisms thirty-four to forty five of the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a. However, what is 
more significant for our immediate concerns is that in the Kit$b al-Milla and 
the I's$’al-‘Ul#m, al-F!r!b" illustrates his thinking about the workings of 
tajriba and ta‘aqqul by drawing once again an analogy between the medical 
and political crafts180.  
Thus, he claims that when it comes to the application of his art, the 
true king ought to proceed in a manner similar to that of the excellent 
physician. The latter applies his trade in light of the lengthy experience 
(tajriba) he has acquired while treating various kinds of ailments181. Al-F!r!b" 
insists on the fact that this experience is gained by dealing with particular 
cases and individuals under specific circumstances and not simply by 
reading medical manuals or clinical notes 182. The ideal king similarly will 
                                                
180 See, excerpts [A] and [B]. The reliance on craft-analogy is an important feature of 
Aristotle’s discussion of prohairesis in the Nicomachean Ethics, see S. Broadie, Ethics with 
Aristotle, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, pp. 181-212. C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of 
Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992, pp. 73-79. 
M. Galston briefly discusses al-F!r!b"’s reliance on a medical analogy; see M. Galston, 
Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Alfarabi, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1990, pp. 101-106. 
181 On the importance of experience in Ancient medicine see, Hippocrates, On Ancient 
Medicine, trans. M. J. Schiefsky, E.J. Brill, Leiden 2005. For another significant source see, 
Galen, On Medical Experience: The First Edition of the Arabic Version, ed. R. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1944. See as well, L. G. Ballester, Galen as Medical 
Practitioner: Problems in diagnosis, in Galen: Problems and Prospects, ed. V. Nutton, The 
Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London 1981, pp. 13-47. For a recent 
analysis of this issue in the Arabic context see, M. Forcada, Ibn Bajj$ on Medicine and 
Medical Experience, “Arabic Science and Philosophy”, 21, 2011, pp. 111-148. 
182 On clinical notes and case histories in Islamic medicine see, C. Alvarez-Millan, Practive 
versus Theory: Tenth-century Case Histories from the Islamic Middle-East, in The Year 
1000: Medical Practice at the End of the First Millennium, ed. P. Horden, E. Savage-Smith, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, pp. 293-306. See as well, P. E. Pormann, Case 
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have to develop his prudence (ta‘aqqul) through extensive practical contact 
with political affairs. Al-F!r!b" is emphatic about the concrete nature of this 
experience (tajriba) and how it must involve dealing with palpable actors and 
situations. Here, the influence of Aristotle is visible in the way al-F!r!b" 
presents tajriba and ta‘aqqul as being primarily concerned with tangible 
particulars rather than with abstract universals. 
At this point, one begins to make out why the medical analogy is so 
appealing to al-F!r!b". In many ways the comparison between the medical 
and political craft allows him to harmonize Aristotle’s treatment of prudence 
and Plato’s account of political authority. The result is a distinctly Farabian 
perspective on the nature of political leadership. This outlook comes out 
clearly when he lists the various attributes of the ideal ruler or true king (al-
malik f! l-'aq!qa). Among these qualities, al-F!r!b" highlights specifically the 
king’s rare combination of theoretical wisdom ('ikma) and complete 
prudence (ta‘aqqul t$mm)183. The assumption is that this unusual ability 
enables the ideal ruler to seamlessly perform the complementary tasks of 
grasping the universal nature of human flourishing and of actualizing this 
vision in a particular socio-political context involving specific individuals.  
Unsurprisingly, al-F!r!b" conveys this point by comparing the craft of 
the ideal king to that of the excellent physician. Indeed, al-F!r!b" presents 
the medical doctor as a fitting model because he is altogether acquainted 
with the universal notions of health, but he also knows how to apply his 
theoretical learning to particular cases by restoring the well-being of patients 
and curing their specific diseases184. I think that al-F!r!b" wants us to see 
                                                                                                                                    
Notes and Clinicians: Galen’s Commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics in the Arabic 
Tradition, “Arabic Science and Philosophy”, 18, 2008, pp. 247-284. 
183 See, F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 244-249. F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 66-67. For a brief but 
extremely helpful comparison of al-F!r!b"’s treatment of the attributes of the ideal ruler in 
these two texts see, Dunlop, Aphorisms cit., pp. 86-87.  
184 This conception of the ideal medical practitioner as a figure who perfectly combines 
theoretical and hands-on knowledge is influenced by Galen’s visions of medical science. 
Galen develops his thesis notably in his polemical writings against the Methodist and 
Empiricist schools. See, Galen, On the Sects for Beginners, in Galen: Three Treatises on 
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that it is this unique ability to bridge the realms of abstract learning and 
concrete practice that makes the excellent physician a master of his trade 
and it is the same combination of theoretical and practical intellectual virtues 
that makes the ideal sovereign an expert in the virtuous kingly craft and as a 
result a legitimate king. 
 
4.1-The Virtuous Kingly Craft and the Excellent Physician:    
 
This stance is perceptible in the following two excerpts where al-F!r!b" 
describes the faculties that compose the virtuous kingly craft (mihna 
malikiyya f$%ila) by comparing them to the capacities used by the medical 
practitioner:  
A-“(1) The first virtuous kingly craft (mihna malikiyya f$%ila ’#l$) consists in 
the knowledge of all the actions that help establish the virtuous habits and 
modes of life in cities and nations. [It consists as well] in the ability to 
preserve them for [the citizenry], and to safeguard and protect them from the 
influence of something coming from the ignorant (j$hiliyya) ways of life; for 
these are all diseases that affect the virtuous cities. (2) In this sense, it is 
like the medical craft (mihnatu "ibb); for the latter consists in the knowledge 
of all the actions that help establish health in a human being, preserve it for 
him, and guard it against any disease that might affect him.”185   
 
B-“(1) The virtuous kingly craft (mihna malikiyya f$%ila) is composed of two 
faculties: One of these is the faculty for universal rules (qaw$n!n kulliyya). 
The other is the faculty a human being acquires through lengthy 
involvement in civic deeds, carrying out actions with respect to particulars 
and persons in specific cities and [gaining] proficiency in them through 
experience (tajriba) and long observation (mush$hada) as it is with 
medicine. (2) Indeed, a physician becomes a perfect healer only by means 
of two faculties. One is the faculty for the universals and rules he acquires 
                                                                                                                                    
the Nature of science, ed. M. Frede, pp. 1-20. For the Arabic version of this work see, M. S. 
S!lim, ed. Kit$b Jalin#s f! Firaq al--ibb lil-Muta‘allim!n, al-Hay’a al-Mi%r"ya, Cairo 1978. The 
idea that genuine scientific knowledge results from a combination of empirical and 
theoretical elements is also characteristic of Galen’s epistemology see, M. Frede, On 
Galen’s Epistemology, in Galen: Problems and Prospects, ed. V. Nutton, The Wellcome 
Institute for the History of Medicine, London 1981, pp. 65-86. See also, V. Boudon, Art, 
Science et Conjecture Chez Galien, in Galien et la Philosophie, eds. J. Barnes, J. Jouanna, 
Fondation Hardt, Geneva 2003, pp. 269-298. 
185 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, D!r al-Mashriq, Beirut 2001, pp. 56-57. 
Translation modified see, Butterworth, The Political Writings cit., pp 104-105.   
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from the medical books. The other is the faculty he attains by lengthy 
involvement in practicing medicine on the sick and by skill in it from long 
experience (tajriba) with, and observation of, individual bodies. (3) By 
means of this faculty the physician is able to determine the medicaments 
and cure with respect to each body in each circumstance. Similarly, the 
kingly craft is able to determine the actions with respect to each occurrence, 
each circumstance and each city in each moment only by means of this 
faculty viz. the experiential (tajribiyya) [faculty]”186 
 
In excerpt [A] al-F!r!b" reiterates, but in a more precise fashion, the position 
stated in the opening aphorisms of the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a. Here, the use of the 
medical analogy is from the start unambiguously associated with the virtuous 
kingly craft and appears to exclude other forms of political leadership. Even 
so, the focus of the analogy is clearly similar; we are told that the virtuous 
king is concerned mostly with his subjects’ moral welfare, in the same way 
that the physician is concerned with his patients’ health. Al-F!r!b" extends 
his use of medical terminology by describing the vicious or ignorant ways of 
life (siyar j$hiliyya) as diseases (’amr$%) that affect the habits of the virtuous 
citizens.  
The association of moral concepts such as vice and virtue with 
medical notions like health and disease is of course, a common theme in the 
ethical writings of the time187. This is famously illustrated by the title and 
                                                
186 Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", I'sa’ al-‘Ul#m, ed. O. Amin, D!r al-Fikr al-‘Arab", Cairo 1948, pp. 
103-104.  Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political Writings cit., pp. 77-78 
187 On the various genres of Arabic ethical writings see, D. Gutas, Ethische Schriften im 
Islam, in Orientalisches Mittlealter, ed. W. Heinrichs, AULA-Verlag, Wiesbaden 1990, pp. 
346-365. The therapeutic approach in Arabic ethics is noticeable in all three genres listed by 
Gutas: Popular-philosophical works, the gnomological collections and the Fürstenspiegel. Of 
course the emphasis on ethical therapy is closely linked to similar developments in Ancient 
philosophy, for an examination of the relationship between Ancient and Arabic ethics see, 
Th.-A. Druart, La Philosophie Morale Arabe et l’Antiquité Tardive, “Bulletin d’Etudes 
Orientales”, 48, 1996, pp. 183-187. On the Galenic influence on Arabic ethics see, G. 
Strohmaier, Die Ethik Galens und ihre Rezeption in der Welt des Islams, in Galien et la 
Philosophie, ed. J. Barnes, J. Jouanna, Fondation Hardt, Geneva 2003, pp. 307-327. See 
as well, J. N. Mattock, A Translation of the Arabic Epitome of Galen’s Book Peri Ethon, in 
Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition : Essays presented to Richard Walzer on his 
Seventieth Birthday, ed. S. M. Stern, A. Hourani, V. Brown, Bruno Cassirer Publishers, 
Oxford 1972, pp. 235-260. On the therapeutic approach in Ancient philosophy see, R. 
Sorabji, Emotion Peace of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000. M. Nussbaum, The 
Threrapy of Desire : Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton University Press, 
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content of al-R!z"’s treatise on moral improvement the -ibb al-Ru'$ni. 
There, al-R!z" provides a series of dialectical arguments, practical 
suggestions and rhetorical anecdotes that are supposed to act like remedies 
against moral diseases such as envy, pride or lust188. A similar therapeutic 
bent is noticeable in the ethical work of al-F!r!b"’s associate Ya!y! Ibn ‘Ad", 
the Tahdh!b al-Akhl$q and in Miskawayh’s treatise bearing the same 
name189.  However, in the case of al-F!r!b", the therapeutic attitude appears 
to be less attentive to individual or personal moral guidance or salvation and 
is mostly focused on collective or socio-political healing.  
As a result, al-F!r!b" is primarily interested by the question of how a 
virtuous ruler can establish and preserve the ethical and civil health of the 
ideal city’s inhabitants. A partial answer to this problem is provided in section 
[B]-1 when al-F!r!b" differentiates between the two faculties that constitute 
the virtuous kingly craft (mihna malikiyya f$%ila). The first is a theoretical 
faculty concerned with universal rules (qaw$n!n kulliyya) and the second is a 
practical capacity, which is rooted in experience (tajriba). Although al-F!r!b" 
is not explicit in this context about the exact nature or content of the qaw$n!n 
kulliyya, it is obvious that part of what he has in mind is a set of broad ethical 
principles concerned with human flourishing190. This comes out clearly in the 
                                                                                                                                    
Princeton 1994. J. Pigeaud, La Maladie de l’Âme : Étude sur la Relation de l’Âme et du 
Corps dans la Tradition Médico-philosophique Antique, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1981. P. 
Hadot, Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie Antique, Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, Paris 
1993. 
188 See, al-R!z", Opera Philosophica Fragmentaque Quae Supersunt, ed. P. Kraus, 
Ma,ba‘at B$l B!rb"h, Cairo 1939. Arberry’s English version of this text is rather free and one 
should prefer the more recent and faithful French and Spanish translations. See, al-R!z", 
The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes, trans. A. J. Arberry, J. Murray, London 1950. For the 
French version see,  al-R!z", La Médecine Spirituelle, trans. R. Brague, GF Flammarion, 
Paris 2003. For the Spanish translation see, al-R!z", La Conducta Virtuosa Del Filósofo, 
trans. E. Tornero Poveda, Trotta Editorial, Madrid 2004. 
189 See, Ya*y! Ibn ‘Ad", The Reformation of Morals: A Parallel English-Arabic Text, trans. S. 
H. Griffith, Brigham Young University Press, Provo 2002. Ibn Miskawayh, Traité d’Ethique, 
trans. M. Arkoun, Institut Français de Damas, Damas 1970.  
190 On the difference between Aristotle’s and al-F!r!b"’s conception of ethics see, Th.-A. 
Druart, Al-F$r$b!, Ethics and First Intelligibles, “Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione 
Filosofica Medievale”, 8, 1997, pp.403-423.  
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following definition of civil philosophy (falsafa madaniyya) which al-F!r!b" 
provides a few lines later in the I's$’ al-‘Ul#m: 
 
C-“This science [civil philosophy (falsafa madaniyya)] has two parts: (1) One 
part comprises bringing about cognizance of what happiness is; 
distinguishing between what it truly is and what it is presumed to be; 
enumerating the universal voluntary actions, ways of life, moral habits, and 
states of character that are such as to be distributed in cities and nations, 
and distinguishing the virtuous ones from the non-virtuous ones. 
(2) The other part concerns the [concrete] ranking (tart!b) of the virtuous 
states of character and ways of life in [given] cities and nations, [and] the 
knowledge of the kingly practices by which the virtuous ways of life and 
actions are established and ranked (turattab) among the inhabitants of the 
cities and the practices by which this ranking and acquired habits are 
preserved.”191 
 
As one would expect, al-F!r!b" seems to suggest that the two faculties that 
characterize the virtuous kingly craft correspond to the two parts that 
constitute the discipline of civil philosophy (falsafa madaniyya). If this is 
correct, then the content of the qaw$n!n kulliyya should tally to a large extent 
with the subjects listed in [C]-1. In other words, the theoretical faculty of the 
kingly craft will be mostly concerned with the task of grasping the nature of 
human flourishing  (sa‘$da). This will include a detailed understanding of the 
virtuous qualities that help promote happiness as well as an awareness of 
the vices that hinder its attainment. Importantly, al-F!r!b" also insists on the 
political dimension of this knowledge. The flourishing he has in mind is 
obviously related to the specific arrangement and distribution of these virtues 
within the context of a city or a nation. This knowledge will certainly include 
al-F!r!b"’s description of political justice discussed in the preceding chapter.  
 This impression is confirmed when we turn to an examination of the 
role the practical faculty is supposed to play. In [C]-2 al-F!r!b" enumerates 
the topics embraced by the second part of civil philosophy. In this passage, 
he clearly indicates that the practical element of the falsafa madaniyya deals 
with the procedures and methods that help actualize, in a concrete socio-
                                                
191 F!r!b", I'sa’ al-‘Ul#m cit., pp. 104-105 
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political setting, the abstract ethical knowledge discovered in the first part. In 
this context, al-F!r!b"’s use of terms like tart!b and turattab to describe the 
work carried out by the practical faculty is quite telling. This terminology is 
obviously meant to remind us of al-F!r!b"’s hierarchical analysis of justice in 
the ideal city. As we have already seen the happiness and flourishing of the 
mad!na f$%ila depends on a specific rank ordering of its inhabitants in terms 
of their virtuous abilities. Beyond that, of course, the idea of tart!b is also 
reminiscent of the scalar order of the cosmos, and it hints as well at al-
F!r!b"’s hierarchical conception of the cardiocentric body. By exploiting the 
semantic wealth of the term tart!b in this manner, al-F!r!b" evidently wants 
us to recall that the cosmic, corporeal and civil structures are analogous (a 
similar strategy is employed in passage [F] below).  
To confirm the depth of this analogy, al-F!r!b" appeals at [A]-2 and 
[B]-2 to the medical metaphor. The first ruler, we are told, ought to proceed 
like an expert physician, he must grasp the theoretical aspect of human 
flourishing and then proceed to apply them in a concrete manner; in the 
same way that the doctor grasps the theoretical aspect of health and 
preserves it in a specific body. To illustrate this recommendation, al-F!r!b" 
gives a detailed account of the reasoning an excellent physician engages in 
when attempting to cure a specific case of jaundice. This example is 
presented as a model of the cooperation that takes place between the 
theoretical and practical faculties in the medical therapeutic context; a model 
which of course ought to be emulated by the first kingly craft.  
 
4.2-Medical Practice: Zayd’s Case of Jaundice Fever 
 
Al-F!r!b" presents this case study in an important passage of the 
Kit$b al-Milla, which I will now quote at length: 
 
D-“(1) However, when the physician cures, he cures the bodies of 
individuals and of single beings: Zayd’s body, for instance, or Amr’s body. 
(2) In curing Zayd’s jaundice fever, he does not only rely on his knowledge 
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that opposites are fought by opposites, or that jaundice fever is alleviated by 
barley-water. Unless he knows in the case of Zayd’s fever more particular 
things than the [general] ones he learned [in the study of] his craft. (3) So he 
investigates whether [Zayd’s] jaundice fever ought to be relieved by barley-
water so that his body is filled with cold and moist qualities or whether 
barley-water will heal the bodily humour but not let him perspire, and similar 
things. (4) If barley-water has to be drunk, he is not content to know this in 
an unqualified way, but needs to know, in addition, what amount has to be 
drunk, and in what consistency it should be drunk, at what moment of the 
day it ought to be administered, and in which one of Zayd’s feverish states it 
should be drunk. So he will have to determine that with regards to quantity, 
quality, and time. It is not possible for him to make these determinations 
without observation (mush$hada) of the sick person, so that his prescription 
accords with what he observes in the states of the sick person, namely 
Zayd.”192  
 
Al-F!r!b" assumes at [D]-2 that the doctor will be aware of general 
therapeutic rules and will also be conscious of more specific prescriptions. 
For instance, the physician should be thoroughly familiar with the principle 
that “contraries are fought by contraries”. Here, al-F!r!b" has obviously in 
mind one of the most basic notions of Hippocratic and Galenic humoral 
pathology.  Quite simply, this is the view that health consists in the balance 
of the four bodily humours (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm and blood) and 
that illness is the product of their imbalance. Therefore, in order to restore 
the initial equilibrium, one should counter the excess in one of the humours 
by fostering the development of its opposite elements.   
Partly, this reasoning is founded on the idea that each humour is 
associated with at least one concomitant primary quality (e.g. dry, moist, hot 
and cold). As a result, conditions that derive from excessive dryness should 
be counter-balanced by providing a treatment that assists the body in 
acquiring more moisture. The same reasoning is of course valid in the case 
of ailments involving disproportionate levels of hotness or coldness193. 
Based on this general principle, the physician will also be aware of the more 
                                                
192 F!r!b", Kit$b al-Milla cit., pp. 57-58.  Translation significantly modified see, Butterworth, 
The Political Writings cit., pp. 105-106. 
193 For a succinct and insightful overview of this issue see, Pormann, Islamic Medicine cit., 
pp.42-45. 
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specific prescription that administering barley water normally cures jaundice. 
This is because jaundice was believed to be caused by an excess of yellow 
bile, which has a heating effect on the body194. Barley water, on the other 
hand, was thought to possess certain cooling qualities195. Consequently its 
ingestion, it was assumed, would help counter the nefarious impact of yellow 
bile and restore the patient’s health by moderating his or her feverish state.  
However all of this theoretical information is not specific enough to 
allow for a proper evaluation of Zayd’s particular case of jaundice. To emit a 
diagnosis and provide an adequate treatment the physician will rely on the 
observation (mush$hada) of Zayd’s specific symptoms and use his practical 
experience (tajriba) to arrive at a conclusion.  Thus, al-F!r!b" affirms at [D]-3 
that the physician will ensure that the kind of treatment he suggests has no 
serious side effect in Zayd’s case. For instance, a common counter-
indication of barley is its astringency, a property it was believed to possess 
on account of its husk. This is in all likelihood what worries al-F!r!b" when 
he fears that the ingestion of barley water might interfere with the patient’s 
perspiration. As a result, if it is used at all, the composition of the barley 
water will have to be carefully prepared to avoid such ill effects. Here al-
F!r!b" might be thinking of Galen’s suggestion that the doctor should soak 
the barley and remove its chaff before boiling it; if this recipe is followed then 
the barley water produced is “soothing, slippery, moderately watery, 
                                                
194 On the Hippocratic conception of jaundice see, E. Free, N. Papavramidou, Jaundice in 
the Hippocratic Corpus, “Journal of Gastrointestinal Surgery” 11, 2007, 1728-1731. An 
interesting passage from )unayn Ibn Is'$q’s Mas$’il f! ‘Ilm al--ibb which al-F!r!b" probably 
had access to lists the symptoms and possible cure associated with an excess of yellow 
bile, “What are the signs of an excess of yellow bile, what is to be feared from it, and how 
can it be recognized? It is indicated by paleness of complexion, a bitter taste and dryness in 
the mouth, fainting, lack of appetite, rapid pulse and tremor resembling the pricking needles. 
[#] The [curing] regimen should be cooling and moistening. If the [condition] is not noticed, 
one has to fear as a result a tertian and burning fever, hot phrenitis, severe skin eruptions, 
and thirst, as well as lack of appetite”. See, R. Y. Ebied, M. J. L. Young, A Manuscript of 
)unayn’s Mas$’il f! ‘Ilm al--ibb in the Leeds University Collection, in )unayn Ibn Is'$q: 
Collection d’Articles Publiée à l’Occasion du Onzième Centenaire de sa Mort, E. J. Brill, 
Leiden 1975, pp. 264-270. 
195 On Galen’s view concerning the benefits, detriments and preparation of barley-water 
see, Galen, On Food and Diet, trans. M. Grant, Routledge, London 2000, pp. 62-68.   
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quenching of the thirst, [#] and without astringency”196. Another possible 
source on the detailed preparation and multiple therapeutic usage of barley 
water is Yu!ann! Ibn M!sawayh’s important treatise dedicated exclusively to 
this subject and aptly named the Kit$b M$. al-Sha/!r197. 
Of course, the timing of the remedy’s administration as well as the 
quantity swallowed will have to be determined in function of Zayd’s needs. 
Hence, the doctor during his clinical examination will have to find out the 
exact stage of the fever’s development. Part of the reason for this is that 
different kinds of fevers were thought to progress along various types of 
cycles. For instance intermittent fevers could have a tertian, quotidian or 
quartan cycle198. As a result, the remedy would have to be adjusted to 
correspond to the specific instant the fever had reached in its periodic 
sequence. Based on this information, the barley water used might be more 
or less diluted, its degree of astringency could also be modified and in some 
cases, the doctor might refrain from administering it to the patient altogether.  
All of this points to an interesting fact, which S. P. Mattern underlines 
in her analysis of Galen’s medical case studies199. There she notes that in a 
number of descriptions involving feverish symptoms, Galen focuses on the 
doctor’s ability to pick out the opportune moment (kairos) for the treatment’s 
delivery. To ensure the success of his cure, the physician must plan his 
intervention with regards to the highest point of the feverish attack 
(paroxysmos). This instant of crisis is extremely important since it is at this 
time that the fever either peaks and starts to slowly subside or if it is not 
properly treated it might suddenly gain strength and threaten the patient’s 
life. As such, the correct identification of the opportune moment (kairos) 
                                                
196 Galen, On Food cit., pp. 64-65. 
197 Yu*ann! Ibn M!sawayh, Kit$b M$. al-Sha/!r, ed. P. Sbath, Imprimerie de l’Institut 
Français d’Archéologie Orientale, Cairo 1939. 
198 See, R. Wittern, Galen.s Intermittent Fever, “History and Philosophy of the Life 
Sciences”, 11, 1989, pp. 3-22. 
199 S. P. Mattern, Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore 2008, pp. 60-68, 159-161. 
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represents, according to Galen, a true test of the doctor’s training and skills. 
He must bring to bear all of his theoretical knowledge as well as his practical 
experience and his observational abilities to solve this puzzle 
successfully200. It seems to me that this attitude corresponds to the position 
presented by al-F!r!b" in passage [D]. There as well, successful therapy is 
associated with the physician’s ability to meaningfully combine observation 
(mush$hada), experience (tajriba) and theoretical knowledge.  
 
 
4.3-Treating the City as a Body:  
    
    Al-F!r!b" obviously wants us to understand that the ideal ruler ought 
to practice the first kingly craft in a similar fashion, by adapting his theoretical 
insight to a variety of practical contexts and situations. This comes out quite 
distinctly in a number of important passages where the medical analogy 
plays again a prominent role: 
 
E- “(1) With respect to our bodies, it is not possible for us to acquire all the 
sorts of health and its temperaments, or its constitutional elements, its 
customs, the kind of dwelling particular to it, the art by which to make a 
living, or what is similar to that. [#] For bodies in the condition that has been 
described, it is not up to the virtuous physician to obtain either the most 
perfect levels or the highest degrees of health. It is up to him to obtain as 
much health as is possible for their nature. [#] (2) It is not up to the virtuous 
leader and the supreme ruler to establish virtues in someone the nature and 
substance of whose soul do not accept these virtues. For these kinds of 
souls, it is up to him to obtain as much of the virtues as is possible for them 
and for the [other] inhabitants of the city.”201 
 
F-“(1) The physician treats each member that is ill only in accordance with 
its relationship to the whole body and the members adjacent to it and tied to 
it. He does so by giving it a treatment that provides it with a health by which 
it is useful to the whole body and is useful to the members adjacent to it and 
tied to it. (2) In the same way, the governor of the city should rule over every 
                                                
200 For a detailed analysis of Galen’s view of the theoretical and practical aspects of medical 
therapy see, P. J. Van Der Eijk, Galen’s Therapeutic, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Galen, ed. R. J. Hankinson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 283-303. 
201 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 99-100. Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political 
Writings cit., pp. 64-65. 
 103 
one of the parts of the city, whether it is a small part such as a single human 
being or a large one like a single household. He treats it and provides it with 
good in relation to the whole (jumlatu) of the city and to each of the rest of 
the parts of the city by endeavouring to make the good that part provides a 
good that does not harm the whole of the city or anything among the rest of 
its parts, but rather a good useful to the city in its entirety and to each of its 
parts in accordance with its rank (martabatuhu) of usefulness to the city.”202  
 
G-“I say the gauge by which we assess actions is patterned on the gauge 
by which we assess whatever imparts healthiness, and the gauge of what 
imparts healthiness is [relative to] the conditions of the body for which we 
seek healthiness; for the median in what imparts healthiness can be 
grasped only when brought into relation with bodies and assessed by 
reference to environmental conditions. Equally, the gauge of actions is 
[relative to] the conditions surrounding the actions, and the median state in 
the actions can be achieved only when compared and assessed by 
reference to their surrounding conditions.”203 
 
H-“When a single member [of the body] is touched by corruption of which it 
is feared that it will be communicated to the rest of the other members 
adjacent to it, it is amputated and done away with for the sake of preserving 
others. In the same way, when a part of the city is touched by corruption of 
which communication to others is feared, it ought to be ostracized and sent 
away for the improvement of those remaining.”204  
 
Unmistakeably, al-F!r!b"’s argument in the first excerpt draws on his 
analysis, which we have already touched on in our preceding chapter, of the 
hierarchal nature of human virtues. Al-F!r!b" expects the first ruler to be 
thoroughly acquainted with the relative standing of each moral and 
intellectual excellence. For instance, he should be aware of the fact that 
military aptitude is superior to proficiency in trade or agriculture but inferior to 
political prudence and philosophical wisdom. Beyond that, the virtuous 
leader is also supposed to have the ability to evaluate these dispositions 
when they are present in any given agent. This skill will help him determine 
the kind of education and training each specific person ought to receive. Of 
                                                
202 Ibid., pp. 24.  
203 F!r!b", Tanbih cit., pp. 238-239. Translation modified see, Reisman, Classical Arabic 
Philosophy Anthology, cit., pp.108-109. 
204 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 42-43. Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political 
Writings cit., pp. 24-25. 
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course, as indicated in section [F]-2, the training in question will be 
correlated with the attribution of a certain rank (rutba) within the city’s 
stratified social structure. Throughout this passage, al-F!r!b" warns us 
against the common mistake of trying to actualize abstract ideals of human 
perfection in all types of individuals without any regard for their concrete 
dispositions. In other words, the theoretical knowledge of the virtuous king 
must be guided by his experience (tajriba) and observation (mush$hada) of 
particular instances of the citizens’ psychological, environmental and social 
life.  
In this sense, al-F!r!b" also assumes that the competent ruler will be 
familiar with the external factors that affect human mores205. Indeed, in the 
Siy$sa al-Madaniyya, borrowing from the Hippocratic text On Airs, Waters 
and Places, al-F!r!b" emphasizes the influence of local climates, diets and 
geographical locations to account for the variety in human customs, 
languages, habits and character206. For instance, he claims that the nomadic 
inhabitants of barren steppe or desert lands, like certain Arabic or Turkish 
tribes, tend to be irascible and exhibit a love of domination (ghulba) and 
sexual pleasure207. Surely, what al-F!r!b" wants us to realize here is that the 
virtuous manner of ruling nomadic populations will be substantially different 
from the way one would correctly govern a more sedentary and pacific 
society. Of course, in section [E], al-F!r!b"’s focus is less on the peculiarity 
of character specific to certain groups and more concerned with the 
                                                
205 F!r!b", Siy$sa cit., pp. 69-71.  
206 See also, Ab$ Na%r al-F!r!b", Kit$b al-)ur#f, ed. M. Mahd", D!r al-Mashreq, Beirut 2004, 
pp. 134-135. For the Arabic version of Hippocrates’ Airs, Waters and Places, see M.C. 
Lyons, J. N. Mattock, Kit$b Buqr$" fi’l-Amr$% al-Bil$diyya, Cambridge Middle East Center-W. 
Heffer, Cambridge 1969. Another possible source of influence is Galen’s commentary on 
this work see, G. Strohmaier, La Question de L’influence du Climat dans la Pensée Arabe et 
le Nouveau Commentaire de Galien sur le Traité Hippocratique des Airs, Eaux et Lieux, in 
Perspectives Arabes et Médiévales sur la Tradition Scientifique et Philosophique Grecque, 
ed. A. Hasnawi, M. Aouad, Peeters, Leuven 1997, pp. 209-216. Of course, discussions of 
climactic and geographic influence on human character and habits are also present in the 
second book of Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblios see, Ptolemy, Tetrabiblios, ed. F. E. Robbins, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1994, pp. 116-128. 
207 F!r!b", Siy$sa cit., pp. 102-103. 
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dispositions of given individuals; even so the general argument remains 
essentially the same. In both cases, the first ruler must adapt his theoretical 
framework and actions to fit the particular nature and dispositions of specific 
agents and make the best, so to speak, out of the “human material” he is 
given.  
 In section [G], al-F!r!b" brings together the Aristotelian notion that 
virtue is an intermediate condition between two extreme states and the 
Hippocratic view that health is the result of a balance between the four 
humours. His object when drawing this parallel is again to underline the 
importance of the situational context when evaluating the appropriateness of 
human actions. According to him, the relevance of this context is as 
significant to our ethical judgement as the surrounding environment is to our 
assessment of bodily health. Therefore, when trying to evaluate whether an 
action is courageous or cowardly, moderate or immoderate, magnanimous 
or petty, the particular circumstances will have to be taken into 
consideration. This is especially relevant when the ideal leader attempts to 
impart certain virtues to the citizenry. For instance, he will know that the kind 
of bravery required by a person during warfare is different from the courage 
needed in a time of peace. As a result, the type of training recommended to 
develop this virtue in the military class will be different from the one used to 
instil it in a set of merchants or peasants. In other words, the true king will 
have to be aware of the variety of accidents that are associated with the 
particular realization of each one of the virtues208. 
                                                
208 It is important to note here that in the excerpts listed above, al-F!r!b" works implicitly 
with the idea of voluntary intelligibles (ma‘q#l$t l-’ir$diya). This notion is introduced in the 
Ta'(!l al-Sa’$da, where al-F!r!b" differentiates between natural and voluntary intelligibles: 
“For instance, moderation, magnificence and the like are voluntary intelligibles. When we 
decide to make them exist in actuality, the accidents that accompany them at a certain time 
will be different from the accidents that accompany them at another time, and the accidents 
they have when they exist in one nation will be different from those they have in another 
nation. In some of these [voluntary intelligibles], the accidents change from hour to hour, in 
others from day to day, in others from month to month, in others from year to year, in others 
from decade to decade, and still in others they change after many decades. Therefore, 
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The same idea appears in passage [H] but this time it concerns the 
king’s precise knowledge of vices rather than virtues. In this section, al-
F!r!b" appeals to a common analogy drawn between bodily amputation and 
political ostracism. The true king should cast away rebellious or dangerous 
citizens in the same way that a doctor removes any member of the body 
infected by a contagious illness. Of course, the idea of casting away or pre-
emptively exiling a person who is deemed a threat to the city’s welfare has a 
long tradition in antiquity209. However, what is interesting in the case of al-
F!r!b" is that he develops a striking analysis of this problem by providing a 
detailed taxonomy of the types of individuals that should be exiled or 
otherwise silenced. These troublesome characters are called the naw$bit or 
weeds because they “sprout” in the virtuous city like unwanted growths210. 
They are classified in six separate groups: the Mutaqanni(#n, Mu'arrifa, 
M$riqa, Mustarshid#n, Mutazayyif#n and Muta'ayyir#n211. When he brings 
up the issue of ostracism, al-F!r!b" expects the virtuous ruler to be aware of 
this classification of ‘diseased’ or ‘infected’ characters and to be able to spot 
the various persons who conform to these descriptions. Thus, someone who 
                                                                                                                                    
whoever wills to bring any of them into actual existence outside the soul ought to know the 
variable accidents that must accompany it in the specific period at which he seeks to bring it 
into existence and in the determined place in the inhabited part of the earth. [#] And he 
ought to know which of these accidents are common to all nations, to some nations, or to 
one city over a long period, or pertain to some of them specifically over a short period [war 
and peace] ”. See, F!r!b", Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da cit., pp. 147-148. Translation slightly modified 
see, M. Mahdi, Alfarabi: Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
1969, pp. 26-27. On the role of the voluntary intelligibles in al-F!r!b"’s ethical and political 
thought see, Th.-A. Druart, Al-F$r$b! on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethics. in 
Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages, vol. 1, ed. B. C. Bazán, E. Andújar, L. 
G. Sbrocchi, Legas, Ottawa 1995, pp. 476-485. As well as, H. Zghal, Métaphysique et 
Science Politique: Les Intelligibles Volontaires dans le Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da d’Al-F$r$b!, “Arabic 
Science and Philosophy”, 8, 1998, pp. 169-194.   
209 See, S. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient 
Greece. Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005. 
210 F!r!b", Siy$sa cit., pp. 104-106. 
211 P. Crone and I. Alon provide an excellent description of each one of these categories 
see, I. Alon, F$r$b!’s Funny Flora: Al-Naw$bit as Opposition, “Arabica”, 38, 1990, pp. 56-90. 
P. Crone, Al-F$r$b!’s Imperfect Constitutions, “Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph” 57, 
2004, pp. 191-228. See as well, M. S. Kochin, Weeds: Cultivating the Imagination in 
Medieval Arabic Political Philosophy, “Journal of the History of Ideas”, 60, 1999, pp. 399-
416. 
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merely pays lip service to the ideal city’s ethical code and then pursues 
behind closed doors other goals like the excessive accumulation of wealth or 
honour will be recognized as a mutaqanni( i.e. an opportunist. Similarly, an 
individual who disrupts the epistemological foundations of the virtuous city 
by expressing his or her perplexity through a badly digested assortment of 
sceptical and relativist positions, will be identified as a muta'ayyir212. Al-
F!r!b" adds, that these people tend to wallow in their confusion and 
puzzlement and thus suffer in a permanent state of anxiety. Interestingly, 
this renders them sometimes less dangerous than other types of naw$bit 
such as the mutaqanni(#n for instance. As a result, exile might not be the 
only treatment recommended in their case, the ideal king might prescribe a 
different course of action. In fact, al-F!r!b" lists a series of remedies (‘il$j) 
that have to be tailored to the specific conditions of each particular kind of 
‘weed’. These ‘civil cures’ include admonishment, reformative work, jailing 
and ultimately ostracism.  
Once again, al-F!r!b" expects the true king seamlessly to integrate 
his theoretical knowledge and his practical skill by relying on his experience 
and observation. Hence, on the one hand, he must have a general 
acquaintance with the different kinds of vicious lifestyles. On the other hand, 
he ought to possess as well the aptitude of recognizing these vices in 
particular situations and of prescribing the right treatments at the appropriate 
moment. I believe, that at this point, it has become abundantly clear how al-
F!r!b" models the theoretical and practical expertise of the true king (al-
malik f! l-'aq!qa) on the therapeutic method of the excellent physician. This 
combination, we shall see immediately, is also apparent in the way al-F!r!b" 
amalgamates Platonic and Aristotelian traits to describe the first ruler (ra’!s l-
’awwal).  
                                                
212 On the possibility that al-F!r!b" was reacting to a mood of doctrinal skepticism in 
contemporary intellectual circles see, P. L. Heck, Doubts about the Religious Community 
(Milla) in al-F$r$b! and the Brethren of Purity, in In the Age of al-F$r$b!: Arabic Philosophy in 
Fourth/Tenth Century, ed. P. Adamson, Warburg Institue, London 2008, pp. 195-213. 
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4.4- Is Prophecy a necessary feature of the Kingly Craft ? 
 
R. Walzer has correctly pointed out that al-F!r!b"’s depiction of the ideal 
ruler reflects to a large extent Plato’s presentation of the philosopher-king in 
book six of the Republic213. Indeed, many of the perfect sovereign’s twelve 
inborn dispositions (khi($l) listed by al-F!r!b" correspond to intellectual and 
ethical traits possessed by the Platonic philosopher-king. Attributes such as 
physical fitness, ease of learning and understanding, excellence in 
memorizing, the love of truth, knowledge and justice and the dislike of 
money, worldly goods and pleasures are all shared by the Farabian and 
Platonic rulers alike. Of course, one must complement these features with 
significant Aristotelian elements, to make the portrait of the ra’!s al-’awwal 
more precise.  
Thus, if we add to the twelve inborn dispositions (khi($l), the six 
conditions (shar$’i") that the ruler must slowly acquire and develop, then our 
depiction of his nature will be complete. These conditions are listed in the 
following excerpts [K] and [L]. There we are told, predictably, that the first 
ruler must above all acquire a perfect form of prudence (ta‘aqqul t$mm) 
along with theoretical wisdom ('ikma). The other requirements pertain 
mostly to the functions of public speaking and military leadership. Thus, the 
true king ought to be able to lead an army into war and he must also master 
the art of rhetoric and eloquence:  
 
J-“The true king (al-malik f! l-'aq!qa): he is the supreme ruler and the one in 
whom six conditions (shar$’i") come together: theoretical wisdom ('ikma), 
complete prudence (ta‘aqqul t$mm), excellent persuasion, excellent 
imaginative evocation (jawdatu takhayyul), bodily capability for struggle, and 
having nothing in his body that prevents him from carrying out the things 
pertaining to military struggle (jih$d). One in whom all these qualities come 
together is the model, someone to be imitated in his way of life and his 
                                                
213 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 444-451. 
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actions, someone whose declarations and counsels are to be accepted and 
one who may govern as he thinks and wishes.”214 
 
K-“He is the man who knows every action by which happiness can be 
reached. This is the first condition for being a ruler. Moreover, he should be 
a good orator and able to rouse [other people’s] imagination by well-chosen 
words. He should be able to lead people well along the right path to 
happiness and to the actions by which happiness is reached. He should in 
addition be in excellent physical condition to lead in times of war ('arb). This 
is the ruler over whom no one else rules, he is the im$m and the first ruler 
(ra’!s l-’awwal) of the virtuous city.”215 
 
It is crucial to notice that when al-F!r!b" uses the expression jawdatu 
takhayyul in passage [J], he is referring to a kind of epideictic rhetorical 
ability216. In fact, he goes to great lengths to explain the nature of this 
“excellence in imaginative evocation” in aphorism fifty-five. In that segment, 
al-F!r!b" defines jawdatu takhayyul as the capacity to arouse strong 
passions in the souls of the listeners. Emotions such as fear, disgust, anger, 
or pleasure are stirred up by constructing evocative images and similes. 
These intense feelings in turn will lead the listeners to adopt a certain mode 
of behaviour, whereby they will either pursue or flee the imagined objects 
and fancied notions. In this light, it is evident that the jawdatu takhayyul 
differs substantially from the idea of a prophetic imagination. The most 
obvious disparity pertains to the epistemic status of these two capacities. 
While the prophetic imagination receives its visual imprints directly from the 
active intellect217, the jawdatu takhayul does not share this noetic privilege. 
Instead the imaginary production it conjures up appears to be entirely the 
work of the king’s rhetorical ability.  
                                                
214 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 66-67. Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political 
Writings cit., pp. 37-38. 
215 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 245-247. 
216 For al-F!r!b"’s view on rhetoric see, J. Langhade, M. Grignaschi, Al-F$r$b!: Deux 
Ouvrages Inédits sur la Rhétorique. D!r al-Mashreq, Beirut 1971. See as well, J. W. Watt, 
From Themistius to Al-Farabi: Platonic Political Philosophy and Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the 
East, “Rhetorica”, 13, 1995, pp. 17-41. See also, D. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1990. 
217 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 211-227. 
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At this point, an important question arises: Is prophecy, as has often 
been argued218, an essential feature of the kingly craft? I think the answer is 
less straightforward than it might be thought. D. Dunlop has already pointed 
out the inconsistency of al-F!r!b"’s position on this topic219. In the +r$’ ahl 
al-Mad!na al-F$%ila, it is clear that the ideal ruler must also be a prophet220. 
However, in the Fu(#l Muntaza‘a the same requirement is not put forward 
and as we have just seen, it is sufficient for the true king to simply possess 
an “excellent imaginative evocation” (jawdatu takhayyul). Moreover, in his 
definition of the kingly craft al-F!r!b" does not include prophecy (nubuwwa) 
or revelation (wa'y) in his itemization of the qualities possessed by the malik 
f! l-'aq!qa 221. 
Dunlop suggests a possible solution. He speculates that al-F!r!b" 
might have simply changed his mind and that the Fu(ul Muntaza‘a having 
been written sometimes after the Mad!na al-F$%ila and shortly before his 
death, probably contains his final thoughts on the subject222. R. Walzer 
proposes a different chronology. He argues that al-F!r!b" continued revising 
                                                
218 F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1958, pp. 10-15. E. I. J. Rosenthal, The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Al-
F$r$b!, “Islamic Culture”, 29, 1955, pp. 157-178. H. A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and 
Averroes, on Intellect, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992, pp. 58-63. R. Walzer, Al-
F$r$b!’s Theory of Prophecy and Divination, in Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic 
Philosophy, Bruno Cassirer Publishers, Oxford 1962, pp. 206-219. W. C. Streetman, “If it 
were God who sent them”: Aristotle and Al-F$r$b! on Prophetic Vision, “Arabic Science and 
Philosophy”, 18, 2008, pp. 211-246. 
219 D. Dunlop, Aphorisms cit., pp. 86-89. In fact, according to J. Macy one can find as many 
as four different positions on this issue in al-F!r!b"’s work: In the Mad!na al-F$%ila the ideal 
king is endowed with nubuwwa and wa'y, in the Siy$sa al-Madaniyya, he possesses only 
wa'y, in the Fu(ul, as we have already seen, he requires neither, this is also the case in the 
Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da, where the ideal ruler is said to merely invent (ikhtara’a) religious images to 
deliver his message to his subjects. See J. Macy Prophecy in Al-F$r$b! and Maimonides, in 
Maimonides and Philosophy eds. S.Pines, Y. Yovel, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 
1986, pp.185-201. On al-F!r!b"’s view of how religious imagery can be used to 
communicate philosophical insight see, P. Vallat, Farabi et L’École d’Alexandrie cit., pp. 
297-346.  
220 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 241-247. 
221 See, F!r!b", Kit$b al-Milla cit., pp. 56-59, I'sa’ al-‘Ul#m cit., pp. 102-107. 
222 D. Dunlop, Aphorisms cit., pp. 9-17, 88. 
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the Mad!na al-F$%ila well into the end of his philosophical career223 and 
believes that this treatise was in fact “the last of his extant works”224. Part of 
the issue, as F. W. Zimmerman fittingly indicates is that the available 
evidence makes the precise dating of al-F!r!b"’s writings notably difficult225. 
In light of this, it would seem that one should treat arguments based on the 
relative chronology of his works with caution. A safer option might be to 
simply recognize that the various positions on this topic betray a genuine 
tension in al-F!r!b"’s philosophical project226. Averroes, whose commentary 
on Plato’s Republic is greatly influenced by the “Second Teacher”, offers an 
interesting solution to this predicament. After quoting al-F!r!b" by affirming 
that “philosopher”, “king”, “lawgiver” and “im$m” are equivalent terms, 
Averroes broaches the question of prophecy and asks whether the ideal 
ruler should also be a prophet? His answer is straightforward; prophecy is a 
desirable but not a necessary requirement to occupy the highest political 
office. In other words, a sovereign who exhibits all the other traits but is not 
endowed with nubuwwa or wa'y will still be deemed a perfect king227. 
I think that the same lesson could be retained from the relevant 
sections of the Fu(ul Muntaza‘a. The main thrust of al-F!r!b"’s argument in 
that context is to define the various components of the mihna malikiyya 
f$%ila. As a result, he is focused on listing all the characteristics necessary to 
insure competence and expertise in the theoretical and practical parts of this 
art. From this perspective, his omission of prophecy is not a spurning of the 
                                                
223 F!r!b", Perfect State cit., pp. 20-21. 
224 Ibid., pp. 1, line 27-28. 
225 F. W. Zimmerman, De Interpretatione cit., pp. xxiii-xxiv. 
226 In fact, as A. Melamed indicates, many of the later debates in Jewish philosophy on the 
issue of the ‘philosopher-king-prophet’ are greatly influenced by the ambiguities inherent in 
al-F!r!b"’s treatment. See, A. Melamed, The Philosopher-King in Medieval and 
Renaissance Jewish Political Thought, SUNY Press, Albany 2003, pp. 1-23, 75-111.  
227 “Hence these names are, as it were, synonymous- i.e., ‘philosopher’, ‘king’, ‘lawgiver’; 
and so also is ‘im$m’, since, im$m in Arabic means one who is followed in his actions. [#] 
As to whether it should be made a condition that he [the ideal ruler] be a prophet, why there 
is room here for [penetrating] investigation [#]. Perhaps if this were so, it would be with 
respect to what is preferable, not out of necessity.” see, R. Lerner, Averroes on Plato’s 
Republic, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1974, pp. 72-73. 
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qualities of nubuwwa and wa'y but simply an indication that these traits, 




4.5- The Argument from Expertise: The Kingly Craft and the  
       Legitimate Use of Power. 
 
Al-F!r!b"’s analysis of the kingly craft culminates in what might be called 
an argument from expertise. In one way, the argument is rather 
straightforward. It is simply that a ruler’s political authority is legitimate if, and 
only if, that ruler has the right qualification; namely that he possesses the 
highest level of expertise in the virtuous kingly craft. Al-F!r!b" goes a little 
further however, as he presents a slightly more arresting version of this 
argument in passages [J] and [K]. There, he asserts that if the condition of 
expertise is fulfilled then the virtuous king is the legitimate king irrespective 
of his ability or inability to command power and have control over a certain 
population. In other words, al-F!r!b" makes expertise in the kingly craft the 
sole and sufficient condition of political legitimacy. This detail is of course 
significant, since it enables him to considerably reduce the role played by 
force (taghallub) and dominion (sul"a) in his analysis of political justification.    
 
L-“(1) The king is king by means of the kingly craft, the art of governing 
cities, and the ability to use the kingly craft at any moment whatsoever as a 
leader over a city-whether he is reputed for his art or not, finds tools to use 
or not, finds a group who accepts him or not, is obeyed or not. (2) In the 
same way, the physician is a physician by means of the medical craft –
whether he is recognized by people for it or not, is furnished with the tools of 
his art or not, comes upon sick persons who accept his statement or not. 
Nor is his medicine diminished by his not having any of these. (3) Similarly, 
the king is king by means of the craft and the ability to use the [kingly] art-
whether he has dominion (tasalla"a) over a group or not, is honoured or not, 
is wealthy or poor.”228   
 
                                                
228 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 49-50. Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political 
Writings cit., pp. 28-29. 
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M-“(1) The true philosopher-[king] is the one mentioned before. If after 
reaching this stage no use is made of him, the fact that he is of no use to 
others is not his fault but the fault of those who either do not listen or are not 
of the opinion that they should listen to him. Therefore, the king or the imam 
is king and imam by virtue of his skill and art regardless of whether or not 
anyone acknowledges him, whether or not he is obeyed, whether or not he 
is supported in his purpose by any group; (2) just as the physician is a 
physician by virtue of his skill and his ability to heal the sick, whether or not 
there are sick men for him to heal, whether or not he finds tools to use his 
activity, whether he is prosperous or poor, not having any of these things 
does not do away with his medical skill. (3) Similarly, neither the imamate of 
the imam, the philosophy of the philosopher, nor the kingship of the king is 
done away with by his not having tools to use in his activities or men to 
employ in reaching his purpose.”229 
 
It is important to notice how at [L]-2 and [M]-2 al-F!r!b" consistently relies on 
the medical analogy to advance his argument from expertise. Thus, he 
claims that the competence of the physician is unaffected by external factors 
such as the number of patients he treats, the availability of his medical 
equipment or the magnitude of the financial remuneration he receives. 
Rather, expertise in medicine depends entirely on qualities that are intrinsic 
to the agent, namely the doctor’s medical knowledge and his therapeutic 
skills. As long as an agent possesses these essential features then, 
favourable or unfavourable external factors notwithstanding, he or she can 
rightly be called a doctor or a physician. As we have already seen, al-F!r!b", 
believes that the same reasoning holds true in the case of the kingly craft: If 
an agent’s competence in the virtuous kingly craft obtains, then he can 
legitimately be called a king (malik f! l-'aq!qa). 
Why does al-F!r!b" commit himself to such a specific version of this 
argument? Part of the answer, I believe, is that this position allows him to 
reject more forcefully a number of alternative justifications of political 
authority. This is apparent already in the way the argument is framed in 
excerpts [J] and [K]. There al-F!r!b" disapprovingly hints at other sources of 
                                                
229 F!r!b", Ta'(!l al-Sa‘$da cit., pp. 195-196. Translation slightly modified see, Mahdi, 
Alfarabi cit., pp. 48-49. 
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political power such as obedience, wealth, popularity or reputation. This line 
of thought is more clearly expressed in the following excerpt where he 
explicitly lists and dismisses these sources: 
 
N-“ (1) A group of others is of the opinion that they do not apply the name 
king to anyone who has the kingly craft without being obeyed and honoured 
in a city. Others add wealth to that. And others are of the opinion to add to 
that dominion (al-tasallu") by conquest (qahr), humiliation (idhl$l), terror 
(tarh!b) and provoking fear (takhw!f). (2) None of these are among the 
stipulations of kingship. Yet they are results that sometimes follow the kingly 
craft, and it is therefore presumed that they are kingship.”230  
 
In [N]-1, al-F!r!b" presents an interesting objection to his own position, 
which he attributes to a group of unnamed adversaries. The counter-
argument they put forward starts with the view that competence in the kingly 
craft provides insufficient ground for a full-fledged justification of civil 
authority. Their contention is that a number of supplementary criteria are 
required to buttress that initial claim. In their eyes, mastery of the kingly craft 
would have to be complemented by a series of other conditions such as the 
ability to command power (sul"a), extract wealth (most certainly via taxation) 
and receive honours from a given population. 
Al-F!r!b"’s rebuttal is relatively simple; he accuses his opponents in 
section [N]-2 of making a significant blunder by confusing the external 
effects of the exercise of authority and the sources of its legitimacy. Hence, 
he asserts that while the use of legitimate civil power will often require the 
employment of compulsion, violence and taxation, the ability to coerce, 
subdue and tax is simply a manifestation, not a justification, of sovereignty. 
To illustrate al-F!r!b"’s thinking here, it might be helpful to resort to his 
favourite analogy. The expert physician during the practice of his trade will 
rely on the use of certain instruments such as cupping utensils or scalpels. 
However, the mere ability to pick up a scalpel or any other surgical tool and 
                                                
230 F!r!b", Fu(#l cit., pp. 49-50. Translation slightly modified see, Butterworth, The Political 
Writings cit., pp. 28. 
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to use it on a sick person by making an incision in the affected area is not an 
indication of medical expertise. Al-F!r!b" wants us to see that this is also the 
case when it comes to political practices. Coercion and violence are simply 
implements in the kingly craft’s large apparatus of persuasive techniques. In 
the hands of a competent ruler they will be used correctly to promote the 
moral and ethical flourishing of the city’s inhabitants. In contrast, if violence 
is employed by an unqualified ruler to achieve greater personal power or 
financial gains, then the outcome of his coercive actions will often be 
detrimental to the inhabitants’ general well being and prosperity. As such, 
the only valid factor when deciding whether the use of civil authority is 
legitimate or not remains expertise in the kingly craft. Based on this view, al-
F!r!b" finally draws the substantial and concomitant lesson that if a 
sovereign is ignorant of the mihna malikiyya f$%ila then his rule is effectively 
illegitimate:  
 
O-“Those whose leadership is ignorant should not be named kings at all. 
For they have no need in their [ethical] states, actions and administrations 
either of theoretical or of practical philosophy (falsafa al-na&ariya wa l$ l-
‘amaliyya). In fact, each one of them can attain his purpose in the city and 
nation under his rule, by using his experiential faculty (quwwa tajribiyya). 
[This faculty] is developed by pursuing the kind of actions that allow [the 
ignorant ruler] to obtain what he intends to and to attain the goods he 
desires.”231  
 
In this excerpt al-F!r!b" makes it abundantly clear that the ignorant rulers’ 
incompetence stems from their inability to make use of theoretical and 
practical philosophy. This is, of course, just another way of saying that they 
are essentially incapable of combining the universal ethical rules (qaw$n!n 
kulliyya) and prudential aspects of the kingly craft. Notably, they are gravely 
unaware of the providential order of the world and the dispositional hierarchy 
inherent in the human species; instead when devising their institutions and 
staffing their administration, these rulers rely for the most part on their 
                                                
231 F!r!b", I'sa’ al-‘Ul#m cit., pp. 106-107. 
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experiential faculty (quwwa tajribiyya). It is important to notice here, that al-
F!r!b" carefully avoids the use of the word ta‘aqqul when referring to this 
particular capacity. Part of the reason for this is that when experience and 
observation (tajriba wa mush$hada) are employed to attain non-virtuous 
goals their usage is no longer an instance of prudence; rather, al-F!r!b" 
suggests, following Aristotle, that this kind of practical deliberation is more 
appropriately called cunning or shrewdness (dah$’)232. In other words, al-
F!r!b" highlights the fact that practical experience on its own and unaided by 
a theoretical grasp of ethical excellence and cosmic justice, is incapable of 
guiding us towards human flourishing.  
This criticism recalls the Platonic distinction made between genuine 
crafts (techne/mihna) like medicine that draw on a scientific body of 
knowledge and other practical pursuits like cookery or rhetoric that rely 
simply on empirical knack and loose rules of thumb233. Importantly, it is the 
same sort of concern that induces Galen to distance himself from the 
Empiricist school by insisting that authentic medical knowledge requires also 
a thorough grounding in theoretical learning234. We are now in a better 
position to understand why ignorant rulers are never compared to expert 
physicians by al-F!r!b". Indeed, unlike the malik f! l-'aq!qa who is aware of 
all the conceptual and practical components of the mihna malikiyya f$%ila, 
these sovereigns are not masters of their trade. As a result, they are at best 
benign charlatans and at worst cunning, oppressive tyrants but in all cases 
their rule is irrevocably vicious and illegitimate235. 
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233 Gorgias, 501 a-c. 
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        CONCLUSION:  
                          Civil Science, Medicine and Cosmic Justice 
     
Al-F!r!b"’s use of a medical idiom to describe civil science (‘ilm al-
madan!) considerably influenced the development of Medieval Arabic and 
Jewish philosophy. This was especially true in Andalusia, where thinkers 
such as Ibn B!jja, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides embraced this approach. For 
instance, in his magnum opus the Tadb!r al-Mutawa''id, Ibn B!jja appeals 
several times to arguments based on medical language and analogies to 
advance his philosophical position. Thus, he affirms that the households 
contained in ignorant cities are unnatural by comparing them to infectious 
diseases. In the same vein, when contrasting the virtuous and vicious ways 
of life, he argues that, just as bodily health is one and its illnesses many, so 
the virtuous way of life is unique and the vicious lifestyles numerous. In fact, 
Ibn B!jja depicts his entire project in the Tadb!r al-Mutawa''id in therapeutic 
terms. His purpose, he claims, is to develop an ethical ‘regimen’ that will 
shelter the virtuous solitary citizen (al-mutawa''id) from the corrupt 
environment of ignorant polities in the same way that a physician’s 
preventive care insulates his patient from the surrounding sickness and 
malady236.  
 The use of medical phraseology is equally pronounced in the writings 
of Ibn Rushd. He begins his paraphrase of Plato’s Republic by faithfully 
reiterating al-F!r!b"’s definition of the ‘ilm al-madan!. Thus, he explains that 
civil science is made up of two parts: a theoretical side that deals with 
abstract ethical knowledge and a practical side concerned with the 
application of this moral insight. These two parts, Ibn Rushd assures us, 
                                                
236 Ibn B!jja, La Conduite de l’isolé et deux autres épîtres, ed. C. Genequand, J. Vrin, Paris 
2010, pp. 123-124, 127-128, 176-78. 
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correspond to the two main components of medical science. The first ethical 
part is equivalent to theoretical medicine and the second part tallies with 
clinical practice237. Similarly, Ibn Rushd compares the proficient statesman 
to the expert physician. He claims, in typically Farabian fashion, that both 
figures become masters of their trade by seamlessly combining their 
empirical and theoretical knowledge238. This line of thought helps explain 
why in the closing portion of the Fa(l al-Maq$l, Ibn Rushd confidently affirms 
that the analogy between the craft of the physician and that of the lawgiver is 
apodictic and not merely illustrative or conveniently rhetorical239. 
The Farabian conception of a therapeutic civil science aimed at 
establishing political health and warding off political corruption is also found 
in the works of Maimonides, Ibn Falaquera, Ibn La$"f and other Medieval and 
Renaissance Jewish philosophers240. As a matter of fact, the best illustration 
of the pervasive influence of al-F!r!b"’s understanding of the ‘ilm al-madan! 
comes under the pen of Samuel Ben Judah of Marseille241. The author of the 
Hebrew version of Ibn Rushd’s paraphrase of Plato’s Republic makes a 
number of interesting remarks in his colophon but none is as revealing as his 
unequivocal acceptance of al-F!r!b"’s division of the ‘ilm al-madan! into a 
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theoretical moral part and an applied political section242. In fact, Ben Judah 
apologies for his inability to offer a complete discussion of this science but 
his unfortunate incarceration in the south of France at the Chateau of 
Beaucaire prevented him from carrying out his plans. Indeed, his initial 
intention was to supply the reader with a comprehensive exposition of the 
‘ilm al-madan!, which would also have included (as a treatment of the first 
part of this science) a translation of al-F!r!b"’s commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. Regrettably, Samuel Ben Judah could never bring this 
project to fruition. 
A major reason for the wide and sustained appeal of the Farabian 
account of civil science in the Medieval period was the intimate way his 
position linked political issues with the cosmic theme of divine providence. 
Indeed, as al-F!r!b" repeatedly reminds us, the nature of human flourishing 
depends on the benevolent structure of the universe. Thus, in his synoptic 
presentation of Aristotelian philosophy, the Falsafat Aris"#"$l!s, he affirms 
that in order to understand the proper function and rank (rutba) of mankind, 
we first need to grasp the broader arrangement of the world243. In keeping 
with this recommendation, al-F!r!b" famously dedicates the first half of the 
Ar$’ Ahl al-Mad!na al-F$%ila and the Siy$sa al-Madaniyya to a detailed 
description of the graded structure of the universe before embarking, in the 
later chapters, on an analysis of the various political regimes244. In so doing, 
he is able to contextualize his investigation of the ideal and non-ideal 
commonwealths and rulers within a much larger metaphysical and physical 
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F$r$b!’s Mab$di0 $r$0 ahl al-mad!na al-f$dila, in In the Age of al-F$r$b!: Arabic Philosophy in 
Fourth/Tenth Century, ed. P. Adamson, Warburg Institue, London 2008, pp. 1-14. On the 
theme of the interaction between the study of physics and ethics see, R. Brague, Is Physics 
Interesting? Some Late Ancient and Medieval Answers. “Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal”, 23, 2002, pp.183-201. 
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framework245. As a result, al-F!r!b" offers a comprehensive yardstick by 
which to judge a community’s progress towards felicity. If, as we have seen, 
the institutions and leadership of a polity are virtuous then its perfect order 
will reflect the stratified organization of the body and cosmos. If, on the other 
hand, they are vicious, then the arrangement of the city will be haphazard 
and chaotic. Its various offices, starting with the highest one, will be filled 
with individuals that are not endowed with the appropriate dispositions; 
consequently the communal striving of its inhabitants will be directed at an 
assortment of fleeting desires and capricious pleasures. The whole structure 
of this dominion will be dissonant, bringing about, more often than not, civil 
discord and upheaval. This disharmony and the ultimate demise of this polity 
will be a testament to its inhabitants’ failure to recognize, understand and 


















                                                
245 For a discussion of this problem see, M. Mahd", Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic 
Political Philosophy cit., pp. 56-60, 78-88, 118-121. See as well, M. Galston, The 
Theoretical and Practical Dimensions of Happiness as Portrayed in the Political Treatises of 
al-F$r$b!, in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. 
Mahdi, ed. C. E. Butterworth, The Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 
Cambridge 1992, pp. 95-151. See also by the same author Politics and Excellence cit., pp. 
180-221. For a rebuttal of M. Galston’s position see, H. Zghal, Métaphysique et science 
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